The Rise of American Extremism: An Exploratory Analysis of American Religious and Political Extremism from Presidents Jimmy Carter to Barack Obama: 1977-2016 by Melton, Alwyn J.
Nova Southeastern University
NSUWorks
Department of Conflict Resolution Studies Theses
and Dissertations CAHSS Theses and Dissertations
1-1-2019
The Rise of American Extremism: An Exploratory
Analysis of American Religious and Political
Extremism from Presidents Jimmy Carter to Barack
Obama: 1977-2016
Alwyn J. Melton
This document is a product of extensive research conducted at the Nova Southeastern University College of
Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. For more information on research and degree programs at the NSU
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, please click here.
Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd
Part of the Criminology Commons, Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the Political Science Commons
Share Feedback About This Item
This Dissertation is brought to you by the CAHSS Theses and Dissertations at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Conflict
Resolution Studies Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.
  
 
 
 
The Rise of American Extremism: An Exploratory Analysis of American Religious and 
Political Extremism from Presidents Jimmy Carter to Barack Obama: 1977-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
 
Alwyn J. Melton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented to the  
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
Nova Southeastern University 
2018 
  
  
 
 
Copyright © by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alwyn J. Melton 
October 2018 
 
 
  

  
Dedication 
I dedicate this paper to my grandmother, my mother and my family. There is an 
old adage that states “Behind every great man is a great woman” and my grandmother, 
Dorothy Jean Deleveaux and my mother, Phyllis A. Melton, were living testaments to the 
truth of this statement. From the time I was young man until the day she passed away, my 
grandmother stressed the importance of education and learning. She would always quip, 
“Learn all you can, whenever you can, regardless if the situation is positive or negative. 
Boy, don’t just live life! Learn life!” Although my grandmother had a second-grade 
formal education, she read the newspaper intently every day, stayed abreast of current 
events, and prided herself on learning. In times when I decided to quit, she would not 
hear of it and forced me to continue by encouraging me that I could do anything if I put 
my mind to it and its okay to “give out, but never give up.” In her 60s, she decided to 
enroll in school, attain her GED and went on to become a nursing assistant, graduating at 
the top of her class. Her resiliency inspired me to pursue advanced degrees. If my 
grandmother was the inspiration, my mother, was the consummate teacher. She laid the 
foundation. Because of my mother’s persistence and insistence, I excelled in reading, 
writing, and spelling. She would read to me just about every night. As I got older, she 
would make me read every day. Her dedication to my education is and will always be a 
testament to my academic and professional achievements. I also would like to dedicate 
this paper to my daughter Melissa and my wife Doris. I have always stressed to my 
daughter the importance of hard work and expressed to her that education and learning 
“levels the playing field” because the opportunity is available to those who diligently 
  
pursue its benefits. My pursuit of a doctoral degree caused us to miss many weekends and 
quite a few family nights. Now that my journey is finally complete, I look forward to 
spending more time with my family, doing more in my community, and being more 
involved in my church. To my wife Doris, I say your support and confidence in me 
throughout this process helped me immensely. My father, who taught me the value and 
importance of critical thinking, was instrumental in my life. He taught me the value of 
character and integrity. More importantly, he taught me many life lessons, most 
important was never to seek validation in people or “things.” I can honestly say that my 
father’s guidance was equally instrumental in providing me the confidence to achieve 
anything I set my mind to by making every interaction a teachable moment.  
  
  
Acknowledgements 
There are many people I need to thank for helping me finish the dissertation journey.  
First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee Chairperson, Dr. Jason J. Campbell, 
for his overwhelming support and feedback throughout this process. His tutelage and 
guidance provided me with the opportunity to learn from a recognized expert in the field of 
National Security and Terrorism. I would also like to thank committee member Dr. Gregory 
M. Vecchi. Not only did I appreciate his expert advice and him taking me on as a teaching 
assistant, the way he successfully managed his education and professional career was nothing 
short of inspiring and motivational. I would also like to thank Dr. Robin Cooper, who put my 
doctoral journey back on the “right track” when it was close to being derailed by life 
circumstances during one of the most challenging periods of my academic pursuits.  
 
 i 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables  ................................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures  ............................................................................................................... vii 
List of Abbreviations  ................................................................................................... viii 
Abstract  .......................................................................................................................... ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction  ................................................................................................... 1 
     Statement of the Problem  ........................................................................................... 6 
     Purpose of the Study  .................................................................................................. 7 
     Importance of the Study  ............................................................................................. 9 
     Definition of Terms .................................................................................................... 9 
     Characteristics of Domestic Terrorism  .................................................................... 11 
     Potential Causes of Domestic Terrorism  ................................................................. 13 
     Encouraging Extremism  ........................................................................................... 14 
     Conclusion  ............................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 2: What is Domestic Terrorism?  ..................................................................... 17 
     Defining Terrorism  .................................................................................................. 17 
     Defining American Extremism  ................................................................................ 18 
     Typologies of Domestic Terrorism  .......................................................................... 21 
     Religious Extremists  ................................................................................................ 25 
     Political Extremists  .................................................................................................. 30 
     National Extremists  .................................................................................................. 33 
     Eco-Terrorists  .......................................................................................................... 35 
     Anti-Abortion Extremists ......................................................................................... 37 
 ii 
     Left-wing Terrorism ................................................................................................. 39 
     Right-wing Terrorism  .............................................................................................. 42 
     Militia and Paramilitary Groups  .............................................................................. 47 
     Lone Wolf Terrorism  ............................................................................................... 50 
     Sovereign Citizens  ................................................................................................... 53 
     Conclusion  ............................................................................................................... 54 
Chapter 3: Literature Review  ........................................................................................ 55 
     U.S. Public Policy on Terrorism from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan  ................. 56 
          President Jimmy Carter  ....................................................................................... 56 
          Ronald Reagan  .................................................................................................... 63 
     U.S. Public Policy on Terrorism from George H.W. Bush to Bill Clinton  ............. 77 
          George H. W. Bush  ............................................................................................. 77 
          Bill Clinton .......................................................................................................... 82 
     U.S. Public Policy on Terrorism from George W. Bush to Barrack Obama  ........... 90 
          George W. Bush  .................................................................................................. 90 
          Barrack H. Obama  ............................................................................................ 102 
          Conclusion  ........................................................................................................ 109 
     Evolution of U.S. Anti-Terrorism Policy  ............................................................... 116 
     Economic Determinants of Domestic Terrorism  ................................................... 124 
     Political Determinants of Domestic Terrorism  ...................................................... 127 
     Religious Determinants of Domestic Terrorism  .................................................... 132 
     Racial Determinants of Domestic Terrorism  ......................................................... 134 
     Systemic Determinants of Domestic Terrorism  ..................................................... 141 
 iii 
     Social Determinants of Domestic Terrorism  ......................................................... 143 
     Extremist Social Movements and the Internet  ....................................................... 144 
     Conclusion  ............................................................................................................. 145 
Chapter 4: Methodology  ............................................................................................. 146 
          Hypothesis 1 ...................................................................................................... 147 
          Hypothesis 2 ...................................................................................................... 147 
          Hypothesis 3 ...................................................................................................... 149 
     Case Study Selection .............................................................................................. 150 
     The Dependent Variables  ....................................................................................... 152 
     Independent Variables  ........................................................................................... 153 
     Control Variables  ................................................................................................... 155 
     Conclusion  ............................................................................................................. 155 
Chapter 5: Case Study Analysis  .................................................................................. 157 
     Militia and Paramilitary Groups Case Study  ......................................................... 157 
     Lone Wolf Case Study  ........................................................................................... 161 
     Political Extremist Case Study ............................................................................... 166 
     Eco-Terrorist Case Study  ....................................................................................... 171 
     Anti-Abortion Case Study  ..................................................................................... 176 
     Left-Wing Extremist Case Study  ........................................................................... 180 
     Conclusion  ............................................................................................................. 182 
Chapter 6: Findings  ..................................................................................................... 183 
     Bivariate Correlations  ............................................................................................ 183 
     Bivariate Correlations Significant Findings  ........................................................... 184 
 iv 
     Case Details and Demographic Characteristics  ..................................................... 185 
     Case Details and Social Characteristics  ................................................................. 186 
     Case Details and Behavioral Characteristics  ......................................................... 187 
     Results of Cluster Analysis  .................................................................................... 188 
     Conclusion  ............................................................................................................. 189 
Chapter 7: Discussion and Analysis  ........................................................................... 190 
     A Typology of Domestic Terrorism  ...................................................................... 190 
     Counterterrorism Strategies In The 21st Century  .................................................. 191 
     Terrorist Network Deconstruction Model  .............................................................. 194 
          Intelligence Gathering/Analysis ........................................................................ 195 
          Covert Operations  ............................................................................................. 197 
          Social Media Disruption  ................................................................................... 199 
          The Capone Approach  ...................................................................................... 200 
     Limitations of the Study ......................................................................................... 201 
     Increase in Homegrown Terrorism  ........................................................................ 202 
     Elected Leaders Contribute to the Problem  ........................................................... 202 
     Lack of Policy and Enforcement Directed at Homegrown Terrorism  ................... 206 
     Conclusion  ............................................................................................................. 207 
Chapter 8: Conclusion ................................................................................................. 209 
     Contribution of Research  ....................................................................................... 209 
     Policy Implications  ................................................................................................ 210 
     Ethics and Reflexivity  ............................................................................................ 210 
     Future Research Concepts ...................................................................................... 211 
 v 
     Contribution of Research  ....................................................................................... 211 
     Findings .................................................................................................................. 212 
     Conclusion  ............................................................................................................. 214 
References  ................................................................................................................... 216 
Appendix A: Incidents during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)  ............ 271 
Appendix B: Incidents during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)  .......... 272 
Appendix C: Incidents during the Presidency of George H. W. Bush (1989-1993)  .. 276 
Appendix D: Incidents during the Presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001) 278  ........ 278 
Appendix E: Incidents during the Presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009)  ........ 281 
Appendix F: Incidents during the Presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2015)  ........... 284 
 
  
 vi 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Nature of Extremism  ..................................................................................... 186 
Table 2. Extremist Organizations  ............................................................................... 187 
Table 3. Extremist Group Characteristics  ................................................................... 188 
Table 4. Pearson Correlations 1  .................................................................................. 213 
Table 5. Pearson Correlations 2  .................................................................................. 213 
Table 6. Pearson Correlations 3  .................................................................................. 213 
Table 7. Quantitative Review 1  .................................................................................. 214 
Table 8. Quantitative Review 2  .................................................................................. 214 
Table 9. Quantitative Review 3  .................................................................................. 214 
 
  
 vii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Analysis of U.S. Extremist Groups Terrorism Incidents 1980-1986  ............ 27 
Figure 2. U.S. Domestic Terrorism Incidents and Casualties 1980-1986  .................... 70 
Figure 3. Number of International Terrorist Incidents 1981-1985  ............................... 72 
Figure 4. Anti-Muslim Assaults  .................................................................................. 138 
  
 viii 
List of Abbreviations 
RCSI   random criminal shooting incident 
TER   terrorist attack 
THW   thwarted terrorist attack 
left   left-wing 
mil   militant 
natl   nationalist 
pol   political 
rel   religious 
right   right-wing 
  
 ix 
Abstract 
The purpose of this quantitative case study was to address the problem of domestic 
terrorism facing the United States. This concern led to a comprehensive examination of 
historical documents that focused on the temporal evolution of the problem beginning 
with the Carter administration and continuing through the Obama administration. The 
conceptual foundation centered on resolving the research question and validating three 
hypotheses directed at qualifying the escalation of domestic incidents of terrorism. This 
led to developing a behavioral model to assist law enforcement agencies in combating the 
issue of domestic terrorism. Bivariate and clustering statistical analysis validated the data 
while qualifying the demographics of the various typologies of U.S. domestic terrorists. 
The use of case study analysis, which drew on historical documents for evidence, 
considered the evolution of various groups, motivations, their ideologies, and goals. 
These variables were compared to successes and failures of relevant federal policies. The 
lack of understanding and oversight that led to an escalation of the number of incidents 
was also evaluated. Using ethical and scientific guidelines and protocols, the study’s 
findings promote the need for future research and highlight the dangers of repeating the 
past. By developing a behavioral model, this study gives law enforcement a valuable tool 
for resolving domestic terrorism. Additional considerations relate to future policy 
implications and the course of future research.  
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Surprise! When it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, 
bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility but also responsibility so poorly 
defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, 
but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to 
give those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has 
gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the 
one who knows he’ll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. 
It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes 
somebody else is taking care of it. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also 
decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of 
individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion- 
which is usually too late (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical backgrounds to tip 
us off to the climax). Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of 
genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck. The results 
of Pearl Harbor were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was the 
cumulative, wide-spread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it 
happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at 
Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government’s (or 
in an alliance’s) failure to anticipate effectively.” -Thomas C. Schelling, Forward to 
Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision by Roberta Wohlstetter 
“There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by 
guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by 
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infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy 
instead of engaging him…It preys on unrest…” - John F. Kennedy, Address to the 
Graduating Class, US Naval Academy, 6 June 1962 
In 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary 
Janet Napolitano released a report titled, Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and 
Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). The report warned that Lone Wolf terrorists, Right-Wing 
extremists, White supremacists, Sovereign Citizens and disgruntled military veterans 
were potential terrorist threats and their anger was possibly being fueled by the economic 
recession, unemployment, the inability to obtain credit, and the election of the first 
African-American president (DHS, 2009). The report sparked outrage among several 
Republicans in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.  
Then House Minority Leader Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), sharply criticized the 
DHS Secretary saying that her Department was not focusing on the real threats the United 
States faces: 
[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security owes the American people an explanation 
for why she has abandoned using the term ‘terrorist’ to describe those, such as al 
Qaeda, who are plotting overseas to kill innocent Americans, while her own 
Department is using the same term to describe American citizens who disagree 
with the direction Washington Democrats are taking our nation. Everyone agrees 
that the Department should be focused on protecting America, but using such 
broad-based generalizations about the American people is simply outrageous. 
(Mehta, 2011) 
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U.S. Congressman Bennie Thompson of Mississippi, chairman of the House Homeland 
Security Committee, said in a letter to Ms. Napolitano that he was “dumbfounded” that 
such a report would be issued and “This report appears to raise significant issues 
involving the privacy and civil liberties of many Americans - including war veterans” 
(Lake & Hudson, p.1, 2009). Napolitano, under intense criticism from both Democrats 
and Republicans issued the following statement in defense of the agency’s report: 
Let me be very clear: we monitor the risks of violent extremism taking root here 
in the United States," Napolitano said in a written statement issued by her 
department. "We don't have the luxury of focusing our efforts on one group; we 
must protect the country from terrorism whether foreign or homegrown, and 
regardless of the ideology that motivates its violence……. We are on the lookout 
for criminal and terrorist activity but we do not -- nor will we ever -- monitor 
ideology or political beliefs," Napolitano said in the statement. "We take seriously 
our responsibility to protect the civil rights and liberties of the American people, 
including subjecting our activities to rigorous oversight from numerous internal 
and external sources. (O'Keefe, 2009) 
Despite her statements explaining her position on the DHS report, the criticism 
was relentless. Republicans accused Napolitano of offending the American people 
especially those military veterans who served their nation. While some Republicans 
demanded an apology, others demanded that she be fired. The polarization of the issue 
became so contentious that Napolitano issued a statement apologizing to all military 
veterans. This was unfortunate because it deflected from the real issues and concerns of 
the report, which was ultimately to assist law enforcement in keeping all Americans safe. 
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Moreover, under President George W. Bush, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
issued a report entitled, White Supremacist Recruitment of Military Personnel since 9/11 
(7 July 2008). Ironically, this report went virtually unnoticed by right-wing conservatives 
because the strategy was to contest “all things Obama.” The political partisanship diluted 
the seriousness of the threat and unfortunately, based on historical evidence, when the 
anger manifests itself into violence, the innocent become the causalities of political 
gamesmanship. On January 08, 2011, anti-government extremist Jared Lee Loughner 
shot and injured 19 people including U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, and 
murdered another six people, including Chief U.S. District Court Judge John Roll (Orr, 
2013). 
This phenomenon of politicizing and ignoring domestic terror warnings is not a 
new phenomenon. According to Aaron Winter (2010), a senior lecturer in criminology 
and criminal justice, it can almost be expected. Winter wrote: 
Throughout American history, both terrorism and extremism have been 
constructed, evoked or ignored strategically by the state, media and public at 
different points, in order to disown and demonize political movements whenever 
their ideologies and objectives become problematic or inconvenient – because 
they overlap with, and thus compromise, the legitimacy of the dominant ideology 
and democratic credentials of the state, because they conflict with the dominant 
ideology or hegemonic order, because they offend the general (voting) public, or 
because they expose the fallacies of national unity and bi-polar opposition in the 
face of foreign enemies or international conflicts, such as the war on terror (p. 
156)      
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This scientific research study into U.S. domestic terrorism focuses on the 
temporal nature of domestic terrorism as a criminal phenomenon. In addition, it accounts 
for a wide variety of social influences and variables. Using an enhanced mixed-
methodology, it connected past and current domestic terrorism events and offered depth 
and scope to the research. The research established its foundation on the potential causes 
associated with domestic terrorism and highlighted individual and organizational causes. 
What is presented is a research opportunity to draw on the past, prevent future attacks, 
and empower law enforcement with the tools to move beyond reactive ideologies and 
positions.  
For purposes of clarity and the direction of this study, the link between 
international and domestic terrorism goals is acknowledged. However, what is essential is 
understanding that domestic terrorists are an internal threat to the United States; they 
operate from an agenda that does not include international funding, mandates, messages, 
or goals. Centralizing the problem as domestic, President    Ronald Reagan, in his 1981 
Inaugural Address stated that, “government is not the solution to our problems, it is the 
problem” (Stoken, 2004). To promote their ideology, domestic terror groups determined 
that our government and its leaders are evil by their own acknowledgment, thus allowing 
self-justified actions to support what they perceive as a positive end. As a result, the U.S. 
domestic terrorist is unique, having turned his or her back on society to pursue its 
destruction. Thus, they present a clear and present danger, requiring ongoing evaluation 
and study (Borucki, 2014). 
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Statement of the Problem 
The United States of America came into existence from acts of domestic terrorism 
that would later be hailed as acts of patriotism because Americans decided rebellion was 
the most effective action to free them from tyrannical leadership by the British. Citizens 
felt it necessary to engage in civil disobedience (e.g., the Boston Tea Party, the founding 
of the Sons of Liberty, and Massachusetts’s social elite) to provoke a revolution that 
would dismantle the heavy-handed social construct of totalitarian rule. Although these 
actions seemed reasonable under the circumstances, in 18th century society, these groups 
and acts would be classified as terroristic.  
As a nation that is predicated on free speech and democratic principles that call 
individuals to action if they believe their government is operating contrary to the will of 
the people, determining who is a terrorist or freedom fighter ultimately rests in the mind 
of the individual and society. While the birth of the United States provides a starting 
point, the focus of this research will be on the growth of American extremism between 
1977 and 2015; that is beginning with the administration of former President Jimmy 
Carter and ending with the term of President Barack Obama.  
In reviewing this period, my inquiry discovered a lack of current research 
focusing on domestic terrorism as a criminal phenomenon, which subsequently created 
gaps in the research that this study will attempt to fill by addressing emerging issues and 
problems. Timothy McVeigh and his bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building  
in Oklahoma City (1995), the Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta (1996), and 
the shooting at Knoxville’s Unitarian Universalist Church (2008) are examples that 
highlight sustained domestic terrorist assaults in the United States (Weiner, 2012).  
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In his research, terrorism expert Alberto Abadie (2006) notes that while 
international terrorist attacks has been the primary focus of the American media and its 
elected officials, statistically, domestic terrorism presented the greatest threat towards 
government facilities and public spaces. During the period 1998–2005, the Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism dataset recorded 26,445 fatalities, but only 6447 
resulted from international terrorism, of which more than 3000 were due to the  9/11 
attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 447). 
A scientific assessment of these and other events will highlight the realities of the 
domestic terrorist beyond media sensationalism and address the true nature of these 
individuals. Currently, the domestic terrorist is identified as evil, destructive, and remains 
hidden within U.S. society. By responding to the misinformation about domestic 
terrorists, problems associated with identifying domestic terrorist groups are resolved, 
thereby elevating the awareness of both law enforcement and society through empirical 
study, and thereby assist in preventing future tragedies. 
Purpose of the Study 
On October 12, 2001, while providing testimony to the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs, terrorism experts Zoe Budinger and Jeffrey 
Smith provided the committee with this observation: 
The attacks on 9/11 showed all of us that the Cold War “need to know” system for 
managing classified and sensitive information drove a culture of information security that 
resulted in countless stovepipes and secretive pockets of the nation’s most valuable 
information. It may have worked in the Cold War, but it was not adequate to keep 
America safe in a world of asymmetric threats. Many realized that protecting America in 
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this new threat environment would require the government to operate in an entirely new 
way (p. 1). 
Domestic terrorism and its perpetrators remain in the consciousness of America, 
the distinction between various groups, their goals, and their methods of operation remain 
unclear. The purpose of the research is to assist law enforcement in destabilizing 
domestic terror cells by understanding their motivations for engaging in terroristic 
activity. In addition, this study will show that from 1977-2001 (pre-9/11), every president 
since Jimmy Carter failed to develop a comprehensive domestic counter-terrorism 
strategy.  The only constant under each president during this period was their 
commitment to fighting international and transnational terrorism.   
The recurrence of domestic terrorism events support the notion that this 
phenomenon is escalating, and there is a need for ongoing study to ensure current and 
relevant responses that minimize organizational growth and capacity to inflict damage on 
U.S. citizens. To achieve this goal, correlations were drawn between incidence of 
domestic terrorism and changes within the economy, political climate, and influences 
related to religious faith. Defining key variables that underlie this research study allows 
for developing models, which can assist law enforcement in their approaches to 
combating domestic terrorism. These models considered social, political, and 
environmental contexts that influence individuals and organizations, drawing the 
domestic terrorist out of the darkness and subjecting him or her to intensive scrutiny that 
could ultimately save the lives of citizens. 
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Importance of the Study 
The importance of studying past and contemporary domestic terrorist groups and 
their actions, is to aid in developing methods to thwart their attacks, which are presented 
as outcomes in the conclusion of this study. A mixed-method approach that uses case 
study analysis and bivariate correlations of quantitative data, makes this research unique, 
as previous researchers used a single methodology. With emerging technology reshaping 
society and education, the ability to conduct detailed analyses of statistical trends that 
consider key demographic variables provided hard data and evidence. This evidence, 
drawn from multiple sources and evaluated in dynamic scientific approaches, supported 
creating profiles, which could assist law enforcement. By creating a valid and reliable 
study, which promotes outcomes that can be generalized and replicated in future studies, 
this research can serve as a foundation and benchmark for further studies examining this 
social phenomenon to promote positive social change (Yin, 2012).  
Definition of Terms 
Anti-terrorism. According to Joint Publication 3-07.2 (2010), anti-terrorism is 
defined as defensive measures strategically used to minimize the vulnerability to the U.S. 
citizens, allies, and property from terrorist acts, to— including rapid containment by 
local, state, federal, military, and civilian forces.  
Counterterrorism. The FBI (1999) defined counter-terrorism as activities and 
operations taken to neutralize terrorists, and their organizations and networks, in order to 
render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or 
societies to achieve their goals. 
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Domestic terrorism. According to the FBI (1999) and for the purposes of this 
paper, domestic terrorism is dangerous acts to human life that violate federal and/or state 
law and are designed to intimidate or coerce the U.S. civilian population; influence the 
state/federal policy of a U.S. government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the 
conduct of the government by engaging in guerilla tactics that involve mass destruction, 
assassination(s), or kidnapping(s). 
Homegrown Terrorist. The Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007 
defines homegrown terrorism as the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or 
violence by a group or individual, born, raised, or based and operating primarily within 
the United States or any possession of the United States, if its purpose is to intimidate or 
coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.  
Patriot Act. Section 802 of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act (Public Law No. 107-52) 
was expanded to include acts covering “domestic” (as opposed to “international” 
terrorism) post 9/11. The act allows for expanding the earlier definition of terrorism to 
include that any act dangerous to human life can be considered domestic terrorism. 
Propaganda. Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, that is used 
to promote or publicize a particular political cause or point-of-view. The use of social 
media outlets such as YouTube has become a popular tool by which domestic terrorists  
support their causes. 
Terrorism. Terrorism, as defined in the Code of Regulation (28 C.F.R., Section 
0.85), is act driven by political violence that is designed to induce terror and 
psychological fear through violent victimization and destruction of non-combatant 
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targets. The purpose of terror is to send a message by exploiting the media in an effort to 
obtain maximum publicity coverage.  
Characteristics of Domestic Terrorism 
As policy makers, law enforcement officials, and terrorism experts seek to 
identify specific internal characteristics and conditions that might make countries such as 
the United States more likely to experience domestic terrorism on its soil, The notable 
increase in empirical research on the causes associated with terrorism in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks is noted. The completion of these studies is essential to not only educate 
counter-terrorism policy makers, but the general public must also be informed as to 
emerging patterns that terrorists use in qualifying the use of violence as a domestic 
weapon (Abadie, 2014). 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush, politicians, world leaders, 
and terrorism experts immediately hypothesized that the motive for the attack was 
economic disparity. They argued the following point:  
Why else would the attacks be directed toward New York City, the financial 
capital of the world, and the World Trade Center the symbolism of capitalism and 
international commerce unless economic depravity was the root cause?   
In a speech given in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 22, 2002, President George W. 
Bush stated, “we fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (Bush, 2002). 
This was a provocative statement; given the time, right-wing extremist ideologues were 
searching for answers and more importantly, a scapegoat to justify their anger and overt 
bigotry. While the comments on the relationship between poverty and terrorism make 
sense intuitively, what can result are anger and grievances—leading to a sense of 
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hopelessness that some domestic terrorist organizations used for their benefit (Frey, 
2004).  
The empirical evidence from studies focusing on democracy and terrorism 
generally failed to validate the idea that promoting democracy was an antidote to 
terrorism.  While numerous researchers concluded that democracies do not experience 
fewer domestic terrorist attacks or produce fewer terrorists, there are some studies 
showing that political participation is a way to reduce domestic terrorism. Though 
research in this area continues to find interconnections and divergences, with discussions 
in some empirical studies offering that recent democracies are at a higher risk of domestic 
terrorist activities than more established democracies such as the U.S., there is 
nonetheless a need to continue to seek unifying variables to assist all democratic, and 
even non-democratic, nations in preventing domestic terrorist attacks (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004). 
Though democracy is not a complete remedy for terrorism, what appears to be 
central to reducing domestic terrorist threats is protecting and preserving human rights. 
Countries whose governments choose to abuse citizen rights can expect elevated attacks, 
leading to government responses, and thus creating a destructive cycle. To reduce human 
rights violations, which often occur in crackdowns against protesters who are affiliated 
with organizations that covertly support political violence, escalating confrontations that 
lead to violence should be avoided. This can defuse potentially explosive situations. 
The U.S. created programs of torturing confirmed and suspected terrorists, after 
9/11, and did not allow constitutional rights for foreign nationals who committed acts of  
terror on U.S. soil. These techniques likely diminished the government’s ability to act as 
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a positive role model. By not protecting the human rights of even the worst offenders of 
domestic terror, the United States may have taken retribution, but when the offenses 
came to light, the government’s standing as a beacon around which citizens could rally in 
denouncing terror was diminished (Frey, 2004).  
Additional recurring findings in the literature relate to countries where ethnic 
and/or religious minorities occupy a lower status in society. Such groups are more likely 
to experience and engage in terrorism. This is most notable when the disenfranchised 
groups also experience significant economic discrimination and/or are excluded from 
political power and are unable to promote change in society. Exclusion and 
discrimination leads to grievances by these groups against the government, and makes 
them more likely to challenge the majority population, and the status quo.  
In these scenarios, the lack of social integration routinely hinders government 
attempts to elicit cooperation from members of minority groups. Lack of cooperation and 
cohesion promotes the alienation of these groups, and leads to them identifying with 
domestic terrorist groups, thus generating the worst possible outcomes (Claude, 2007). 
Potential Causes of Domestic Terrorism 
According to Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab (1970), right-wing extremism 
is the “politics of backlash” that evolves in response to economic and social changes, 
which will ultimately result in “the displacement of some population groups from former 
positions of dominance” (Martin et al., p. 3., 1970). Although empirical research supports 
this analysis, it must be noted that the potential causes of domestic terrorism can be 
attributed to numerous variables related to individual and/or organizational perceptions. 
These variables can lead individuals beyond rational thought and into overt and/or covert 
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dissent, validated by criminal acts of defiance, which can be connected to the following: 
religious ideology, government positions or actions which the individual views as 
contrary, racist, or affecting socio-economic status, and/or environmental conditions. 
These variables routinely occur together and create convergences that further dilute the 
reasons that may have caused an individual or organization to move in open defiance of 
the government and engage in criminal activity. When analyzing the causes of terrorism, 
law enforcement and policy makers must exercise academic caution and not use poverty 
as the primary metric in determining terrorists acts.  Terrorism expert, Jeff Victoroff 
(2003) conducted and extensive study and found that many terrorist were not the 
stereotypical young and uneducated. In fact, his study uncovered that in the late 1990s, 
terrorists were a very diverse. Some were professionals, college students, married, and 
some were even older men well into their forties.   
This study sought to understand the evolution of domestic terrorists, and the 
changes in their perceptions, positions, and ideologies regarding society. In addition, the 
study also considered the legitimacy of the primary perceptions of terrorists who are U.S. 
citizens through historical examination and by conducting psychological and sociological 
assessments of the individuals and their motivations (Schuck, 2011). 
Encouraging Extremism 
When examining the alignment of the research variables historically, while 
accounting for external sources that motivate individuals or groups to engage in extremist 
action, as a researcher, you must first move beyond the simplistic narrative of extremists 
merely being disgruntled, xenophobic, racist, or politically partisan without justification. 
For example, in the book, The Politics of Terrorism, Brannan (2006) posited that right-
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wing extremists who subscribe to a seed-line theology wholeheartedly believe that non-
Whites deserve enslavement, expulsion, or even death if Whites are to stave off the “left-
wing’s” socially manufactured plot to force them into the abyss of extinction. Their 
justification and absolution are rooted, according to their interpretation, in the Holy 
Bible, which, according the right-wing extremists is just as important or superior to the 
U.S. Constitution. But religion does not hold a monopoly on agitating extremism. The 
political divisive rhetoric espoused by politicians and media outlets since 2009, 
revitalized organizations promoting domestic terrorism. There is a typology that links 
right-wing extremists’ behavior to their underlying political ideology that provides the 
framework for these individuals or groups to engage in violence to shape their message.  
This approach reinvigorated various causes and ushered in a new and energetic breed of 
domestic terrorists. As such, it is essential that law enforcement have the necessary 
intelligence and counter-intelligence techniques and resources to respond to this threat. 
By describing the how, what, and why of participation, and considering the ongoing 
support and encouragement from domestic terrorist organizations, law enforcement 
agencies can qualitatively assess motivation and develop appropriate responses 
(Creswell, 2011; Yin, 2012).  
Conclusion 
The study’s purpose, significance, and rationale for the study of domestic 
terrorism was established. The nature of this study requires an understanding of essential 
terms and concepts associated with domestic terrorism; these are defined in Chapter 2. A 
review of the typologies presented are central to developing profiles that can assist law 
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enforcement agencies in creating a significant deterrence aligned with validated 
outcomes.  
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Chapter 2: What is Domestic Terrorism? 
To create a foundation for this study, the operational definition of domestic 
terrorism concerns using violence against a civilian population or infrastructure of a 
nation often, but not always, by citizens of that nation and usually with the intent to 
intimidate, coerce, or influence national policy (Vohryzek-Bolden, Whamond, & Olson-
Raymer, 2001). Definitions of domestic terrorism overlap; however, what is central to 
domestic terrorism is that the acts are violent and dangerous to human life, and are a 
violation of the criminal laws of a state and, for this study, the United States. The purpose 
of these acts is to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of the 
government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by 
assassination or kidnapping (Reitan, 2010).  
Defining Terrorism 
The definition of terrorism is given in Chapter 113B of the United States Code, 
entitled, “Terrorism”. It stipulates that in order for any action to be characterized as a 
terrorist act, it must have specific characteristics. An act of terrorism must be inherently 
dangerous to human life, violate federal and/or state law and appear to be intended to: (a) 
intimidate the civilian population; (b) influence policies of the U.S. government by using 
intimidation and/or coercion and/or; (c) affect the conduct of government officials 
through the use of mass destruction, assassination, and/or kidnapping. A domestic 
terrorist attack by its nature must be directed at the state and, for the purpose of this 
research, occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, n.d.). 
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Key domestic terrorist definitions in law include 18 U.S.C. §2332b, which defines 
“federal crime of terrorism” as an offense that is designed to influence or affect the 
conduct of government organizations and officials through the use of intimidation or 
coercion, and/or retaliation against government conduct. This law is one of several 
statutes aimed at qualifying a general understanding of terrorism, which include §930(c). 
The latter identifies domestic terrorism as engaging in activities that relate to the killing 
or attempted killing of government officials during an attack on a federal facility with the 
use of a dangerous weapon. Also, §1114 addresses the killing or attempted killing of U.S. 
officers and employees by organizations determined by the government as being involved 
in domestic conspiratorial activities. As domestic terrorism has evolved, what is seen is 
the need for updated legislation, ongoing studies, and creating deterrents that will assist 
the nation in remaining current as to both under-standing domestic terrorism and 
prosecuting it (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.; Smith, 1994). 
Defining American Extremism 
A review of contemporary research on violent American extremism supports the 
premise that a series of theoretical frameworks evolved that seek to explain individual 
involvement in politically or religiously motivated violence—and correct the poor 
understanding of causal mechanisms. Building on situational action theory, in the current 
study the researcher proposed that an understanding of movements and causations 
beyond dominant risk factors is necessary and requires developing integrated models. In 
seeking explanations for politically and religiously motivated violence, the challenge 
facing researchers is the ability to distinguish direct mechanisms from other causes 
(Schils & Pauwels, 2016). Though models emerged that seek to understand the 
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motivation of the domestic terrorist by combining existing theories and mechanisms from 
different but complementary traditions, further insight is needed (Schils & Pauwels, 
2016). 
In earlier primary and secondary studies that considered the underlying causes of 
domestic terrorism, a central focus has been evaluating the influence of key direct 
mechanisms. These mechanisms incorporate a propensity towards violent extremism and 
exposure of potential recruits to violent extremist moral settings. However, what is also 
sought is the ability to explain—from a political perspective—foundational premises and 
variables that are used to support political and religious violence. Various theoretical 
models of domestic terrorism have been used to test structural equation modeling that 
estimates the strength and power base of domestic terror organizations. The main results 
from these studies indicate that violent extremist propensity, as well as exposure to 
violent extremist moral precepts and settings, were found to have direct effects on the 
likelihood of individuals engaging in domestic political and religious violence.  
Such research highlight explicit and direct mechanisms thought to be connected to 
a series of exogenous factors, including perceptions which lead to a sense of injustice, 
and manifest as poor social integration. Feelings of perceived injustice and poor social 
integration converge with political and religious violence and are strengthened by a sense 
of alienation, belief in the failure of the judicial system, and a background of religious 
authoritarianism. As a result of the convergence of these social mechanisms in people 
throughout the country, organizers capitalized on these feelings in order to create 
extremist groups across America. Displaced and marginalized individuals who join these 
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groups believe that violent action can restore a balance of power, as well as restore 
perceived injustices (Kushner, 2003; Schils, & Pauwels, 2016; Simmons, 1999). 
Domestic terrorism, because of the definitional impediments associated with its 
antecedent term, terrorism, scholars and terrorism experts, for the sake of contentious 
academic debate, simply defined domestic terrorism, in its most basic form, as a set of 
actions, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, and strategies of an individual or group who are far 
removed from the mainstream, or what is commonly considered ordinary. In conflict 
settings, those engaged in extremist activities show severe forms of conflict engagement. 
However, caution is urged when labeling particular activities, individuals, and groups as 
extremist. While acknowledging an idea or position that is commonly believed by society 
as being ordinary, these assessments become subjective when considering political and 
religious beliefs, concepts, and ideologies that are outside the norm.  
As a result, discussions regarding extremism must consider that researchers will 
have different perspectives; some will consider various acts just and moral (“freedom 
fighting”). Others will see these same acts as unjust, immoral, and consistent with 
ideologies associated with anti-social “terrorism.” The point-of-view depends, of course, 
on an observer’s politics, moral scope, values, and the nature of his or her relationship 
with the member and his organization. Further, an individual’s sense of the morality of a 
given act must be considered and assessed within current and historical contexts of 
extremist acts, as well as support the shaping of an overall view on these individuals and 
their organizations (Wilcox, 2013). 
One of the most important and relevant factors in determining the drive of 
extremists is their awareness and consolidation of power differences, which are both 
21 
 
essential when defining domestic terrorism/extremism. As social disparities increase and 
lead to conflict, the activities of the members of low-power groups are often viewed as 
more extreme than similar activities done by members of groups advocating the status 
quo. Political terrorist/extremist acts are more likely to be used by marginalized 
individuals and organizations that believe in a more radical form of engagement because 
traditional forms of protest are considered of little worth. It is worth noting, though, that 
high-power terrorist groups also commonly employ extreme activities to achieve their 
ends (Goble, 2015). 
The separate ideologies of the extremist support actions that routinely employ 
violent means, although groups differ in their choices of and preferences for the use of 
and/or level of violence. Also, there can be a range of choices for targets of their 
violence: infrastructure, law enforcement, military personnel, and civilians (including 
children as primary targets). Although low-power groups are more likely to employ 
direct, episodic forms of domestic terrorist violence, higher-power groups are more likely 
to be associated with structural and/or institutionalized forms of terrorism, such as covert 
and overt torture. Although extremist individuals and their groups in the country are often 
viewed by the general population as being evil, their indoctrination and belief systems 
allow them to violate societal norms and break federal and state laws by their acts 
(Coleman & Bartoli, 2003). 
Typologies of Domestic Terrorism 
Domestic terrorism has been the most common form of terrorism in the United 
States and until 9/11 became the deadliest. The FBI recorded 353 incidents or suspected 
incidents of terrorism in this country between 1980 and 2001; 264 of these incidents were 
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attributed to domestic terrorists (Lewis, 2004). Domestic terrorism cases nearly doubled 
from 1999 to 2003 according to the FBI (2003). Between 1999 and 2001 the FBI 
prevented 10 possible domestic terrorist incidents, including two potentially large-scale, 
high-casualty attacks by right-wing groups (Mueller, 2003). 
A significant oversight by researchers has been accepting the premise that 
terrorists are a uniform class who lack diversity. As studies continue, terrorist groups are 
now seen as not all the same; their characteristics, means, and goals ultimately define 
their actions. Thus, continuing analysis of such groups is necessary and relevant to 
understand this unique social phenomenon. Terrorist groups develop goals and frame 
strategies, just as other groups do. In researching and understanding the war on domestic 
terrorism and individual groups, it is necessary to understand how their typologies, 
defined by their ideologies, are related to their behaviors.   
Viewing domestic terrorism as a monolithic entity overlooks key points when 
describing the platforms and tactics used by various groups against the government and 
its citizens for a variety of reasons. These organizations believe violence is a reasonable 
response to what is seen as the government’s incorrect policies, legislation, and choices. 
A review of past presidents, beginning with Jimmy Carter, demonstrates how short-
sighted approaches to domestic terrorism exacerbated the problem, and led to increased 
levels of criminality and violence (Boxall, Rosevear, & Payne, 2015).  
By examining the goals, strategies, and tactics of different groups, this study 
seeks to understand why domestic terrorists have various strategic logistical platforms 
and approaches, and how these variations should inform and augment federal and state 
policies. A typological analysis divides terrorist groups into four main categories: ethnic, 
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ideological, political, and religious. They are distinguished by the nature of their 
ideologies and identities. Key questions concern the aims of each group and a 
consideration of whether they are bound to the idea of a single nation or state and their 
laws, or whether they seek to affect changes throughout the United States and want 
changes to or dissolution of the federal government.  
For domestic terrorists, important considerations include the race, ethnicity, 
religious affiliation, shared language, customs, and traditions. These help researchers 
define members of extremist groups. Central issues and beliefs are important when 
determining longevity—which is driven by continuously enrolling or reaching out to like-
minded individuals. Terrorist groups routinely use similar methods and tactics to achieve 
their goals. However, the basic characteristics that define these organizations and their 
goals vary based on the desired outcomes. The result is a differentiation of strategic logic 
that dictates their commitment to the level of violence.   
By qualifying the variables and tactics that affect the domestic terrorist’s ability to 
act, along with his or her potential for survival, dictates the group’s level of sophistication 
and the potential damage they can inflict on society in promoting their message. By 
identifying unifying variables that can develop predictive behavioral models based on the 
identified variables and expected outputs, law enforcement can create and promote 
counter-terrorism strategies to address threats to all levels of society from domestic terror 
groups (Rosenthal, 2006). 
With terrorism routinely deployed as an attempt to wreak havoc, create fear 
among the population, draw attention to a particular cause, and affect change, what is 
important to note is that all groups that opt to use terrorist tactics do not all share the 
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same ends. Some domestic terrorist groups seek political autonomy, statehood, or are 
looking for greater political freedoms within the U.S., while others promote extreme 
ideas of anarchy and, consequently, also engage in criminal behaviors for profit. In 
addition, there are domestic terrorist organizations that use violence in hopes of bringing 
about what has emerged as the idea of the final clash of civilizations: cataclysmic 
destruction (Huntington, 1993).  
Terrorism in the U.S. has become a frightening and all too-common experience. 
Extremist groups employ these tactics to force policy changes commensurate with their 
stated goals and objectives while simultaneously considering it their “patriotic duty” to 
liberate the masses from the tyranny of government by destabilizing it to a point of 
lawlessness. If law enforcement fails to categorize the domestic terrorist groups correctly, 
counter-terrorism strategies will be flawed. These flaws, in turn, could create situations 
that risk exaggerating domestic terrorist threats, create policies that are inconsistent, 
thereby alienating potential allies and strengthening the very groups the U.S. is seeking to 
undermine (Huntington, 1993).  
On September 15, 2010, terrorism expert, Stephen Flynn, provided testimony 
before the U.S. House of Representatives, Homeland Security Committee on The 
Evolving Nature of the Terrorism Threat: Nine Years after the 9/11 Attacks. In his 
testimony, Flynn pointed out the seriousness of domestic terrorism in America stating 
that: 
When terrorists are homegrown, it is the streets of Bridgeport, Denver, 
Minneapolis, and other big and small communities across America that become 
the frontlines. That translates into local cops on the beat and increasingly the 
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American public at large who must be better informed and empowered to deal 
with the terrorism threat. 
Since 9/11, both current and past terrorism experts have sought to examine how 
ethnic, ideological, religious, and financial terrorist groups are ideologically different, 
while seeking methods of political and military deterrence. Acknowledging the 
differences among terrorist groups, and analyzing them, can lead to new methodologies 
that can generate appropriate policy which may reduce violence and save lives. One of 
the more current methods by which to assess extremist groups that opt for terror is using 
deconstruction.   
The purpose of deconstruction and its associated analytical strategy is to 
understand and define terrorism by dividing groups according to their identities, focusing 
on the group’s ideological imperatives, and subsequently creating viable group-specific 
strategies for use in counterterrorism (Hutchinson, 1972). These foundational concepts, 
first used by the Carter administration, supported law enforcement in promoting response 
strategies based on group typologies to provide law enforcement with the ability to 
respond to the ongoing threat of domestic terrorism (Hutchinson, 1972).  
Religious Extremism 
A review of the literature on the threat of religious extremist groups to national 
stability demonstrates that their past actions influenced domestic and foreign policies. 
Why some such groups fail, while others flourish, can be understood by identifying 
common attributes, which informed and enhanced government policy, leading to current 
response strategies. Characterizing key variables within various extremist groups reveals 
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two major typologies: those based on religion and those driven by religious and political 
ideologies. According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (1999): 
Religious and secular terrorists also have starkly different perceptions of 
themselves and their violent acts. Whereas secular terrorists regard violence as a 
way to instigate the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good, 
religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth 
preserving at all but as “outsiders” seeking fundamental changes in the existing 
order. This sense of alienation further enables the religious terrorist to 
contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than 
secular terrorists—and reinforces the tendency to embrace a far more open-ended 
category of “enemies” for attack. 
 The extremist groups that emerged from these religions generally share the 
following four common attributes: (a) the search for meaning, (b) sense of religious 
responsibility, (c) the quest for purity, and (d) inspirational leadership often using 
scripture as justification for violence. The success of groups that are highly effective can 
be attributed to these unifying attributes. In some instances, Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic extremist groups that engaged in domestic violence not only achieved their goals, 
but also transformed themselves into political parties that operate within the boundaries 
of traditional society and follow the normal channels of protest.  
Using comparative case studies, Zisk (1981) determined that Islamic groups 
present the greatest threat to society as domestic terrorists. Islamic extremist groups since 
the 1970s having bonded due to the common perceived threats of modernity and 
globalization. Domestic Islamic extremist groups routinely engaged in supporting 
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traditional Islamic identities within various communities, resulting in cultural clashes that 
are ongoing examples of extremist domestic violence. However, by the 1980s, according 
to the 1986 FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States Report, there was a 
significant shift in the domestic terror threat. An analysis of Figure 1 reveals that during 
the Reagan Era, specifically, from 1980-1986, Middle-Eastern (Islamic) and Right-Wing 
extremist groups only accounted for seven terrorism incidents each. In contrast, Anti-
Castro terrorism groups accounted for twenty-one (21) incidents, Jewish terrorism groups 
accounted for twenty-four (24) incidents, Left-Wing terrorism groups accounted for thirty 
(30) incidents and Puerto Rican terrorist groups accounted for seventy-four (74) 
incidents.  
 
Figure 1. Analysis of U.S. Extremist Groups Terrorism Incidents 1980-1986. Note. FBI 
Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States Report 1986 
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According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (1986), since their failed mission to 
assassinate President Harry Truman on November 1, 1950, Puerto Rican extremists have 
consistently sought there independence from the United States by specifically targeting 
U.S. symbols of power and commerce which they understood to be tools of political 
repression and economic exploitation (p. 10).  
It is unclear as to what specific variable(s) precipitated the significant increase in 
the number of terrorist incidents perpetrated by Puerto Rican extremists under the Reagan 
administration. Nevertheless, Puerto Rican extremists were considered a top priority 
when a 1980 police raid uncovered documents that revealed plans to kidnap several U.S. 
politicians and business leaders. More importantly, there was one name on that list 
peaked law enforcement’s interests and that was the name of the newly elected president, 
Ronald Reagan (Hoffman, 1986). Between 1980-1985, federal and local law enforcement 
authorities came to a consensus that dismantling Puerto Rican extremists organizations 
such as Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña (FALN), which in 
English translates to Armed Forces of National Liberation, had to be their primary focus. 
In 1980, eleven FALN members were arrested Illinois (Hoffman, 1986, p. 11). In 1983, 
FALN’s bomb expert, William Morales and four other members were taken into custody 
and two (2) safe houses were raided in Chicago, Illinois (Hoffman, 1986). Law 
enforcement authorities uncovered a cache of weapons, bullets, explosives, disguises, 
bullet proof vests and significant subversive documentation (Hoffman, 1986). The seizure 
of this arsenal by law enforcement led to the decline of the organization (Hoffman, 1986). 
By 1985, authorities arrested seventeen (17) key members of both FALN and Macheteros 
(a Puerto Rican extremist group) which ultimately decimated both groups to the point 
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where they were no longer a threat to the United States or their interests (Hoffman, 
1986). 
Government domestic policies and response strategies would likely be more 
successful in uprooting and ending extremist groups if they had a better understanding of 
their organizational dynamics, and able to identify why some groups fail and others 
succeed. Behavioral models that integrate a proper balance of soft and hard power within 
domestic terror organizations are essential for success in developing strong law 
enforcement responses, which include de-radicalization and political inclusion, supported 
by civilian intelligence and law enforcement.  
The most effective way to prevent domestic terrorism is to have an effective 
community policing policy embracing different groups within the community which can 
possibly assist in deterring people from joining terrorist organizations (Portland State 
University, 2013). McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak (2007) suggested when law 
enforcement personnel develop strong relationships with community members, they are 
more likely to gain knowledge of critical information.  Information that can alert 
authorities to behaviors or actions that can metastasize into homegrown terrorism.    
Extremist groups thrived during the past decades, drawing new recruits by their 
divisive rhetoric and condemning national political leaders who failed to resolve or 
respond to anxieties about the country’s shifting demographics (Southern Poverty Law 
Center [SPLC], 2016). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) determined that the 
number of hate-groups organized against religious and/or racial characteristics rose to 
892 in 2015, from 784 the previous year. This 14% increase came after 3 years of decline 
in the number of extremist groups, which suggested a decrease in religious extremist 
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growth. However, a shift in demographic attributes, owing to White Americans’ 
heightened fears over their shrinking majority during the Obama administration, let 
religious extremist factions capitalize on these fears and end the downward trend 
(McPhate, 2016). 
The SPLC (2016) also identified 34 anti-Muslim groups having heightened anger 
in 2015 after the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California. Over the course 
of 2015, a year in which battles over same-sex marriages occurred, the National Coalition 
of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP), received reports on 24 hate-violence related 
homicides of LGBTQ and HIV-affected people in 2015, which was a 20% increase in the 
number of reports compared to 2014 (NCAVP, 2016). 
As extremist religious groups used new laws and acceptance as a rallying cry to 
validate their criminal behavior and attacks on pro-LGBT groups and infrastructure, an 
increase in future religious violence is anticipated (Norwitz, 2011; Southern Poverty Law 
Center, 2015). 
Political Extremism 
When the American economy struggles, its woes emerges as a unifying theme 
among citizens who continually blame politicians and big government for its failures. For 
example, the right-wing extremist do not share political and social values with left-wing 
extremist, but each group points to, and fixates on, the same political and economic 
stories: bank insolvencies, currency devaluations, securities fraud, total-collapse 
scenarios (e.g., the mortgage crisis of 2008), the short-comings of the Federal Reserve, 
and the need to return to the gold standard (Stern, 2016).  
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Political extremists in America, ranging from militias, the Black Bloc, to 
Sovereign Citizens (who style themselves as homegrown radicals united by political and 
economic ideology and not race), highlight the failures of politicians who have grown 
corrupt (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shapiro, 2005). By examining data convergences for 
various studies, core questions (such as how many extremists and/or groups are active in 
the United States) remain unanswered. Yet, their pervasive influence is undeniable, as 
seen in the 400+ U.S.-based websites that generate thousands of extremist posts each day 
(Mulloy, 2004). This level of traffic suggests that these groups are a clear and present 
danger to the government. Therefore, research must focus on the growth of political 
terrorist groups and their individual and group-unifying behavioral characteristics 
(Berger, 2012). 
Political terrorists in the United States seek to manipulate every piece of so-called 
credible evidence that supports end-of-the-world scenarios driven by economic collapse 
which can be leveraged to spread other extreme ideologies (Applegate, 2016). As 
perceptions of the social, economic, and political milieu are filtered and shaped by this 
ideology, ultimately, what terrorists wholeheartedly believe is what will affect their 
decision to employ violence as a means to achieve their social and political goals 
(Crenshaw, 1988). 
The exercise of militia training in the woods, hoarding gold and food, arming 
wives and children in anticipation of political insurrection, massive civil unrest or 
government collapse is extremist propaganda that is effective in the proliferation and 
justification of terrorist action as a means of survival. By appealing to one’s fears, these 
pseudo-reality scenarios produce a two-fold effect. First, promoting these concepts can 
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lead to increased political awareness by potential followers. By choosing to believe the 
worst about humanity, the ranks of politically extreme organizations will grow and 
reinforce the commitment of those who are already members of what Eric Hoffer (1951) 
described as “true believers” (Brecher, Devenney, & Winter, 2010). Second, extremist 
anti-government websites offer the premise for their  existence by suggesting that: 
citizens should arm themselves, have the courage and determination to face this world, 
and challenge political mandates and laws (Lombardi, Ragab, & Chin, 2014). 
Despite the deep moral opprobrium that the word terrorism carries, certain 
national, sub-national, and extremist groups have often employed terrorist tactics when 
more conventional means of conflict resolution have been exhausted or ignored (Weeber, 
2011). In fact, every violent extremist movement or group requires an ideology or belief 
system “to nourish, motivate, justify, and mobilize [its] use of terror violence” 
(Wilkerson, 1998, p. 205). 
By promoting insurrection against existing political structures and laws, their 
hope is the fall of society, implosion of the collective order, and destruction of the rule of 
law. The raison d’ȇtre (justification) for political extremists is that government is 
intrusive, only benefits the aristocracy of society, and manufactures internal strife, civil 
unrest, repression, wars, and misery. Although this is the basic premise for their actions, 
not all political extremists subscribe to the concept that violence is the necessary means 
that produces desired results. Like a duplicitous anarchist, some political extremists have 
all but concluded that government is a great unnecessary evil, and that anarchy, in the 
literal sense of no government, need not mean anarchy in the popular sense of violence 
and disorder (Carter, 2010). 
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These differences and typologies are essential to understanding the ongoing 
changes of the U.S. political terrorist by law enforcement agencies (Jenkins, 2012). 
National Extremism 
“The up-tick in moderate-to-small scale attacks in the West since last summer by 
individual extremists reinforces our assessment that the most likely and immediate threat 
to the Homeland will come from Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) or individuals 
with loose affiliation to terrorist groups overseas.” - Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen, 
National Counterterrorism Center, February 12, 2015 
The United States has faced significant challenges from national domestic 
terrorists since the 1970s. According to Dale L. Watson (2002), former Executive 
Assistant Director of Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division of the FBI, 
between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded 335 incidents or suspected incidents of 
terrorism. Of those, 247 were confirmed and attributed to acts of national domestic 
terrorists. As threats from national extremist movements have grown, the need to address 
this reality has become a priority. National terrorists continue to refine and expand their 
methods, the threat they pose will grow. In response, the FBI divided the national 
terrorist threat facing the United Stated into two general categories: national and 
international.  
The FBI leads terrorism investigations at the federal level (Bjelopera, 2013). 
Their agents have been on the front lines for the past 40 years (Bjelopera, 2013). What 
emerged from their experience with domestic terror groups is a coordinated effort by 
them to undermine the federal government. Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or 
threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within 
34 
 
the United States. In the case of national terrorism, precedents for criminal prosecution 
are set. Terrorist acts directed and coordinated by U.S. citizens, committed against 
persons or property with the intent to intimidate or coerce the government and/or civilian 
population, is a message cloaked in terror. These acts seek to further personal, 
organizational, political, and/or social objectives.  
Through continued research, some national terrorist groups have been sponsored 
by, or received financial support from, international terrorist groups. However, the central 
objective of national terrorist groups is to promote internal change within the national 
government. In some cases, the objectives of international groups support this, and lead 
to collaborations (Wager, 2009). During the past decade, the United States witnessed 
dramatic changes in the nature of the national terrorist threat. In the 1990s, right-wing 
extremism surpassed left-wing extremist groups as being the greatest domestic terrorism 
threat. Right-wing politics had devolved from healthy Christian activism into contentious 
and ultra-politically conservative extremist groups who viewed political empowerment as 
a Constitutional right particularly when conservative politicians and media personalities 
become increasingly tolerable of far right-wing ideals that had been suppressed from the 
mainstream for decades. As national extremist groups grew during the past decade, 
special interest extremism emerged and reinvigorated this category of terrorists, 
characterized by groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth 
Liberation Front (ELF), both considered by law enforcement agencies as serious national 
threats. In 2002, former FBI Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, James F. Jarboe reported 
that ALF and ELF were responsible for approximately 600 criminal acts in the United 
States since 1996, causing damages in excess of $42 million. As these nationwide 
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organizations, which operate overtly and covertly, continue to seek and gain support by 
rationalizing their terrorist acts, the message will continue to be refined for public 
consumption and used as a recruitment tool.  
Eco-Terrorism 
Eco-terrorism is a tactic used by radical environmentalists who believe that the 
approach of the mainstream environmental movement has been ineffective. Eco-terrorists 
argue that industrialization, urbanization, and corporate expansion, has violently 
infringed upon nature, and bringing about the destruction of the earth. As a result, violent 
retaliation is needed. Those who are part of left- or right-wing radical environmental 
reformists do more harm than good. Eco-terrorists advocate the intentional destruction of 
machinery they believe is detrimental to nature and includes bulldozers, cranes, trucks, 
and whaling vessels. Their activity has also included releasing animals from laboratories 
and zoos (Smith, 2014). 
The basis of eco-terrorism can be traced to writing by Aldo Leopold and Edward 
Abbey, among the first to advocate for civil disobedience in the preservation of nature. 
Organizations such as ALF, who actively embrace the tactics of eco-terrorism, draw  
from the “Earth First” movement, and publicly call for direct and radical environmental 
actions. Between 1990 and 2000, attacks by ALF and ELF resulted in the emergence of 
an anomaly in the United States. In the post-9/11 era, the FBI has warned that the primary 
domestic threat to national security is not political or religious terrorism, but rather the 
environmental variety. By examining the variables that define eco-terrorists, further 
analysis finds a gap between the description of eco-terrorism and devising and enforcing 
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public policy. As a result, there is a need to advocate for research that supports a better 
understanding of this dangerous social phenomenon (Smith, Tunno, & Smith, 2002). 
Synthesizing relevant findings suggests that the definition of eco-terrorism 
remains ambiguous. As a result, it is subject to numerous interpretations, which affect 
how public policy responds to eco-terrorism. Attacks coordinated by ALF and ELF have 
not been adequately deterred to-date. A majority of the attacks by these groups are most 
likely to occur in states which rank in the 80th percentile of per capita income, meaning 
that the attacks occur primarily on the West Coast. The significance of the relationships 
between the ELF and ALF attacks in conjunction with U.S. public policy demonstrates 
that these two facts (infusion of capital and location) are related. With researchers 
seeking a better understanding of what constitutes eco-terrorism, along with identifying 
radical elements within the environmental movement, this study provided a model for 
seeing the cycle of terrorist attacks and government responses in a fresh way. In 
developing and providing a framework of inquiry for understanding eco-terrorism, the 
expected result will be a reduction in this form of extremism, and deterrence due to 
sentencing of eco-terrorists (Smith, 2014; Smith et al., 2002).  
By returning to an ideology that supports terrorist actions in conjunction with civil 
disobedience to be distinguished through definition and the assignment of penalty, the 
argument is presented where people will be more confident in their ability to engage in 
their rights of free speech and engage in political opposition. The loss of civil liberties, a 
direct result of the increases in eco-terrorism, suggests a correlation between these 
variables. Miller, Rivera, and Yelin (2008) argued the opportunity to prevent escalations 
at the domestic level.  
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The United Nations conducted a review of civil liberties assignments in 
developing their official policy against all forms of terrorism, including eco-terrorism. It 
should be an example to the United States and the rest of the world in the fight against 
international and domestic terrorism. What is called for is a balance and notes that, while 
domestic security is necessary, but should not come at the expense of civil liberties. The 
U.S. government is required to continue a course of due diligence while adjusting to ever-
changing societal expectations and norms, but yet uphold Constitutional rights. It is clear  
that this is going to be a delicate balance indeed (Miller et al., 2008). 
Anti-Abortion Extremism 
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court legalized abortion in the Roe v. Wade, 
(410 U.S. 113, 1973) decision. Since that decision, anti-abortion protesters have for the 
most part, peacefully protested against the decision or actively making the argument to 
their elected officials that Roe v. Wade (1973) must be overturned and the only way to 
accomplish that is nominate anti-abortion Supreme Court judges. In fact, in order to 
receive the endorsement of the powerful evangelical voting bloc, a candidate must be a 
pro-life hardline conservative. But discontentment quickly grew within the ranks of the 
pro-life movement and proselytizing, picketing and praying were rapidly being 
considered as ineffective by radical anti-abortionists who literally wanted sweeping 
policy change by any means necessary even if that meant intimidation or murder. 
In 1985, Joe Scheidler, president of the Pro-Life Action League, wrote a book 
entitled Closed: 99 Ways to Stop Abortion. In his book, he advocated for pro-lifers to 
engage in disruptive activities such as blockades, preventing water from entering the 
clinic and clinic sit-ins (Jacobson & Royer, 2010). Like many pro-lifers, Scheidler did 
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not openly advocate violence, he did not openly oppose its usage. The Army of God 
(AOG) however, openly embraced terrorism and was one of the most prolific anti-
abortion informal terrorists group in America in the 1980s and 1990s (Jacobson &Royer, 
2010). According to the National Abortion Federation, AOG scripted a manual on h ow 
to target abortion clinics using bombs, arson, and butyric acid (Jacobson & Royer, 2010). 
Moreover, AOG would post a “Wanted List” on their website listing the names, pictures, 
addresses, license plate numbers and names of family members (Jacobson & Royer, 
2010). The AOG was so effective in intimidating abortion clinic providers, that other pro-
life organizations would adopt their tactics.   
In Pensacola, Florida, Dr. David Gunn decided to perform abortions in the rural 
south because other doctors had refused to do so because of religious convictions or 
concerns for safety of themselves and their family.  But Dr. Gunn was determined, and he 
wholeheartedly believed in a woman’s right to choose. So much so, that at one point in 
his career he gave up his own practice to travel to surrounding clinics to perform 
abortions (Rimer, 1993). Pro-life radicals were on a mission to put an end to what they 
deemed as a “sin against God.” Anti-abortionists employed every means of intimidation 
at their disposal. They posted “Wanted” posters with Dr. Gunn’s name, address, work 
schedule and telephone number (Salcedo, 1990). Those actions were followed by daily 
hate mail, frequent tails that followed him around from clinic to clinic, he received a 
consistent barrage of death threats, and he was greeted with anti-abortion protesters 
everywhere he went standing outside calling him a “murderer” and a “baby killer.” 
(Rimer, 1993). Doctor Gunn was not dismissive of these threats from pro-life radicals. 
For protection, he strategically placed three firearms in his car for his personal safety 
39 
 
(Rimer, 1993). He positioned one in his glove compartment, one under the driver’s seat, 
and one in the trunk of his car (Rimer, 1993). Despite his precautions, on Wednesday, 
March 10, 1993, Doctor David Gunn arrived at his Pensacola, Florida office and was 
greeted by routine pro-life protesters, but before he could enter the clinic, thirty-one year 
old Michael Griffin yelled, "Don't kill any more babies!" and shot Doctor Gunn three 
times in the back with a .38 caliber revolver (Booth, 1993). When the police arrived, they 
identified the perpetrator as 31-year old pro-life protester, Michael Griffin.  
The murder of Doctor David Gunn was met with disaffection and disillusionment 
from pro-life radicals. Joseph Foreman, the dogmatic pro-life ideologue and president of   
Milwaukee’s Missionaries to the Pre-born, stated that Gunn was a "mass murderer. He 
was preparing to kill five to ten babies. I'm genuinely happy these lives are spared." 
(Robinson, 1993). This glorification of the murder of Doctor Gunn may have appalled 
non-violent anti-abortionist, but not to the point where they were willing to actively 
challenge pro-life radicals to supplant their pro-violence narrative. The unquestioned 
radical dogma at the end of the day was self-serving to non-violent pro-life protesters in 
that pro-life radical terrorism, although horrific, was silently embraced as both quixotic 
and salvific.  
Left-Wing Terrorism 
The ideology of leftist groups, often referred to as Marxist-Leninist terrorism 
and/or revolutionary/terrorism is a form of domestic extremism designed to overthrow 
capitalist systems and replace them with socialist constructs. The concept of left-wing 
terrorism draws its roots from later 19th and early 20th century anarchist and Bolshevik 
forms of domestic terrorism and became pronounced during the Cold War. Modern left-
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wing terrorist movements developed in the context of the political unrest of in Western 
Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Notable factions include the West German 
Red Army Faction and the Bader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, the French 
Action Directe, and the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells. Asian groups included the 
Japanese Red Army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, although the latter 
organization later adopted nationalist terrorism. In Latin America, groups that became 
actively involved in terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s included the Nicaraguan 
Sandinistas, the Peruvian Shining Path, and the Colombian 19th of April Movement. This 
international movement challenges the ruling elite and the premises of democracy, along 
with traditional understandings of law and order (Department of Homeland Security, 
2008). Between 1973 and 1975, the Symbionese Liberation Army committed bank 
robberies, two murders, and other acts of domestic violence. One of the most infamous of 
these was the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, one of the grand-daughters of newspaper 
magnate William Randolph Hearst. During the 1980s, left-wing terrorist actions grew to 
include groups such as the May 19th Communist Organization and, later in the decade, 
the smaller United Freedom Front, both engaging in covert/overt domestic, left-wing 
terror. However, in 1985, with the end of these groups, there was a reduction in the 
confirmed acts of left-wing terrorism reported in the U.S. Further, left-wing terrorism 
incidents dropped-off dramatically at the end of the Cold War in 1991, primarily due to 
loss of support for communism, and lack of money (Department of Homeland Security, 
2008). 
Left-wing extremism often has developed from working-class movements seeking 
in theory to eliminate, not preserve, class distinctions (Seger, 2001).  In the 1980s 
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through the mid-1990s, domestic leftist terrorist groups and state-sponsored cells and 
continued their espionage activities and the planning of terrorist actions against the U.S. 
government which at times, paralyzed local law enforcement agencies who did not have 
the resources to combat extremism (Seger, 2001).  Leftist extremists were so prolific that 
they were responsible for three-fourths of the officially designated acts of terrorism in 
America in the 1980s (Seger, 2001).  To put this in perspective, of the 13,858 people who 
died between 1988 and 1998 in attacks committed by the 10 most active terrorist groups 
in the world, 74% were killed by leftist organizations (Seger, 2001). 
Between 1973 and 1975, the Symbionese Liberation Army committed bank 
robberies, two murders, and other acts of domestic violence. One of the most infamous of 
these was the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, one of the grand-daughters of newspaper 
magnate William Randolph Hearst. During the 1980s, left-wing terrorist actions grew to 
include groups such as the May 19th Communist Organization and, later in the decade, 
the smaller United Freedom Front, both engaging in covert/overt domestic, left-wing 
terror. However, in 1985, with the end of these groups, there was a reduction in the 
confirmed acts of left-wing terrorism reported in the United States. Further, left-wing 
terrorism incidents dropped-off dramatically at the end of the Cold War in 1991, 
primarily due to loss of support for communism, and lack of money (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008). 
Despite their success in earlier decades, there are currently no equivalent groups 
fashioning themselves as left-wing extremists. Bands of protestors, who periodically 
engage in bouts of smashing windows or throwing rocks at police (for instance, the 
Occupy Wall Street protestors), have become the norm. Bombings, bank robberies, and 
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terrorist engagements with law enforcement have now become the province of extremist 
right-wing groups. Unlike earlier decades, there are only a few true left-wing extremist 
organizations still operating. This reduction, believed to be the end of left-wing 
extremism, was chronicled by Daryl Johnson (2012) in his book, Right-Wing 
Resurgence: How a Domestic Terrorism Threat is Being Ignored. However, in 2009, 
Johnson’s research noted that cyber-attacks are now viewed as an attractive low-cost 
option for left-wing extremists. These types of attacks, in which engagement with 
economic targets is promoted in order to align with their non-violent agenda and no-harm 
doctrines, are seen as producing positive outcomes for these organizations. Prior to 9/11,  
their was a serious need for a counter-terrorism strategy that could effectively respond to 
the re-emergence of radical left-wing groups before they became pervasive in society. 
Considering the success the FBI has experienced in preventing potential domestic terror 
threats post 9/11, we now understand the importance of an effective counter-terrorism 
strategy in preventing left-wing radicalism from becoming a significant and ongoing 
domestic terror threat in the United States (Johnson, 2012). 
Right-Wing Terrorism 
“I personally regard them as more dangerous than the Klan groups from which they 
emanated.” - Director William Webster, FBI, New York Times, April 4, 1985 
Right-wing extremists are considered to be on the far-right end of the political 
spectrum and they are often called right-wingers or the far-right usually as a pejorative. 
According to data from the New America Foundation (2014), in the years since the 
September 11th attacks, right-wing extremists committed at least 19 different terrorist 
attacks in the United States, resulting in the deaths of at least 48 people. 
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Right-extremist are motivated by a deep sense of conviction that a revolution to 
overthrow a government is necessary in order to restore the White race to their “rightful” 
position of dominance and authority in America. Their views of an American past of self-
sufficient, morally righteous, hard-working people is similar to that of the mainstream. 
The difference however, are the tenets of the right-wing ideology which is deeply rooted 
racial hatred and anti-government sentiment.  Moreover, they are willing to exact 
violence on anyone they deem as a threat to advancing their cause. Their methods of 
effecting change include violence and intimidation which qualifies them to be labeled as 
domestic terrorists instead of patriots because they lack the affective or cognitive skills 
that would allow for constructive engagement.  
The Turner Diaries, the infamous racist dystopian novel by neo-Nazi William 
Luther Pierce, inspired more than 200 murders since its publication in 1978, including, 
prior to 9/11, the single deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing (Berger, 2016). In the book, the character of Earl Turner was 
crafted in a way to connect to the anger and fears of working-class White men became 
frustrated with government and their failure to prevent Jews, African-Americans, and 
other from “taking over” America. From their perspective, the White man was being 
systematically excluded from almost every facet of the American dream. The character of 
Earl Turner articulates a litany of missed opportunities by White men that precede the 
book’s apocalyptic events, explicitly stating that earlier action would have produced a 
better outcome (Berger, 2016):  
We have allowed a diabolically clever, alien minority to put chains on our souls 
and our minds. These spiritual chains are a truer mark of slavery than the iron 
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chains which are yet to come. Why didn’t we rebel 35 years ago, when they took 
our schools away from us and began converting them into racially mixed jungles?  
Why didn’t we throw them all out of the country 50 years ago, instead of letting 
them use us as cannon fodder in their war to subjugate Europe?  More to the 
point, why didn’t we rise up three years ago, when they started taking our guns 
away? Why didn’t we rise up in righteous fury and drag these arrogant aliens into 
the streets and cut their throats then? Why didn’t we roast them over bonfires at 
every street-corner in America? Why didn’t we make a final end to this obnoxious 
and eternally pushy clan, this pestilence from the sewers of the East, instead of 
meekly allowing ourselves to be disarmed? (Macdonald, 1978, p. 13) 
Right-wing extremists perceived that the marginalization of White Americans 
began shortly after World War II, when the armed forces were first integrated, the 
United Nations established its general headquarters on U.S. soil, and anti-
communism became the driving political force of the early Cold War (Gumbel, 
2015). 
Although the Klan’s membership had dwindled from three million in 1925 to 
roughly 50,000 by 1964, the Klan was still a force to be reckoned with in the south 
(Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011). By 1964, FBI investigations and congressional 
probes had dealt a significant blow to the Klan and their hegemonic ideology of White 
supremacy.  FBI’s COINTELPRO relentlessly targeted the Klan between 1965-1967, and 
the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-
American Activities conducted hearings into the Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations 
In The United States, most notably terrorism, and produced the report The Present Day 
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Ku Klux Klan Movement (Eighty-Ninth U.S. Congress, 1965). The fanaticism of White 
extremist was further crushed by  the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the Voting 
Rights Act in 1965 and government hearings into the Klan in 1965-1966, in the late 
1970s as the farm crisis was starting to affect the population of rural America and stoke 
existing White anger and resentment at the federal government, Texas Klansman and 
Aryan Nations ambassador Louis Beam Jr. issued a call to arms, ‘where ballots fail, 
bullets will prevail’, introducing a period of radicalization and violence that would 
become known as the ‘Fifth Era’ (Ridgeway, 1990).  
America’s bruising experience in Vietnam radicalized the far right even further, 
breathing life into the Patriot movement, whose members referred dismissively to the 
American government as the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG), and believed that 
only a return to the values of the American Revolution could save the country from its 
corrupt leaders who were under the undue influence of Jews at home and abroad.  
(Gibson, 1994). By the 1980s the farm crisis reached its apex, plunging entire rural 
communities into penury as giant agribusinesses took over family small-holdings, the 
movement briefly achieved a Robin Hood-style romantic appeal as two notable right-
wing extremists actively resisted what he perceived as government abuse and over-reach 
(Gumbel, 2015). Gordon Kahl was a North Dakota farmer who refused to pay his taxes 
and emerged as hero when he was killed for his extremist positions. Kahl likened the 
government to “Satan”, and died in a shootout with federal law enforcement in Arkansas. 
Wayne Snell left his farm in Arkansas to join the efforts of three anti-government 
paramilitary groups; The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. It was during 
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this period where the first abortive plan to blow up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City (Gumbel, 2015).  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the American extreme right, made up of Ku 
Klux Klan paramilitaries, White separatists, neo-Nazis, Identity Christians and anti-
government patriots such as Invisible Empire, White Patriot Party, White Aryan 
Resistance, National Alliance, Aryan Nations, Posse Comitatus and The Order, was 
implicated in numerous robberies, shootouts, murders and terrorist plots that grabbed the 
public and state’s attention, such as the 1984 murder of Denver Disc Jockey Alan Berg 
by The Order (Winter, 2010).   
By the 1990s, right-wing extremism surpassed left-wing terrorism as the most 
dangerous domestic terrorist threat in America (Watson, 2002). The most notable attacks 
perpetuated by right-wing domestic terrorists during this time was the infamous April 19, 
1995 attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City by right-wing 
extremists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, killing 168 people, including 19 
children in a day care and injuring 500 others (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2001). In 
January 1998, Christian Identity extremist Eric Rudolph was responsible for detonating a 
remote-controlled nail bomb in Birmingham, Alabama that instantly killed Robert 
Sanderson, an off-duty police officer and severely injured Nurse Emily Lyons (Stack, 
2015). Prior to this incident, On July 27, 1996, a pipe bomb, filled with nails and screws, 
exploded in Atlanta’s Centennial Park at the Olympic Games. The explosion killed one 
person and wounded 111 others (START, 2012). 
 In the summer of 1992, members of the Christian Identity and Patriot movements 
convened at the Rocky Mountain Rendezvous in Estes Park, Colorado (Southern Poverty 
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Law Center, 2000). The meeting was organized by Identity Minister Pete Peters in order 
to devise a strategic response to the government’s “assault on Ruby Ridge in which they 
deemed as tyranny of the government (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2000). At the 
meeting, Beam introduced “Leaderless Resistance”, a strategy based on the formation of 
autonomous terrorist cells to combat a better equipped and larger state law enforcement 
and military (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2000). This meeting is widely believed to 
have influenced the development of the Militia movement (Winter, 2010). 
Militia and Paramilitary Groups 
The defining characteristic of many domestic terrorist groups, include militia 
extremists, is that they are all anti-government (Bjelopera, 2013). The characteristic that 
differentiates militia groups from others is that they routinely organize themselves into 
paramilitary groups that follow military-style rank. These groups seek to stockpile 
various kinds of illegal weapons and ammunition and seek fully automatic firearms. They 
attempt to illegally convert weapons from semi-automatic to fully automatic and try to 
purchase or manufacture improvised explosive devices. They engage in multiple types of 
training, some of which include wilderness, survival, or other paramilitary training. Their 
primary focus is to generally target the government itself, including law enforcement 
personnel, representatives of the courts, public officials, and government buildings. When 
members are arrested, they are routinely charged with various explosives, weapons, 
and/or conspiracy violations (Mulloy, 2004).  
The Patriot movement reached its peak in the early-mid 1990s, as the end of the 
Cold War shuttered many defense industries, the country experienced a recession, and a 
resurgent militia movement that detested the militarization of federal law enforcement 
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agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the FBI (Gumbel, 2015).  
On August 21, 1992, the FBI enraged White extremists when during a raid on 
Ruby Ridge, Idaho, FBI sniper Lon Horiuchi shot Vicki Weaver in the head (killing her 
instantly) as she hid behind their cabin door. Extremists considered it vindication when 
Agent William Degan was shot to death in a shootout that killed the Weaver’s 14-year-
old Sam Weaver during an exchange of gunfire (Churchill, 2009). The FBI went to serve 
a warrant on Randy Weaver after informant Kenneth Fadely advised the FBI that Weaver 
had provided him with two sawed-off shotguns with obtaining a 200-dollar government 
permit (Churchill, 2009). This transaction, and Weaver’s refusal to turn “state’s witness,” 
gave the FBI a reason to raid the Weaver Household (Churchill, 2009). During the trial of 
Randy Weaver and family friend Kevin Harris, April 19, 1993, the government assault in 
Waco, Texas on David Koresh and the Branch Davidians sent the militia movement into 
a frenzy. Right-wing extremists viewed these assaults as grave injustices and an abuse of 
power perpetuated by a Zionist Occupation Government (Churchill, 2009). Jim 
Mckinzey, the co-founder of Missouri 51st Militia, described his move to action against 
para-military policing: 
Ruby Ridge was a wakeup call for a lot of people in the country, including 
myself. Until Ruby Ridge came down the pike, I could care less about 
politics…This is the greatest country in the world, love it or leave it…And then, 
they’re starting to shoot children, and shooting unarmed women in the head. Wait 
a minute now, I need to pay attention to what’s going on here. Then, what, less 
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than a year later, these same people are now down in Texas, taking on women and 
children, and that is really what did it. (Churchill, 2009) 
Militia extremists see themselves as protecting the U.S. Constitution, other U.S. 
laws, or their own liberties (FBI, 2011). Their actions are based on the belief that the 
Constitution grants citizens the ability and the right to wrest power from the federal 
government by force, if it is deemed that the federal government has become 
authoritarian or tyrannical. One of the primary ways this justification to overthrow the 
government manifest itself is by intense propaganda that the federal government wants to 
disarm the average citizen by violating their second amendment right “to keep and bear 
arms.” Militia extremists are often described as subscribing to various conspiracy theories 
regarding government; a central one concerns the New World Order. Their training and 
preparation is preparation for an inevitable invasion of the United States, coordinated by 
United Nations forces. Another fear held by militias is that the federal government will 
forcibly relocate citizens to camps controlled by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency or force them to undergo vaccinations against their will (Bill, 2005).  
An individual simply espousing anti-government rhetoric is not against the law. 
However, when the desire is to advance that rhetoric through violence, it becomes illegal. 
That is when the FBI and law enforcement agencies become involved. As the FBI, 
backed by the government, attempt to combat militia threats, its primary goal is to gather 
intelligence and analyze it in order to successfully identify the gaps in knowledge that 
may possibly lead to future terrorist attacks. By developing networks using confidential 
informants, tracking and identifying emerging tactics and trends, and proper use of 
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effective investigative techniques, militias planning domestic terror plots, can be stopped 
and prosecuted before they carry out their plots (Mulloy, 2008). 
Lone Wolf Terrorism 
“…the most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more 
of a lone wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack.” - President 
Obama, CNN, August 16, 2011 
Existing research on “lone wolf” terrorism often interprets it through the lens of 
psychoanalytic theory (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). Numerous defining characteristics, 
which can depict the lone wolf include: framing an ideology, a personal grievance, moral 
outrage, dependence on a virtual community, failure to affiliate with an extremist group, 
lack of occupational goals, radicalization fueled by changes in thinking and emotions, 
excitement of clandestine activities, contempt and disgust with various ideologies; failure 
to sexually bonding; and predatory violence sanctioned by moral (superego) authority 
figures (Phillips, 2011).  
The greatest threat for law enforcement agencies, and what makes lone wolf 
terrorist so extremely dangerous, is their unpredictability. Although they are driven to 
destruction by extremist rhetoric and ideology, lone wolves are individuals radicalized 
without significant contact with others and their plots of destruction are without direction 
from a top down military styled chain of command. Lone wolf terrorists are free to act 
upon any scenario and are only limited by what they can conceive in their minds (Simon, 
2013). This freedom to act independently has resulted in some of the most horrendous 
domestic terrorist attacks in American history.  
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There are three primary types of lone wolves: (a) the secular lone wolf is defined 
by the violent nature of attacks for political, ethno-nationalist, or separatist causes; (b) the 
religious lone wolf operates under an ideology that perpetrates terrorism in the name of 
Islam, Christianity, Judaism, or other belief systems; (c) the third type is the single-issue 
lone wolf, who perpetrates attacks for specific issue, such as abortion, animal rights, or 
the environment (Simon, 2013). 
While secular, religious, and single-issue lone-wolf attacks have similar 
objectives and motivations, there is a fourth and fifth type of lone wolf terrorist that is 
rather distinctive. The criminal lone wolf is primarily motivated by the desire for money 
and personal gain, as opposed to other kinds of terrorists, many of whom may be 
motivated by political, social, religious, or ethnic-nationalist goals. The lack of an 
ideological objective is why most analysts do not consider lone-wolf criminals to be 
‘terrorists’ in the traditional sense. However, there do exist cases where the criminal 
activity has so great an effect on society and government that it should be considered 
terrorism (Barnes, 2012). 
The fifth kind of lone-wolf terrorist is termed the “idiosyncratic” lone wolf. This 
person is mainly motivated by personal demons or mental illness. This category of lone 
wolf terrorist is unique. Except for cults that commit terrorist acts, there are no 
idiosyncratic terrorist groups currently in operation. Although the idiosyncratic lone wolf 
may commit attacks in the name of some radical ideological belief, these causes are the 
result of irrational desires, and perpetrators are frequently driven to violence mainly by 
severe personality disorders or other psychological issues. One of the most classic 
examples of the idiosyncratic lone wolf terrorist is Theodore Kaczynski, who called for a 
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revolution against an increasingly industrial-technological society, and although he was a 
mathematical genius, it was later determined that Kaczymski was not only an ideologue, 
but he was psychologically diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic (Barnes, 2012). 
Law enforcement strategies employed to deter homegrown terrorism has not been   
significantly useful, and most instances ineffective, against lone wolves.  The greatest 
challenge is that the modus operandi of the lone wolf is so inconsistent that it is almost 
impossible to prevent because their actions are only detectable by authorities after the 
terrorist incident has been committed.  
Technology has given the lone wolf terrorists significant tools for contacting other 
participants and accessing the Internet for planning. On the other hand, it can also cause 
problems in carrying out attacks. Lone wolves have become most vulnerable to discovery 
by law enforcement agencies when they surface online. Whether announcing to the world 
that they are ready, willing, and able to commit a desired terrorist act, or posting online 
manifestos (as some have done in the past), they can leave behind many Internet clues 
that can ultimately lead to their detection and demise. The chat rooms they visit, and the 
online searches they conduct can all become pitfalls leading to their arrest, and highlight 
a weakness for this kind of domestic terrorists (Reid Meloy, & Yakeley, 2014). 
Because of the relatively recent emergence of the lone wolf threat and the 
politicization of domestic terrorism by non-jihadist, legal scholarship is deficient in fully 
addressing this specific type of terrorism.  Like past presidential administrations dating 
back to president Jimmy Carter, previous legal scholarship addressing the more widely 
discussed phenomenon of homegrown terrorism focuses primarily on prosecutors’ efforts 
to criminalize nascent expressions of criminal intent (Abrams, 2005).   
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Sovereign Citizens 
The ideology of the sovereign domestic terrorist originates from the Posse 
Comitatus movement, which was promoted by William P. Gale, a Christian identity 
minister. His theories led to the rise of the Christian Patriot Movement, which was 
followed by the Redemption Movement, and further challenged the authority of the 
federal government by making use of citizens as a form of collateral to be used against 
foreign debt. The 14th amendment to the Constitution, according to Gale and others, 
converts sovereign citizens into federal ones by using their agreeing to accept benefits 
directly from the federal government, and thereby become indebted to the government,  
creating a new problem. To free themselves from their oppressive government, they 
instead label themselves as a group that is “seeking the Truth”, and also challenges the 
authority of the government and, in some instances, do so by directly engaging in acts of 
domestic terrorism (Loreleil, 2014). 
One of the central issues debated by and acted upon as Sovereigns, are the various 
laws concerning taxes where a variation of the argument that promotes civil disobedience 
is that the person is not directly subject to various laws because the person is considered 
“sovereign.” These challenges to the government have been repeatedly rejected by the 
courts especially, the tax courts (e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).  
The basis of the argument was that the individual is not to be subject to federal income 
tax because they are an “individual sovereign citizen.” This reasoning, if ever validated, 
would make every individual a nation unto themselves, such that prosecution using 
common and statutory laws would be unlikely. The sovereigns, having been rejected by 
the government, have performed isolated and sporadic acts of domestic terrorism, and are 
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individuals that need to be monitored by the government in an effort to avoid escalation 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). 
Conclusion 
This chapter considered key domestic terror groups and described their 
ideological positions, their histories, and their fears. The various groups described offer 
insights that can aid in creating a comprehensive, predictive model of future group 
behavior and assist law enforcement. Chapter 3 offers an analysis of policies, 
determinants, and social and behavioral characteristics that promote an in-depth review of 
the domestic terrorist groups. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This review examined current scholarly articles and studies related to key themes 
identified in the study that are useful to incorporate in a prevention model. Based on the 
findings of Chapter 2, the factions described there will be reviewed through a temporal 
evaluation. Searching for common themes and variables defining a particular time period 
supporting the growth and evolution of a domestic terror group will provide insights and 
the opportunity to develop deterrent capabilities, such as predictive behavior models 
(Davidson & Hudson, 2012). 
By developing each group, themes were interconnected and analyzed based on the 
literature offered by standard academic databases, including ERIC, Sage, and ProQuest, 
focusing on primary and peer-reviewed research articles and studies. Review of the 
various domestic organization typologies was developed in response to the problems law 
enforcement faces in responding to domestic terror groups. The researcher synthesized 
relevant research and provided recommendations at the conclusion of the study for 
stakeholders (Rosenau, 2013). 
Boolean search terms used to achieve saturation include: U.S. domestic terrorism 
groups, governmental responses, evolution of domestic terror organizations, history of 
key terrorist groups in the United States, and the future of U.S. domestic terrorism. By 
under-standing the past and the creation and growth of the important types of U.S. 
domestic terror groups, unifying variables can be identified, thus allowing for statistical 
analysis.  Supported by research, the analysis can draw from key inputs and outputs to 
develop models that can provide U.S. law enforcement agencies the opportunity to 
identify trends, hot-spots, and emerging issues related to domestic terrorism. Building on 
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past research utilizing quantitative methodological approaches, the potential damage from 
these organizations can be minimized, and give law enforcement the upper-hand in 
preventing future attacks (Schmitt, 2010). 
U.S. Public Policy on Terrorism from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan 
“I’m a father and I’m a Christian; I’m a businessman and I’m a Christian; I’m a farmer 
and I’m a Christian; I’m a politician and I’m a Christian. The most important thing in my 
life beyond all else is Jesus Christ.” - President Carter (Nielsen, p. 18, 1977) 
President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) 
In examining Jimmy Carter’s approach to terrorism or his overall approach to 
policy development, it is important to consider his devotion to his Christian faith. 
Reflecting on the tumultuous and politically charged sixties and seventies, some of 
Carter’s advisors felt that he should not be so straightforward regarding his faith for the 
fear that he would be viewed as a religious ideologue and alienate a new generation of 
voters. However, what was underestimated by Carter’s advisors was that even though 
Americans were not as indoctrinated or theologically dogmatic as their parents or 
grandparents, most Americans still expected that elected leaders, especially the President 
of the United States, be of the Christian faith. The uncomfortable or unnerving aspect to 
some extent was the time when elected officials, especially a President, gave the 
appearance that faith guided all their decisions on domestic and foreign policy. Although 
President Carter was aware of this concern, he was so deeply rooted in his religious 
convictions it was clear that his Christianity was inextricably connected to his 
personality. As a result, any attempts President Carter would have made to sever his 
decisions from his faith would often place him in an uncomfortable position.  
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In qualifying his moral turpitude, Carter’s religious convictions were essential in 
developing policies on terrorism (Ariail & Heckler-Feltz, 1996). As Carter (1976) 
believed that his faith would make him a different type of President from his immediate 
predecessors, researchers determined that those who knew and worked with Jimmy 
Carter believed that his religious faith was the core of his existence. To the Secret 
Service, he was known as "The Deacon,” and he would often forthrightly proclaim that 
his "religious faith has always been at the core of [his] existence" (Ariail & Heckler-
Feltz, 1996, p. 28).  
When President Jimmy Carter was elected as America’s 39th president of the 
United States, combating domestic terrorism was not considered a top priority. By the 
time President Carter was elected, incidents of domestic extremism had drastically 
declined.  Furthermore, Carter was intensely focused on dismantling the hierarchical 
modus operandi of the Nixon/Ford administrations and approaching acts of terrorism 
from a more humanitarian perspective where conflict negotiation, soft sanctions, coercion 
and compromise would be the alternative to military force. One of Carter’s primary 
concerns from the outset was to set up his foreign policy machinery in a way that would 
avoid the extreme centralization of power that Kissinger, as special assistant for national 
security affairs, had acquired during Nixon’s first term and that led him to replace for all 
practical purposes the secretary of state (George, George, & Stern, 1998). In an attempt to 
inhibit the special assistant from becoming the dominant actor in the system and a de 
facto “chief” of staff, Carter planned to rely on collegiality among his principal national 
security advisers which consisted of the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, a 
special assistant, and the vice president (George et al., 1998). Their mandate was to 
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achieve the necessary interaction and coordination required to engage those individuals 
or nations perceived as threat or potential threat to America’s national interest (George et 
al., 1998).     
While Carter accepted that occasionally it was necessary to use military force, he 
rejected the Clauswitzian notion that domestic and international conflict be solely 
resolved through military and law enforcement intervention. Carter rejected the 
imperialist dogma that differentiated between good wars and bad wars. To Carter, all 
wars were considered bad because it devalued the human condition. President Carter 
based on his religious beliefs, felt that it was imperative for any leader to find paths to 
peace and for him, it was not only a presidential priority, but it was in line with biblical 
precept found in Matthew 5:9, which states, “Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall 
be called the children of God.”  
Emerging from the Wilsonian southern traditions, Carter’s approach to governing 
was far different than his predecessor’s, and he was determined to challenge corruption as 
a political and religious necessity. Carter considered himself as a reformer and 
progressive, putting his faith in science and technology as well as religion, to advance the 
human condition, not only in America, but globally. He thought political leadership 
should support a common good, rather than satisfy a small constituency of elites and 
lobbyists whom he thought were only interested in defiling the ideals of democracy. 
Carter admitted that he never had the stomach for “politics as usual,” whether in 
international or domestic affairs; he did not love politics (Gould, 2003). Vice President 
Walter Mondale affirmed this sentiment when reflected on Carter’s predisposition about 
politics: “Carter thought politics was sinful. The worst thing you could say to Carter if 
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you wanted to do something was that it was politically the best thing to do” (Gould, 2003, 
p. 182). Like Woodrow Wilson, Carter intended to act with honesty, fairness, and candor, 
leading people by example, and asking them to reach for a higher moral plane (Ariail & 
Heckler-Feltz, 1996).  
Although President Carter’s faith was a key component to how he governed, his 
technocratic style and his collegial model of governance, although Nobel, would prove 
ineffective in the times of crisis when presidents are expected to “take charge.” 
According to Richard Neustadt (1990):  
Modern presidents need to be activists, experienced politicians, and possess a 
passion for politics. “The Presidency is a place for men of politics,” in fact, 
“extraordinary politicians.” Presidents must be political and learn the art of 
political compromise; they must exercise “the power to persuade” and “the power 
to persuade is the power to bargain.” (pp. 151-53) 
President Carter’s quest to “sanctify” and “sanitize” his administration and 
Washington, D.C. prevented him from developing the political acumen needed to 
advance his policies. The press was routinely harsh and critical of Carter’s frequent 
public displays of faith; church historian Martin Marty explained that President Carter 
knew no other way to govern (Berggren & Rae, 2006).  
Although President Carter was a devout Christian, there were incidents where his 
closest advisors would witness a persona that was far different than the congenial 
statesman displayed in public. His Chief Campaign Speech Writer, Patrick Anderson 
(1994), recounted incidents where President Carter engaged in mild uses of profanity, 
was known to be vindictive at times and would occasionally drink scotch and water in 
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moderation. Carter was a complex duplicitous technocrat that proved challenging to work 
for. In his book, Anderson (1994) made this observation of what it was like working for 
President Carter: 
Hiding behind his big smile and pieties about love and peanut farming was a far 
more interesting and complex man than the voters knew. He possessed not only 
intelligence and high moral purpose, but a mixture of pride and piety that could 
make him quite maddening to deal with. I found much to respect in the candidate 
and much to regret in the man.    
Despite, his shortcomings, his staff was convinced that post-Watergate, Jimmy 
Carter was a righteous and descent man who sincerely had a mission to restore integrity 
and honesty to government.   
Although Jimmy Carter ascended to the president at a time when incidents of 
domestic terrorism were on the decline, his presidency was not immune and his decision-
making in crisis situations would be tested in ways no one anticipated. Carter, like many 
of his predecessors, considered incidents of domestic terror as an annoyance better served 
by local authorities. This position became evident when on March 09, 1977, Hanafi 
Muslim extremists occupied B’nai B’rith headquarters, the Islamic Cultural Center, and 
city government buildings in Washington, DC, holding 134 people hostages (Naftali, 
2006). By the time the sieges were over, a student reporter from Howard University had 
been shot to death and City Council member Marion Barry had been wounded in the 
chest (Naftali, 2006). At the time, under the existing procedures, the incident was 
managed by the District police (Naftali, 2006). It was the Police who called in the State 
department's Office for Combating Terrorism when it became clear that the ring leader of 
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the Hanafis, Hamaas Abdul Khaalis was interested in speaking with Arab representatives 
(Naftali, 2006). The Carter administration received regular updates regarding the 
incident, but they did not take the lead in resolving the crisis. Douglas Heck, the State's 
antiterrorism expert and chairman of the Working Group for Combating Terrorism, 
worked with Egyptian, Pakistani and Iranian ambassadors who were acting as mediators, 
in an attempt to resolve the situations without any more human causalities (Naftali, 
2006). 
On the evening of March 10, 1977, the Hanafi hostage incident, was resolved and 
all involved in the incident were sentenced to prison. The Carter administration 
undertook a low-level review of U.S. counterterrorism policy (Naftali, 2006). Initially, 
under the guidance of Jessica Tuchman, a National Security Council staffer, the process 
did not draw the full attention of the President's national security advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski (Naftali, 2006). Brezinzinski did not believe that domestic terrorism was a 
strategic issue," recalls William Odom who replaced Tuchman after she lost Brzezinski's 
support (Naftali, 2006). As a result, President Carter made no public statement regarding 
the Hanafi Hostage Crisis. 
Jimmy Carter saw the terrorism problem tied to other international issues, and not 
only as threat in the United States (Smith & Thomas, 2001). In that context, Carter took a 
“trickle down” approach to domestic terrorism. That is, if he was effective at combating 
international terrorism, that would somehow curb or reduce the amount of domestic 
terrorism incidents. As a result, Carter was laser focused on dealing with terrorism on an 
international level. So much so that the 1980 Statute of Liberty Bombing received 
minimal attention from the Carter administration. He placed more emphasis on the 
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political character and “warlike” nature of terrorism, and less on its criminality (Smith & 
Thomas, 2001). What started out for Carter as political terrorism—a smorgasbord of sub-
national, transnational groups, some with state sponsorship, willing to operate against 
U.S. and allied interests—ended as “microcosmic” warfare, a teapot war, that scalded the 
Carter Presidency in the end (Smith & Thomas, 2001). By 1980, the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis and international terrorism had consumed the Carter administration to the point 
where almost everything else was secondary, including the economy, the oil crisis, and 
how to deal with stagflation. Carter, true to his humanitarian world view and Judeo-
Christian ethics worked tirelessly to create effective solutions to combat international 
terrorism through negotiations and sanctions. In May of 1980, the Carter Administration 
had developed an aggressive counter-terrorism program with elements that addressed the 
increased international terrorism threat (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Domestic terrorism was 
neither a concern to President Carter or the senior advisors of his administration. This 
was evident when Odom and Brzezinki made their positions known that the United States 
did not need an elaborate domestic counter-terrorism strategy (Naftali, 2006).  As far as 
they were concerned, the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to U.S. interests and 
terrorism abroad was more significant than issues of domestic terrorism in the United 
States. Odom concluded that as a phenomenon [domestic] terrorism did not exist. "When 
it happens here [America], it is a crime." "When it happens abroad, it is war" (Naftali, 
2006). 
Jimmy Carter was frequently criticized for lacking compelling political vision and 
it is noted that he took on too many issues, lacked focus, and lacked priorities (Berggren 
& Rae, 2006).  
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By the end of the 1970s, state-sponsored terrorism became an unambiguous threat 
to U.S. interests, metaphorically devouring President Carter, which ultimately sealed his 
fate and re-election looked bleak if not impossible (Smith & Thomas, 2001). In 
December 1979, the U.S. Department of State began designating state sponsors of 
terrorism, designations that carry harsh penalties in trade and international relations with 
the United States (Smith & Thomas, 2001, p. 206). But these sanctions came a little too 
late. President Carter was already seen as weak when dealing with acts of terrorism on an 
international stage. Despite his efforts to shift the counter-terrorism paradigm from the 
United States might to a role of conflict resolution and mild coercion, Americans were 
disappointed with the Carter administration and they were looking for a President that 
would exude confidence, strength, and military might around the world. They wanted a 
leader that terrorists would fear and respect. In 1981, the American people elected former 
California Governor Ronald Reagan because was the embodiment of toughness and 
confidence. The former actor who was known for his heroic portrayals in cowboy 
westerns was able to transfer that personification of “true grit” to the White House where 
he was expected to take a more aggressive approach in combating both international and 
domestic terrorism.   
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) 
When Ronald Reagan took office on January 20, 1981, he refocused U.S. counter-
terrorism strategy from conflict negotiation and mediation to military action. Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig was emphatic when he announced that President Reagan’s 
approach to fighting terrorism would replace the Carter administration’s focus on 
advancing human rights throughout the world (Richelson & Evans, 2001). In his 
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inaugural speech, Reagan (1981) became the first president in U.S. history to mention the 
threat of international terrorism:  
Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the 
world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is 
a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as 
Americans do have. Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and 
prey upon their neighbors.   
His speech was resilient and a warning to terrorist actors around the world that a new 
commander-in-chief was in the White House, and his name was Ronald Wilson Reagan. 
Reagan would be the first U.S. President to openly announce that he was waging war 
against global terrorism (Willis, 2003).  
Like the Carter administration, the Reagan administration recognized the global 
threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, Reagan and his top security advisors viewed 
the Soviet Union far more critically and accused them of being a stealth sponsor of 
international terrorism and the Reagan administration was determined to disrupt and 
destroy all international terrorist networks that threatened U.S. interests. Throughout the 
presidential campaign, Reagan took every opportunity to characterize Carter as weak on 
issues of international terrorism particularly in his approach of dealing with the Soviet 
Union. While campaigning, Reagan would consistently inject the notion that America, in 
order to achieve world peace, we must do so by rebuilding its military and nuclear 
capabilities (Smith, Clymer, Silk, Lindsey, & Burt, 1980). The slogan, throughout the 
campaign was Peace through Strength and Reagan made it clear that the weakness of the 
Carter administration was the primary reason that “our allies are losing confidence in us 
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and our adversaries no longer respect us” (Smith et al., 1980). Once Reagan was elected 
in November of 1980, he was laser focused on a military arms build-up that rivaled the 
Soviet Union (Smith et al., 1980). He wasted no time in appointing long-time friend and 
World War II veteran Caspar Weinberger as his Secretary of Defense. Reagan wanted 
someone in the position who shared his views, zeal and disdain for the Soviet Union. In 
his book, Fighting for Peace, Weinberger (1990) confirmed Reagan’s assessment of his 
potential commitment to a position of parity with the Soviets when he wrote: 
From then on I became almost totally immersed in defense and security issues, 
and would remain so with an intensity and single-mindedness that permitted 
thought about virtually nothing else, night and day, every day until the end of 
November 1987. (pp. 14-15) 
Both Weinberger and Reagan were convinced that the Soviet Union, via instruments of 
terrorism, were on a mission to destabilize America’s system of democracy and freedom. 
Based on this premise, from 1981-1983, the Reagan administration, with dogged 
determination, developed strategies and policies that would counter, what they perceived 
as diabolical scheme by the Soviets to one day disrupt America’s system of democracy.  
While the terrorism rhetoric-levels were high for incoming President Ronald 
Reagan, initially, the administration did not have in place the necessary strategic planning 
or the required counter-terrorism infrastructure to take decisive action that would yield 
positive results (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Reagan knew that he could ill-afford to 
authorize the execution of a military operation that would be a failure. The praxis of 
actual policy limped behind the fire-breathing rhetoric of the declared policy (Smith & 
Thomas, 2001, p. 238). Throughout his first term as president, Ronald Reagan skillfully 
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gave the appearance that he was the first commander-in-chief to develop a policy to 
combat international terrorism, when in actuality, he was only the first U.S. president to 
synthesize a terrorism protocol in 1986 with the issuance of National Security Decision 
Directive 207 (Rosenau, 2014). This directive resulted from the findings of the 1985 Vice 
President’s Task Force on Terrorism, headed by then Vice-President George H.W. Bush, 
which highlighted the need for improved, centralized interagency coordination of the 
federal government’s significant assets to respond to terrorist incidents (Rosenau, 2014). 
This directive was primarily focused on terrorist incidents abroad and was crafted to 
specifically to coordinate the national response and designate lead federal agencies to 
respond to and resolve terrorist incidents overseas and domestically (Rosenau, 2014). The 
U.S. State Department was renamed as the lead agency for developing international 
terrorism policy, procedures, and programs, while FBI remained the lead law 
enforcement agency for investigating and suppressing acts of domestic terrorism 
(Rosenau, 2014). However, like his predecessors, domestic terrorism never really became 
the primary focus of the Reagan administration. Incidents of international terrorism 
always took precedence even though every administration since the 1970s recognized the 
threat of domestic terrorism in the United States (Richelson & Evans, 2001). The only 
war American soil that Ronald Reagan would focus his attention and the nation’s 
resources, was the War on Drugs. On October 02, 1982, President Reagan officially 
announced, in his weekly radio address, his administration’s War on Drugs: 
The mood toward drugs is changing in this country, and the momentum is with us. 
We're making no excuses for drugs—hard, soft, or otherwise. Drugs are bad, and 
67 
 
we're going after them. As I've said before, we've taken down the surrender flag 
and run up the battle flag. And we're going to win the war on drugs.  
In March 1983, President Reagan announced the formation of the National 
Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to interdict the flow of narcotics into the 
United States (DEA, 1985).  NNBIS was headed by then Vice President George Bush, 
and had an Executive Board made up of members from the State Department, Treasury, 
Defense, Justice, Transportation, Central Intelligence Agency, and White House Drug 
Abuse Policy Office (DEA, 1985). 
Between 1980 and 1984, FBI anti-drug funding increased from $8 million to $95 
million (Beckett, 1997). Department of Defense anti-drug allocations increased from $33 
million in 1981 to over $1 billion in 1991 (Beckett, 1997). During that same period, DEA 
anti-drug spending ballooned from $86 to over $1 billion dollars, and FBI anti-drug 
allocations grew from $38 to $181 million (Beckett, 1997).  
The Reagan administration was well aware of the disruption and destruction of 
domestic terrorists but determined early on in the development of their counter-terrorism 
policy that domestic terrorism did not rise to the level of receiving dedicated federal 
resources in combatting their subversive activities around the country. However, what the 
Reagan administration did not anticipate was that between 1981-1986, there would be a 
simultaneous resurgence of domestic terrorism from right-wing, left-wing, and para-
military extremists. By 1981, there had been a resurgence of left-wing violence 
perpetrated by the May 19th Communist Organization (M19CO), Black Liberation Army 
(BLA), Jewish Extremist groups, Puerto Rican extremist groups, Anti-Castro/Cuban exile 
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extremists, and a few other ethno-nationalist terrorists re-energized their politically 
motivated violent campaigns (Rosenau, 2014).  
On October 20, 1981, exactly 9 months into the Reagan administration, six men, 
comprised of members from BLA and M19CO, donned ski masks and robbed a Brink’s 
armored truck in the Nanuet Mall in the upstate city of Nyack, New York. The guards 
were ambushed as they were loading the money into the truck (Castellucci, 1986). 
Brink’s guard, Peter Paige, was killed immediately while his partner, Joe Trombino, was 
severely wounded (Rosenfeld, 2013). While both guards were incapacitated, the men 
grabbed the bags, hopped into a red Chevrolet van and headed for a vacant Corvette 
dealership where they had a U-Haul truck in waiting (Rosenfeld, 2013). Once they 
arrived to the dealership, they abandoned the Chevrolet van and transferred themselves 
and the $1.6 million dollars to the U-Haul truck and headed for the New York State 
Thruway (Rosenfeld, 2013). A witness, who suspected something suspicious was afoot, 
contacted the police and gave a description of what she had seen. Police quickly set up 
roadblocks and stopped every U-Haul van in search of the suspects (Smith, Damphousse, 
& Roberts, 2006). Finally, on Exit 11, three Nyack police officers, with guns drawn, 
stopped Kathy Boudin and begin questioning her (Smith et al., 2006). Boudin feigned 
hysteria, and asked the police to “Put the guns down” because they were scaring her 
(Rosenfeld, 2013). Almost convinced that they had stopped the wrong U-Haul van, 
Sergeant Edward O’Grady decided to let her leave but Detective Arthur Keenen wanted 
to be sure and asked could he check the van (Rosenfeld, 2013). As the officers proceeded 
to inspect the van, six men emerged from the van and opened fire (Smith et al., 2006). 
Officer Waverly Brown and Sergeant O’Grady were both killed. Detective Keenen 
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managed to hide behind a tree and he was only slightly wounded (Rosenfeld, 2013). 
Kathy Boudin attempted to flee the scene but was captured by New York City 
Corrections Officer Michael Koch (Smith et al., 2006). A Honda, carrying a White male, 
White female and a Black male, crashed and its occupants were caught (Rosenfeld, 
2013). The actual murderer, Chui Ferguson, fled into the woods but was later captured by 
the FBI and a Joint Terrorism Task Force (Rosenfeld, 2013). The Brinks robbery was a 
concern to federal investigators because it disproved law enforcement’s previous theory 
that left-wing groups could not unite because of deep-rooted dogmatic ideology and 
diametrically opposed viewpoints. Nevertheless, the death of two officers and one 
security guard, domestic terrorist incidents on American soil were simply perceived as 
national media events regarding dissidents who engaged in sedition and criminal activity 
as a means to undermine U.S. democracy.  As far as Reagan and his senior policy 
advisors were concerned, illegal drugs and crime were a greater threat to American 
society than comparatively low-level incidents of domestic terrorism that were 
undergirded by the Soviet Union as a tactic to destabilize democracy and advance 
communist ideals (Sterling, 1981). 
Figure 2 demonstrates the frequencies of domestic terror attacks and their 
casualties over time from 1980-1986. In observing the figure, the height for the frequency 
of the attacks over this six (6) year period could be contributed to the disillusionment of 
left-wing extremist organizations who became frustrated with the slow-moving U.S. 
political process for substantive changes in human rights, peace treaties and trade 
agreements. Another reason could be attributed to American imperialism which is 
considered a tool for economic exploitation of less developed countries. In addition to 
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these possible explanations, there were several instances where left-wing extremist’s 
traversed their native infighting to American soil which contributed to the steady increase 
of terrorist attacks from 1980-1982.    
 
Figure 2. U.S. Domestic Terrorism Incidents and Casualties 1980-1986. Note. FBI 
Terrorist and Analytical Center (1986) 
Despite the Reagan administration dismissive approach regarding instances of 
domestic terrorism, these attacks would only intensify. In January 1982, two Armenian 
immigrants murdered Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikan in Los Angeles. The group, 
Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, claimed responsibility for the killing, and 
one member was arrested (Bureau of Diplomatic Security, p. 263, 1985). The Justice 
Commandos demanded that the Turkish Government admit responsibility for “genocide,” 
specifically, the deaths of more than one million Armenians in Turkey in 1915 (Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security, p. 263, 1985). Initially, Reagan officials though that local officials 
should be charged with providing security to foreign diplomats but local police chiefs 
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pushed back citing that they were already experiencing manpower and budget shortages 
(Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1985). On January 4, 1983, the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Public Works and Transportation (1982) resolved the 
issue and passed Public Law 97-418. This act expanded the authority of the U.S. Secret 
Service Uniformed Division, by allowing the agency to provide protective services to 
foreign diplomats as well as providing funds to the Department of State and local police 
agencies that assist with protection. This incident of domestic terrorism concerned the 
Reagan administration because they wanted to assure their allies that diplomats travelling 
to America would be kept safe while visiting the United States on diplomatic missions. 
Ironically, the issue was not viewed as an American problem.  
As far as the Reagan administration was concerned, this was an issue that spilled 
over from Armenia to America and should be considered an anomaly. Furthermore, 
international incidents of terrorism were given far more media attention and the Reagan 
administration wanted to capitalize on American’s fear by channeling these concerns into 
support for their aggressive counter-terrorism agenda. High profile incidents of 
Americans being kidnapped or killed by foreign terrorists demanded a response from a 
president who promised that under his administration, the United States will no longer 
appear weak and as a nation, we will command respect through military action. From 
1980-1986, the Reagan administration was stretched and challenged by a tumultuous 
synchronized wave of unrestrained pandemonium both nationally and internationally. 
According to the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Threat 
Analysis Division report generated on December 31, 1985, international terrorist attacks 
were responsible for 86 American casualties, while the 1986 FBI report listed 57 
72 
 
casualties that resulted from domestic terrorism incidents and not all the causalities listed 
in the FBI report were American citizens.  
 
Figure 3. Number of International Terrorist Incidents 1981-1985. Note. Department of 
State Bureau of Diplomatic Security 1985 
Figure 3 demonstrates terrorist activities abroad against U.S. interest abroad to 
include U.S. businesses and citizens. From 1981 – 1985, there is a steady increase of 
attacks on U.S. facilities and interests with a significant increase between 1984 -1985. 
This increase of attacks against U.S. interests abroad could possibly be attributable to the 
frustration of radical Islamic fundamentalist who wanted to purge U.S. influence and  
presence from the Middle-East. Hezbollah waged war against the United States 
because members strongly believed that the CIA was responsible for the attempted 
murder of their leader, Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. Both Iran and Lebanon 
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sponsored terrorism against the United States and they were determined to force America 
to withdraw military forces from the Middle-East. 
Reagan wasted no opportunity in portraying international terrorism attacks on 
American citizens and their interests as acts of defiance and a war on U.S. democratic 
principles. Every attack gave Reagan a platform to “go public” and emphatically 
denounce international terrorism while his top security advisors were simultaneously 
planning an aggressive military response. 
Reagan and his administration were driven by their priorities and public opinion. 
Fifty-seven casualties on American soil paled in comparison to eighty-six (86) 
international terrorism incidents in size, scope, and media coverage. Although Reagan 
was not as astute as many of his senior policy advisors on issues of international affairs, 
he was a master tactician when it came to understanding how important the media was in 
shaping or reshaping the opinions of the American people These seemingly well-
choreographed press conferences allowed Reagan to portray America to the international 
community as being strong and confident, especially since these characteristics, many 
Americans felt, were severely diminished under the Carter administration.  Reagan was 
well aware of this sentiment and his focus on international terrorism was unshakable. On 
July 8, 1985, while speaking at the Annual convention of the American Bar Association, 
Reagan named Iran, Libya, Cuba, North Korea and Nicaragua "a confederation of 
terrorist states.” (Reagan, 1985). Reagan (2005) went on to issue a scathing indictment of 
state sponsored terrorism: 
So, there we have it -- Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua -- continents 
away, tens of thousands of miles apart, but the same goals and objectives. I 
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submit to you that the growth in terrorism in recent years results from the 
increasing involvement of these states in terrorism in every region of the world. 
This is terrorism that is part of a pattern, the work of a confederation of terrorist 
states. Most of the terrorists who are kidnaping and murdering American citizens 
and attacking American installations are being trained, financed, and directly or 
indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments -- a 
new, international version of Murder, Incorporated. And all of these states are 
united by one simple criminal phenomenon -- their fanatical hatred of the United 
States, our people, our way of life, our international stature.  
Reagan characterized state-sponsored terrorism of as "an act of war" to which the United 
States had the right to respond militarily (Naftali, n.d.). Not only did Reagan hold states 
accountable, he was adamant that individual terrorist or terrorist groups would be 
apprehended and brought to justice on American soil (Naftali, n.d.). Reagan (1985) was 
emphatic as he went on to say: 
There can be no place on Earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest, or 
train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or 
unilaterally, if necessary, to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary - anywhere. 
By 1985, domestic terrorism had declined. This decline had less to do with 
counter-terrorism measures at the federal level and more to do with aggressive 
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions by state governments. In addition, left-wing 
terrorist groups were unable to garner massive support for their outdated political agenda 
due to diametrically opposed ideologies, internal competition for control, the arrest and 
sentencing of charismatic leaders, the demands of being a fugitive and the prevalence of 
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multiple cognitive distortions weakened the sustainability of these groups. But the JDL, 
although they were less prolific than years past, and their membership in decline, they 
would commit a nefarious act of revenge that would reinforce the Reagan 
administration’s polemic that all Muslims were complicit in acts of international 
terrorism. 
On October 11, 1985, at approximately 9:00 am, a bomb exploded at the Santa 
Ana, California office of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), 
killing 41-year-old Palestinian activist, husband and father, Alex Odeh (Habib, 2016). 
Initially, the murder of Odeh was thought to be as the result of his public reverence of 
Yasser Arafat on television the day before his murder (Habib, 2016). But that theory soon 
dissipated as the investigation revealed that the plot was too elaborate to be completed in 
just one day (Habib, 2016). Furthermore, The Los Angeles Times reported on Oct. 12, 
1985, the day after Odeh was killed, FBI spokesman John Hoos stated they had “no 
evidence linking Odeh’s remarks to the bombing” (Habib, 2016). A more plausible 
theory, and one that was circulated throughout the Arab-Palestinian community, was that 
Alex Odeh was murdered by the JDL as retaliation for the October 7, 1985, murder of 
Jewish-American Leon Klinghoffer at the hands of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) 
while he was on the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro (Hoffman, 1986). This incident 
prompted an immediate response from the Reagan administration and although this 
incident occurred in international waters, Reagan wanted the perpetrators extradited as a 
guarantee they would be tried for the murder of an American citizen. In fact, when 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak secretly arranged for the hijackers to be smuggled out 
of the country, Israeli Intelligence notified American Intelligence who in turn relayed this 
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information to President Reagan (Heymann, 1990). Incensed, Reagan immediately 
approved for Navy fighter pilots to force the plane carrying the hijackers to land at a 
NATO airbase in Sicily with last minute approval from Italian Prime Minister Benedetto 
Craxi (Heymann, 1990). What Reagan and his team failed to mention was that there were 
also two transport planes carrying Delta Force troops with orders to arrest all the 
passengers on Egyptian plane and transport them to the United States to be tried for 
murder (Heymann, 1990). Italian officials blocked this move, which strained relations 
between the United States and Italy.  
The Reagan administration was relentless in their pursuit of those responsible for 
the death of Leon Klinghoffer while the investigation of Alex Odeh, in comparison, 
seemingly moved at a pace of disinterest. Ronald Reagan exacerbated the Palestinian 
community’s suspicions of indifference when he met Mrs. Marilyn Klinghoffer to offer 
his condolences for the loss of her husband but the same courtesy was not extended to 
Alex Odeh’s widow, Norma Odeh (Palermo, 1985). Despite the sharp criticism from 
leaders in the Arab-Palestinian community, a spokesman for the Reagan administration 
said the President had no intentions of meeting with the Odeh family (Palermo, 1985). 
Ironically, the Department of Justice, in conjunction with the FBI, would finally take over 
the Alex Odeh murder investigation from local law enforcement because it had finally 
concluded that Odeh’s death was the result of a domestic terror attack (Habib, 2016).  
By the end of his second and final term, Reagan and his administration worked 
incessantly to restore the credibility and the image of the Great Communicator after the 
Iran-Contra Affair stained his reputation and the image. More importantly, Reagan knew 
that the closest he would come to serving a third term in office to further advance his 
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foreign policy agenda would be the election of his vice-president, George H. W. Bush. 
Consequently, the administration never allotted the time or the space required to 
aggressively combat domestic terrorism. Like the Carter administration, Reagan 
dismissed the notion that domestic terrorism was an existential or societal stability 
challenge and continued to stress the criminality of domestic terrorist activities and their 
behavior was nothing more than civil disobedience. Not surprisingly, this sentiment 
regarding domestic terrorism would carry over to the next administration when George 
H. W. Bush was eventually elected the as the 41st president of the United States. Bush 
was integral in the development of the Reagan counter-terrorism strategy and like his 
predecessor, Bush and his senior advisors would focus almost exclusively on combating 
international terrorism. 
U.S. Terrorism Policy from George H. W. Bush to Bill Clinton 
George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) 
George H. W. Bush was a permanent fixture in Washington politics since his 
1966 win of a congressional seat to the House of Representatives after defeating 
challenger Frank Briscoe (then district attorney) for the 7th district of Texas (O’Reilly & 
Renfro, 2006). Bush quickly became a rising star in the Republican Party and was well 
known throughout the state of Texas as a staunch conservative. In 1970, President 
Richard Nixon convinced Bush to vacate his seat in the House of Representatives and 
make another run for the United States Senate. Unfortunately, this was a miscalculation 
by both Nixon and Bush. Former congressman Lloyd Bentsen proved to be a formidable 
opponent and defeated George H. W. Bush denying him a chance to serve in the U.S. 
Senate. Disappointed by his second loss in his bid for the U.S. Senate, Bush’s political 
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career seemed uncertain until President Nixon tapped him to become Ambassador to the 
United Nations where served from 1971-1973 (Hess, 2001). Bush would continue to 
build his foreign policy credentials under President Gerald Ford when in 1974, he 
accepted Ford’s invitation to become the Chief U.S. Liaison to China and 3 years later 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Hess, 2001).   
On January 20, 1989, George Herbert Walker Bush ascended to the office of the 
presidency with more foreign policy experience, and arguably more government 
experience, than any of his predecessors (Knott, 2005). In constructing his 
administration, Bush wanted to surround himself with people that were more agreeable to 
his style of management. Bush was a reserved strategic thinker that did not operate on 
emotion or external pressures, more importantly, he did not want to be surrounded by a 
cabinet of “yes men.” Therefore, Bush methodically forged an administration that placed 
a priority on a collegial exchange of ideas, relying on solid analysis and formal decision-
making (Rothkopf, 2005). His senior, most trusted advisors included National Security 
Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell (Knott, 2005). These 
picks were individuals that Bush had established a personal relationship at some point in 
his career while in Washington with a temperament mirrored his own. Bush however, 
made a notable departure in temperament and style with his selection of John Sununu. A 
graduate of the prestigious M.I.T. University and engineer by training, Sununu was very 
domineering and was known to block access to the president. Despite his proclivity to be 
openly ostentatious, Sununu was brilliant, capable, and he made the controversial 
decisions that made President Bush feel uncomfortable.   
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The “full court press” against international terrorism began under Ronald Reagan 
(Smith & Thomas, 2001). Bush, being the progenitor of the Reagan counterterrorism 
Task Force, was expected to approach terrorism with the same zeal as his predecessor. 
Bush however, despite the rhetorical statements against acts of terrorism, became content 
and preferred that the United States take a defensive or reactionary approach. To the 
chagrin of Reaganites, the Bush Administration’s decision to gradually deprioritize the 
threat of terrorism was viewed as disingenuous considering that he assured foreign policy 
conservatives continuity with the counter-terrorism policies of the Reagan administration 
once he was elected president. Bush’s NSC adviser, Brent Scowcroft, said terrorism 
never really came up on the White House radar screen during the Bush Administration 
except during the release of the hostages in Lebanon (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Overall, 
neither Bush nor Scowcroft viewed terrorism as a strategic threat. This position however 
would cause Bush’s image to suffer under hardline conservatives. Although Bush 
skillfully crafted his image during his presidential campaign as a forceful leader, his 
reversal of policy on terrorism had Reagan stalwarts resurrect images and conversations 
of a salient theme that haunted Bush throughout his career at the White House: President 
George H. W. Bush was still a deferential, indecisive, wimp (O’Reilly & Renfro, 2006).  
The Bush administration’s low-key, non-engagement approach to counter-
terrorism was actually a strategy put forth by then Secretary of State, James Baker. Baker 
rationalized that if the administration was less visible and less vociferous, this would 
keep terrorists guessing and ultimately give the United States a tactical advantage both 
operationally and psychologically. Bush embraced this strategy because it was effective 
and it was more in line with his personality traits and management style. More 
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importantly, it freed him from the burden of acting like Ronald Reagan in order to 
appease a conservative base constantly judged his performance using their own self-
created and highly subjective Reagametrics. Nevertheless, Bush approached foreign 
affairs with characteristic conservatism and pragmatism (Knott, 2005). His approach to 
any issue was methodical and he was comfortable in a collegial setting surrounded by 
likeminded senior staff members who would give him honest feedback in their critique of 
his policy and strategic plans to best accomplish the administrations overall goals. Bush 
was never a person to rush into new actions or policy changes because they were popular 
with voters or the Congress (Knott, 2005). When he acted, he did so with firm conviction 
and determination because Bush and his top advisors would analyze the situation from 
almost every angle. Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of any operation, 
Bush relished uncertainty and always wanted potential outcomes to be as accurate as 
humanly possible.  
Although Bush was perceived as weak by many Reagan loyalists for reducing 
tough talk rhetoric and lessening threats of terrorism, he maintained and supported many 
of the polices of the Reagan administration. He retained the “no quid pro quo” policy 
when it came to negotiating with terrorists, continued emphasis on international 
cooperation, which allowed him to negotiate the release of the hostages during the 
Lebanon hostage crisis without the military force, ransom payments or an exchange of 
weapons (Smith & Thomas, 2001). While levels of international terrorism increased 
during the Gulf War, they quickly returned to much lower post-Cold War levels when 
Bush proved to terrorists that his low-key persona should not be mistaken for weakness 
or timidity (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Bush authorized so-called “snatch” military 
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operations where U.S. forces would covertly enter another country and capture notorious 
drug dealers and terrorist and bring them to America to stand trial (Smith & Thomas, 
2001). Despite the international backlash from world leaders who felt disrespected that 
the U.S. did not seek their approval, these operations were popular with the American 
people and put drug dealers and terrorists on notice they could not out run the long arm 
of U.S. justice (Smith & Thomas, 2001). 
As the Bush presidency was coming to the end of its first term, the success of 
Operation Desert Shield in thwarting Saddam Hussein’s plan to annex Kuwait by force, 
was thought to be enough for Americans to elect Bush to a second term. Although the 
operation afforded Bush high favorability ratings, his re-election campaign was viewed as 
disorganized and off message (O’Reilly & Renfro, 2006). During the re-election 
campaign, Bush struck many Americans as a bumbling New England Yankee whose 
mangled syntax and unfamiliarity with checkout counter scanners invited derision 
(O’Reilly & Renfro, 2006). American voters perceived that President Bush was far too 
concerned with foreign policy and not nearly enough on domestic issues (Knott, 2005). 
Moreover, during his first-term, he alienated Reagan stalwarts by breaking his promise 
not to raise taxes, softening his position on international terrorism, and cutting military 
spending (Knott, 2005). Without their backing, hardline Reagan supporters calculated 
that Bush’s defeat was inevitable and would guarantee him a spot in the pantheon of 
utterly forgettable presidents and the studious successor to the popular Ronald Reagan 
never evolved into the heir apparent conservatives voted for in 1988 (O’Reilly & Renfro, 
2006). On Tuesday, November 3, 1992, Americans voted for change and elected William 
Jefferson Clinton as the 42nd President of the United States.   
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Bill Clinton (1993-2001 
“Terrorism is at the top of the American agenda, and it should be at the top of the 
world’s agenda.” - President Clinton, Address to the UN General Assembly, September 
1998 
On January 20, 1993, after President Clinton was sworn into office, in was 
explicitly clear that terrorism did not figure at all as an issue in the presidential campaign 
of 1992 and the foreign policy experts of the victorious Clinton team did not list terrorism 
as a priority for the incoming administration (Naftali, 2006). Clinton and his senior policy 
advisors reasoned that lowered terrorism statistics did not warrant maintaining the 
counter-terrorism infrastructure put in place by his predecessor (Smith &Thomas, 2001). 
But, what the Clinton administration did not take into account was without American 
leadership on issues of international terrorism, and a contingent strategy to combat 
potential incidents of domestic terrorism, the United States would lag behind if a 
reinvigorated terrorism campaign suddenly emerged. (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Critics of 
the Clinton administration’s new approach towards counter-terrorism felt that he had he 
had dumbed- down, deemphasized, defunded, and deconstructed counter-terrorism to a 
point where it left the U.S. in a vulnerable position (Smith &Thomas, 2001). Thirty-seven 
days into the Clinton administration, his critics would be vindicated in their excoriation 
of President Clinton’s policy position on terrorism.  
On Friday, February 26, 1993, a massive truck bomb exploded in the parking 
garage of the World Trade Center’s (WTC) North Tower in New York City. This would 
be only the beginning. Like Ronald Reagan, the Clinton presidency would be confronted 
with a simultaneous rise of terrorism from various ideological and religious perspectives 
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both nationally and internationally. Most notably, on the domestic front, was pro-life 
domestic terrorists. President Clinton was the first pro-choice President since Jimmy 
Carter and within 1 month of his election anti-abortionist fires caused $1.5 million dollars 
of damage to abortion clinics around the country (National Abortion Federation, 1993). 
The terrorists involved in 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the 1995 Tokyo 
sarin-gas attack, the 1996 Oklahoma City Bombing, and the 1998 East Africa bombings 
were the unmistakable harbingers of a new more vastly more threatening form of 
terrorism which were designed to produce casualties on a massive scale (Simon & 
Benjamin, 2000). Prior to the World Trade Center bombing, The Department of Justice 
(DOJ), the FBI and other law enforcement officials had been complacent about major 
international terrorist incidents in the U.S. (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Both the Bush and 
Clinton Administrations weakened America’s first line of defense against international 
terrorism by cutting budgets, losing experts and refocusing national attention away from 
terrorism being a real threat to American security (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Despite the 
Clinton administration and DOJ’s lack of terrorists’ response readiness, the FBI 
investigation was relentless in finding the perpetrators who committed such a heinous act 
that killed six and injured more than 1000 people (9/11 Report, 2004). But like every 
president before him, Clinton viewed the bombing as a criminal act and not a security 
threat. A responding FBI agent was reported as saying that it was a miracle that the 
incident did not yield more fatalities (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). After the 
bombing, President Bill Clinton ordered his National Security Council to coordinate a 
response to the attack (9/11 Report, 2004). Federal, states, and local law enforcement 
agencies worked feverishly to find the culprits (9/11 Report, 2004).  
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The perpetrators of the WTC bombing turned out to be a group of New Jersey 
men who had been on the FBI’s radar as suspected terrorists for at least 2 years 
(Parachini, 2000). The mastermind, Ramzi Yousef, was assumed to be a naturalized 
Pakistani citizen who entered the U.S. on September 1, 1992 (Dirgham, 1995). Although 
he possessed an Iraqi passport, he claimed to have been born in Kuwait (Dirgham, 1995). 
During the investigation, it was discovered that Yousef, attended a terrorist training camp 
in Afghanistan, where he perfected his skills as an explosives expert (Parachini, 2000). 
After arriving in the United States, Yousef went to live in New Jersey with Musab Yasin, 
an Iraqi whose brother, Abdul Rahman Yasin, also arrived in New Jersey from Iraq 
shortly after Yousef (Parachini, 2000). Mohammad Salameh attended the Mosque of 
Sheikh Omar Abdul an extremist Sunni Muslim cleric who had moved to the United 
States from Egypt in 1990 (9/11 Report, 2004). In speeches and writings, the sightless 
Rahman, often called the “Blind Sheikh,” preached the message of the Egyptian radical, 
Sayyid Qutb and quoted his seminal work Milestones, in which Qutb characterized the 
United States as the oppressor of Muslims worldwide and asserted that it was their 
[Muslims] religious duty to fight against God’s enemies [America] (9/11 Report, 2004). 
Yousef was convinced that the West was evil and a threat to the Islamic way of life and it 
was now his duty to punish America for the perceived atrocities inflicted on Muslims.  
After the bombing, Salameh made an unsophisticated, dull-witted attempt to 
divert investigator’s attention by reporting the truck he rented to commit the terrorist act 
as stolen on March 3, 1993 (9/11 Report, 2004). What raised law enforcement’s suspicion 
even further was the fact that Salameh called the Ryder truck rental company several 
times requesting, and sometimes demanding a refund of his 400-dollar rental deposit 
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(9/11 Report, 2004). On March 4, 1993, FBI SWAT moved in and arrested Salameh as he 
attempted to collect his deposit (9/11 Report, 2004). As the FBI Task Force connected the 
“dots,” and it led them to co-conspirators Ahmed Ajaj, Nidal Ayyad, a trained engineer 
who had acquired chemicals for the bomb, and Mahmoud Abouhalima, was the 
accomplice who helped mix the chemicals (9/11 Report, 2004). Another associate, 
Ibrahim Elgabrowny, while being served with an ATF search warrant attacked the 
serving agent but was immediately subdued and arrested (Stewart, 2015). While 
executing the search warrant, agents discovered Nicaraguan passports, driver’s licenses, 
and identification cards bearing the photos of his cousin, El Sayyid Nosair (Stewart, 
2015). As the search continued and after further investigation, it was clear that agents did 
not have enough evidence to connect Elgabrowny to the bombing, however, there was 
enough evidence to prosecute him for passport and document fraud (Stewart, 2015). The 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York office vigorously pursued 
these lesser charges and indicted Elgabrowny on assault and passport fraud charges 
(Stewart, 2015).  
On May 24, 1994, during the sentencing of four of the convicted WTC bombers, 
Judge Kevin T. Duffy asserted that the perpetrators had incorporated sodium cyanide into 
the bomb with the intent to generate deadly hydrogen cyanide gas that would kill 
everyone in one of the towers. The Judge stated: 
You had sodium cyanide around, and I’m sure it was in the bomb. Thank God the 
sodium cyanide burned instead of vaporizing. If the sodium cyanide had vaporized, 
it is clear what would have happened is the cyanide gas would have been sucked 
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into the north tower and everybody in the north tower would have been killed. That 
to my mind is exactly what was intended. (Duffy, 1994) 
Although the FBI Joint Task Force made the arrest rather quickly, Ramazi 
Yousef, the mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, evaded capture (Stewart, 
2015). FBI agents worked tirelessly and used all their resources to bring Yousef to 
justice. During the course of the investigation, the FBI discovered that Yousef was in the 
process of planning more attacks within the United States including the simultaneous 
bombing of a dozen U.S. international flights (Stewart, 2015). But with some 700 FBI 
agents worldwide, Yousef was captured in Pakistan in February 1995, returned to 
America, and convicted along with the truck driver, Eyad Ismoil (Stewart, 2015).  
Although the work performed by the FBI Joint Task Force and the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, the swiftness and the efficiency of the investigation created an impression that 
law enforcement was well-equipped to deal with this new form of “modern” terrorism 
(9/11 Report, 2004).  
President Clinton created and reformulated the “new-terrorism” discourse, which 
he characterized as borderless and possessing the catastrophic threat of weapons of mass 
destruction. Clinton forced Americans to confront to the realization that homegrown 
terror was no longer a theoretical abstraction that would be “birthed” from a series of 
societal breakdowns. In fact, as President Clinton surmised, terrorism has proven that it 
could come from “within or beyond our borders” (Clinton, 1995a, p. 832) and the 
tentacles of terrorism no longer skirt the edges of American society while wreaking 
havoc abroad, and instead terrorist had “become an equal opportunity destroyers, with no 
respect for borders” (Clinton, 1996a, p. 1257). In other words, there was no longer a clear 
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boundary between domestic and international terrorism. Terrorists had shown that 
resilience paired with criminal ingenuity was difficult to counter and America would 
become increasingly susceptible to foreign attacks whether they be random or target 
specific. Moreover, Clinton’s discourse on international terrorism highlighted the real 
threat of domestic terrorists’ incidents and posited the theory that so-called rogue states 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were skillfully, and strategically 
aimed at the United States for the sole purpose of disrupting American democracy and 
instilling a fear that would give terrorists de facto political leverage. Rogue states, 
according to Clinton, were allies of terrorists, who hated the United States. In his remarks 
at a World Jewish Congress dinner, Clinton (1995b) stated, “Nations like Iran and Iraq 
and Libya aim to destabilize the region. They harbor terrorists within their border. They 
establish and support terrorist base camps in other lands; they hunger for nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction” (p. 616). 
Although President Clinton said all the right things after the 1993 World Trade 
Center Bombing, there was a reluctance by the President and his administration to lobby 
Congress for more resources directed at combatting terrorism (9/11 Report, 2004). Like 
past presidents, Clinton’s focus was on combatting white-collar crimes, gang violence, 
and the war on drugs (9/11 Report, 2004). On September 1, 1993, President Clinton 
chose Louis Freeh as the new Director of the FBI. Freeh immediately recognized that 
terrorism was considered to be the greatest threat America and he moved quickly to 
protect American interests by increasing the number of legal attaché offices abroad with a 
specific focus in the Middle-East and urged FBI agents to be proactive in terrorism plots 
(9/11 Report, 2004). In fact, in his efforts to procure more funding for counter-terrorism, 
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Freeh told Congress, “…merely solving this type of crime is not enough; it is equally 
important that the FBI thwart terrorism before such acts can be perpetrated” (9/11 Report, 
2004, p. 76).  In 2000, the FBI assigned 76% of its agents to criminal cases, roughly 21% 
to counterintelligence, and just 2% to 3% to counterterrorism (DOJ, 2003). Of the FBI’s 
12,730 convictions in 1998, more than half involved drugs, bank robberies, and bank 
fraud, whereas only 37 related to terrorism (Gulati, Rivkin, & Raffaelli, 2016, p. 13) 
Freeh experienced significant “pushback” from the senior agency officials, 
Congress, and the Department of Justice even though he had managed to forge a 
relationship with the CIA to share intelligence regarding terrorists’ activities. Moreover, 
Freeh created a Counterterrorism Division to work in conjunction with the CIA’s 
Counterterrorist Center (9/11 Report, 2004). Despite his best efforts, Freeh was unable to 
convince Congress, the Department of Justice or President Clinton that counter-terrorism 
was significant enough to shift resources away from areas violent crime or drug 
enforcement (9/11 Report, 2004).  
In 1996, President Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (Simon and Benjamin, 2000). Under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), prisoners convicted by a state court must file a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus within one year of “the date on which the judgment became final” 
unless one of three exceptions applies (Harvard Law Review, 2013, p. 319). In the case 
of certain impediments to filing, including unconstitutional state action, recognition of a 
new right by the Supreme Court, or recent discovery of facts crucial to the petition, the 
limitation obtains one year after removal of the impediment (Harvard Law Review,  
2013). In terms of terrorism, it authorized the creation of a special tribunal that had the 
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inherent authority to expedite the deportation of foreign terrorist without disclosing 
classified information to the deportee or his legal counsel (Simon & Benjamin, 2000). In 
addition, the law made it illegal for anyone to render financial or material assistance to a 
designated terrorist or their organization and it mandated that investigators recover and 
test all taggants in an attempt to trace the origin of the explosive(s) used in terrorist 
attacks (Simon & Benjamin, 2000).   
In the first term of the Clinton administration counterterrorism initiatives were 
directly focused on providing local law enforcement agencies resources to protect 
Americans from external threats of violent extremists, building coalitions abroad in order 
to disrupt terrorism networks and more importantly, improve airport security both on the 
ground and in flight (Roberts, 2010). In President Clinton’s second term, his 
administration had become increasingly aggressive towards international terrorists. In 
1996, terrorists attacked the Khobar Towers and killed Nineteen United States Air Force 
personnel and wounded 372 (Riedel, 2015). On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombs exploded 
in front of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. As a 
result of this attack, 291 people were killed and nearly 5,000 injured (Corsun, 1998). 
Among the dead were 12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service Nationals employed by the 
U.S. Embassy (Corsun, 1998). On October 12, 2000, near Aden, Yemen, suicide 
terrorists used a small boat filled with explosives, pulled alongside of the USS Cole and 
detonated their explosives. The explosion ripped a hole in the side of the USS Cole 
approximately 40 feet in diameter and killed 17 U.S. Navy personnel and injured 40 
others (FBI, 2000). The Clinton administration was being heavily criticized for not being 
forceful enough against terrorists who continued to take the lives of American soldiers, 
90 
 
diplomats, and personnel. The Clinton administration was accused of using the “failed” 
counter-terrorism policies of diplomacy and economic sanctions employed by the Jimmy 
Carter administration. As the Clinton presidency was coming to an end, President Clinton 
could ill afford to appear weak on terrorism if his vice-president, Al Gore was to succeed 
him in the Oval Office. The administration pivoted in their approach towards terrorism 
and became more aggressive in tone and willingness to use military force as a first option 
in combating terrorism. With a laser focus on international terrorist abroad and radical 
jihadists in the United States, the Clinton administration “shrugged” off anti-abortion 
terrorists as radical criminal fanatics best dealt with by local law enforcement. The 
actions of Timothy McVeigh, although concerning and horrific, was considered an 
anomaly of hatred that would quickly dissipate and there was no quantitative justification 
to dedicate resources combatting non-jihadist homegrown terrorism.    
U.S. Terrorism Policy from George W. Bush to Barack Obama 
George W. Bush (2000-2009) 
In his examination of the impact of religion on George W. Bush, Fineman 
contended: 
[T]his president—this presidency—is the most resolutely ‘faith-based’ in modern 
times, an enterprise founded, supported and guided by trust in the temporal and 
spiritual power of God…But the Bush administration is dedicated to the idea that 
there is an answer to societal problems here and to terrorism abroad; give 
everyone, everywhere, the freedom to find God, too. (Fineman et al., 2003). 
The scholarly literature on President W. Bush is equally limited in reviewing his 
politics and religion, noting there is a similar reluctance to examine Bush’s faith and its 
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impact on his political decision making. His campaign biography, published in 2000, as 
well as later works on the Bush administration refer to his faith, but do not explore its 
relevance or effect on his conduct in office. In five works on the Bush presidency, there 
are only two chapters on religion. One chapter is a brief discussion of his use of religious 
rhetoric, preference for moral certainties, and belief in universal values (Pfiffner, 2004). 
The other chapter explores Bush’s political relationship with the religious right (Berggren 
& Rae, 2006). This lack of material gives rise to questions regarding the Bush presidency 
and the role faith had with domestic policies addressing terrorism.  
President Bush transformed the White House into a place of faith drawing on his 
evangelical faith, and his cabinet members’ choices reflected his strong religious 
background. His devotional habits during his administration, noting that he "opened 
every cabinet meeting with prayer and insisted on a high moral tone," promoted the idea 
and strength of religious connections to the creation of public policy while in the White 
House (Mansfield, 2003). The Bush White House was noted as being driven by a 
morality that supported a non-smoking, tea-totting, non-cussing affair, promoting a 
higher set of standards by the nation’s leaders. George W. Bush’s former speechwriter 
David Frum (an Orthodox Jew) gave an interview in 2003, in which he explained that if 
researchers wanted to understand the Bush White House, “you must understand its 
predominant creed and culture of modern Evangelicalism” (Frum, 2003, p. 3).  
In many ways, George W. Bush management style was that of a Fortune 500 
CEO. He was decisive in most of his actions and was very impatience when it came to 
bureaucratic “red tape” which he often deemed as unnecessary (Pfiffner & Davidson, 
2003). This was in stark contrast to his father George H. W. Bush and his predecessor 
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Bill Clinton, who, as career politicians and government stalwarts, deemed it imperative to 
analyze every issue thoroughly and ensure that all angles had been examined and the 
appropriate response prepared depending on the outcome (Pfiffner & Davidson, 2003). 
President G. W. Bush, however, saw it as a strength to act decisively and intuitively. In 
his words, “I just think it’s instinctive. I’m not a textbook player. I’m a gut player” 
(Woodard, 2002). President Bush took his role in the Oval Office seriously and if a 
decision had to be made, he felt obligated as president “to force decisions, and to make 
sure it’s in everybody’s mind where we’re headed” (Woodard, 2002).  
Confronted with a continuing rise of terrorism at home and abroad, both Clinton 
administrations were forced to place greater emphasis on terrorism, and as a result, 
between 1996 and 2000, the administration nearly doubled annual counter-terrorism 
expenditures (Dobbs, 2000). That emphasis did not continue when the George W. Bush 
administration assumed office in January 2001. During the 2000 American presidential 
election campaign, George W. Bush gave one foreign policy address. Not unexpectedly, 
domestic priorities prevailed at his Administration’s outset: education reform, the 
environment, private school vouchers, faith-based initiatives, energy sources and 
production, creation of prescription drug benefits, tax relief, an economic stimulus 
package, health care, values, ethics, and propounding a philosophy of “compassion in 
government.” (Stein, 2002, p. 52).  During the first 8 months of 2001, the Bush 
administration took very little action regarding counter-terrorism, despite the warnings 
provided to him by the Clinton administration (Gellman, 2002). Bush’s national security 
team met formally nearly 100 times before the 9/11 attacks, but terrorism was the topic 
during only two of those meetings (Bridis, 2002).  
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When George W. Bush ran for president, it was clear that if he won, the United 
States military would no longer assume the role as the “world police.” Although 
President Bush believed that America should have a strategic military presence around 
the world, he was opposed to the substantial commitment the Clinton administration 
invested in long-term nation-building and humanitarian missions. Instead, the Bush 
administration placed emphasis on limited, but tactical global uses of military force and 
envisaged more of a support role in the areas of multilateral partnerships and nation 
building (Dobbins, Poole, Long, & Runkle, 2008). Domestic issues which contained 
foreign policy components--such as illegal drugs, trade questions, terrorism prevention, 
immigration concerns, energy matters, and currency stability-- also had some priority, but 
only if they affected the lives and immediate economic or physical well-being of 
Americans (Stein, 2002). In terms of foreign policy, the Bush administration had 
primarily focused its attention on China and Russia while simultaneously determining 
whether or not to entangle themselves in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Leffler, 2011). 
President Bush, along with his senior advisors did not consider the threat of global 
terrorism or the rising influence of radical Islam in America (Leffler, 2011). Richard 
Clarke, the chief counter-terrorism expert on the National Security Council along with 
CIA Director George Tenet, did their very best to convince in-coming President Bush, 
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, that Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden were a 
credible threats and that the issues regarding radical Islamic terrorism should be treated 
with a sense of urgency (Leffler, 2011).  
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The Bush administration was not completely dismissive of the warnings regarding 
counter-terrorism, but it became increasingly clear their agenda superseded any concerns 
of the previous administration. The Bush National Security Team was more concerned 
with devising a strategy on how to deal with "rogue" states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and 
North Korea with a specific focus on the best course of action to contain Saddam 
Hussein’s dictatorship in Baghdad (Leffler, 2011). In the end, President Bush would take 
no definitive action on the counterintelligence provided to him by CIA Director Tenet or 
Terrorism expert Richard Clark. For the first 10 months of his administration, President 
Bush focused on fulfilling his campaign promises by executing his domestic agenda. 
On September 4, 2001, Robert Mueller was sworn in as the sixth director of the 
FBI. However, with just seven days on the job, Mueller would be propelled into 
overseeing the largest criminal investigation in American history. Bush’s domestic 
agenda was completely derailed as the president was faced with one of the worst 
domestic terror incidents since Oklahoma City in 1995.  
At 8:46 a.m. on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a 
nation transformed (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). A hijacked commercial 
airliner traveling at hundreds of miles per hour and carrying some 10,000 gallons of jet 
fuel plowed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan (9/11 
Commission Final Report, 2004). At 9:03 a.m., a second airliner hit the South Tower and 
Fire and smoke billowed upward while Steel, glass, ash, and bodies fell below (9/11 
Commission Final Report, 2004). In less than 90 minutes, the Twin Towers of the World 
Trade Center, where approximately 50,000 people were employed, collapsed (9/11 
Commission Final Report, 2004). The uncertainty of what was happening terrified the 
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Americans nationwide. As state and federal law enforcement officials attempted to 
determine what was happening in New York City, at 9:37 a.m., a third airliner crashed 
into the western front side of the Pentagon (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). At 
10:03 a.m., a fourth airliner had targeted the White House but heroic passengers, who had 
been informed by friends and relatives via cell phone that America was possibly under 
terrorist attack, overtook the hijackers forcing the plane to crash in a field in Southern 
Pennsylvania (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004).    
During the 9/11 attacks, President Bush had been visiting Emma E. Booker 
Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida when his Chief of Staff, Andrew Card entered the 
room, walked directly towards the president, and whispered in his ear that the World 
Trade Center had been struck by a commercial airliner (Warshaw, 2003).  President Bush 
paused as if he were processing the information that had just been told to him. Shortly 
after, the Secret Service quickly escorted President Bush out of the school and rushed 
him back to Air Force One (Warshaw, 2003).  While in the air, President Bush contacted 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice via secure communication and instructed 
her to begin to coordinate a response (Warshaw, 2003).   
In a 2012 interview, then FBI director recounted his meeting with President Bush 
to discuss the United States’ plan of action. According to Mueller, the conversation went 
something like this:   
Mr. President, we have command centers that have been set up at each of the sites 
and we’ve started to identify the persons responsible for the attacks by their seat number. 
The president stops me and says “Bob, that’s all well and good, and that’s what I expect 
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the FBI to do. The FBI has done it throughout its existence. But my question to you today 
is, ‘What are you doing to prevent the next terrorist attack? (Gulati, et al., 2016, p. 15) 
After experiencing the worst terror attack on American soil, it had become clear 
to President Bush and his senior advisors that he had to do an about-face on his agenda to 
focus primarily on domestic issues (Brooks, 2012). The attack on the Pentagon and the 
World Trade Center had forced President Bush into the role of a wartime president 
instead of the reformer he spoke of on the campaign trail. Condoleeza Rice began to 
coordinate a War Cabinet as soon after she received the phone call from Air Force One 
(Warshaw, 2003).  The cabinet consisted of senior level officials and they all were given 
specific assignments (Warshaw, 2003). CIA Director Tenet was charged with finding the 
source of the terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was charged with 
raising the military alert to Def-Con 3 to protect against further attacks, while Secretary 
of State Colin Powell, was charged with gathering information and support from 
President Vladimir Putin of Russia (Warshaw, 2003). The response to the 9/11 attacks, 
was a "global war on terror" (Leffler, 2011).  
By 3:30 p.m. on September 11th, only hours after the first attack, Air Force One 
had landed at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska where Bush talked by conference call to 
the key players of the newly formed War Cabinet (Warshaw, 2003). Intelligence agencies 
from around the world began providing credible information as to who may have been 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks which allowed Tenet to surmise with certainty that the 
global terrorism group known as Al-Qaeda had were responsible for the September 11th  
attacks (Warshaw, 2003).  The Bush administration began to prioritized terrorists’ threats 
and catapulted Saddam Hussein to the top of their list. In addition, Al-Qaeda, who was 
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said to be responsible for the attacks, the Taliban and regimes that harbored and succored 
terrorists were immediately classified as enemies of the United States that had to be 
brought to justice (Leffler, 2011). On September 12th, President Bush made the following 
public statement, “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out against our 
country were more than acts of terror.  They were acts of war” (Barnes, 2001, p. 1869).   
Bush was determined to send the message and the war on terror was strategically crafted 
to send a strong message to terrorists’ networks around the world that America would 
spare no expense or resource in eliminating terrorism networks who threatened the 
United States or their interests. Military and intelligence officials were ordered to extract 
actionable intelligence, detain for as long as necessary, rendition known terrorists, and, in 
a few cases, torture terrorist suspects who refuse to willingly cooperate (Leffler, 2011). 
 The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon and the abortive attack (possibly aimed at the White House or Camp David) 
that resulted in the crash of a jetliner in Pennsylvania had resulted in a new and 
extraordinary emphasis by the Bush administration on combating terrorism (Richelson & 
Evans, 2001). President Bush was emotionally impacted that more than 2,600 people died 
at the World Trade Center; 125 died at the Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes and the 
death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (9/11 Commission Final 
Report, 2004). For this reason, during the last 10 days of President Bush’s first term, key 
administration officials, particularly President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, repeatedly emphasized that their long-
term objective is the destruction of terrorism networks a goal to be achieved by the death 
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or apprehension of terrorists, the destruction of their infrastructure and support base, and 
retaliation against states that aid or harbor terrorists (Richelson & Evans, 2001). 
The 9/11 attacks forced a massive overhaul of the FBI. In 2002, while testifying 
before Congress, then FBI Director, Robert Mueller stated, “Starting immediately after 
the planes hit, when over half of our 11,500 agents suddenly found themselves working 
terrorism matters, it became clear that our mission and our priorities had to change.” Just 
a few years prior, former FBI Director Louis Freeh sought to implement changes that 
would have strengthened the agencies capabilities in preventing domestic terrorists 
attacks but this proposed shift in policy and mission was met with both internal and 
external resistance because terrorism was still classified and an overseas problem and the 
FBIs core mission was “fighting crime” (Freeh, 2002). That all changed post 9/11. After 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there became a consensus 
among policy makers, politicians, and veteran FBI agents that the agency needed to 
change its core mission if there was any chance of preventing a catastrophe of this 
magnitude from ever happening again on American soil.  
In the beginning of 2003, Muller and his top management team conducted a 
reassessment of their reorganization efforts and concluded their efforts were only 
adequate enough in the short term in preventing domestic threats of terrorism (Gulati, et 
al., 2016). In order address future threats to national security, Mueller and his team 
realized they needed to construct a model of prevention that synthesized both intelligence 
and law enforcement, an approach Mueller later coined as the “building foundations for 
intelligence” (Gulati, et al., 2016).  
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Although Mueller and his team made significant progress in their reorganization 
of the Bureau’s counter-terrorism strategy, it was deemed not sufficient enough for 
protecting the nation’s national security. Rather than the FBI thwarting domestic terror 
plots from internal intelligence gathering, there was too much reliance on external tips 
(Gulati, et al., 2016). This concerned Mueller and his team because the goal was to create 
a counter-terrorism response model that was proactive and gave them the ability to 
systematically analyze domestic terror threats based on internal data collection. To 
address this weakness, Mueller and his team established a new organizational unit at 
headquarters known as the Directorate of Intelligence (Gulati, et al., 2016). Although 
attitudes were changing in regards to the FBI’s new role in matters of national security, 
they had not changed at a pace to Mueller’s satisfaction. Furthermore, in order for the 
organizational culture to shift from the rigid mindset of prosecution and law enforcement, 
he thought it was imperative to hire a senior executive outside of the FBI who had an 
extensive background in intelligence gathering (Gulati, et al., 2016).  This director would 
be spared the bureaucratic chain of command and report directly to Mueller. His selection 
of an  National Security Agency (NSA) executive, although initially controversial, would 
later prove to be a good strategy. From the onset, the new director changed the hiring 
selection process. Whereas many of the pre-9/11 analysts were promoted into their roles 
from clerical positions, many of the new analysts had graduate  degrees or military 
intelligence backgrounds (Gulati, et al., 2016, p. 20). Between fiscal years 2001 and 
2006, the number of analysts in the FBI more than doubled, from 1,023 to 2,161 (Gulati, 
et al., 2016, p. 20). This new team of intelligence professionals were tasked for just one 
mission: integrate and disseminate valuable intelligence information (Gulati et al., 2016).  
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In 2007, Mueller enacted another one of his priority initiatives called the Strategic 
Execution Team (SET) and their function was to build the FBI’s intelligence capabilities 
and integrate intelligence into FBI operations (Gulati et al., 2016, p. 24). The SET team 
focused on standardizing and upgrading the Field Intelligence Group’s (FIG) best 
practices and codified models (Gulati et al., 2016). Once that task was complete, they 
placed them in a 61-page report, and rolled out a training program for all field personnel 
in 2008 which emphasized integrating national security and law enforcement at lower 
levels of the organization for effective, efficiency and continuity purposes (Gulati et al., 
2016). 
Under the Bush administration, in accordance with Muller’s massive 
organizational restructuring of the FBI, substantial progress was made. Although not 
perfect, the territorial informational gridlock shifted from a “need-to-know” culture, to a 
“need-to-collaborate” environment, with information flowing more freely between state, 
local, and federal governments. In 2006, then FBI Director Robert Mueller, speaking 
before Before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, reported on the benefits of a 
collaborative, unified, national intelligence work force:   
The National Security Branch structure took effect on September 12, 2005, in 
response to a directive from the President to the Attorney General. The NSB consists of 
the FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD), the Counterintelligence Division (CD), the 
Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and the new Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Directorate. Combining our national security workforce and mission under one leadership 
umbrella enhances our contribution to the national intelligence effort and provides us 
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with the opportunity to leverage resources from our U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) 
partners, as well as our federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners. 
The success of multi-agency collaboration was evident as the FBI began to dismantle  
terrorist networks at home and abroad. For example, Operation Blackbear, initiated in 
2001, was responsible for the arrest and conviction of three people found to be funneling 
resources to terrorist organizations (Mueller, 2006). In January 2006, a sixty-five count 
indictment of eleven individuals associated with ELF and ALF was handed down on 
charges including arson and destruction of an energy facility on behalf of both ELF and 
ALF movements.  
Between 2009-2010, the FBI and law enforcement in general, had some of the 
most successful multi-agency investigations in United States history (Dyson, 2012). 
Collaboration and information sharing allowed law enforcement to “connect the dots” 
and prevent numerous terrorist attacks (Dyson, 2012). One of the most significant 
changes in helping law enforcement capture and thwart incidents of domestic terrorism 
post 9/11, was the creation of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).   JTTFs are locally 
based, multi-agency teams comprised of law enforcement investigators, investigators, 
intelligence analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists who are experienced 
in investigating acts of terrorism (Bjelopera, 2013). Prior to 9/11, FBI and DOJ had only 
twenty-nine JTTFS in operation. Post 9/11, Seventy-one more JTTFs were created along 
with  4,400 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents (Bjelopera, 
2013). The FBI, Homeland Security and DOJ now consider the JTTFs the nation’s front 
line on terrorism since they are the “first responders” to acts of terrorism by investigating 
acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including those 
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employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas (Barker & Fowler, 2008). 
Although JTTF investigations are highly tactical, they are equally determined. JTTFs 
expend a massive amount of resources in combating terror threats by developing human 
sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots (Bjelopera, 2013) 
President Bush’s style of political leadership exhibited a confidence and moral 
certainty that helped the nation deal with the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Towers and the Pentagon (Pfiffner, 2003). Bush’s moral certainty reflected 
his deeply held religious beliefs which were evident in his public and private life 
(Pfiffner, 2003). He was convinced that the United States was now duty bound to 
eviscerate “evil” anywhere in the world with seeking approval or support from other 
nations (Pfiffner, 2003). The positive side of President Bush’s moralistic and Manichaean 
view of the world is the moral clarity it brought to U.S. policy (Brookhiser, 2003). In 
spite of the sharp criticism he received during his presidency, overall, conservatives were 
satisfied that Bush’s certainty and conviction enhanced his leadership during the war on 
terrorism. 
Barack H. Obama (2009-2016) 
“And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering 
innocents, we say to you now that, "Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You 
cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you." - President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, 
January 20, 2009 
On January 20, 2009, America elected Barack H. Obama, its first African-
American president. In the United States, at least to some, his election was indicative that 
America had become the utopian post racial society envisioned by Dr. Martin Luther 
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King Jr. World leaders saw this as an opportune moment for U.S. policy to shift from 
being hawkish in its war on Terror to becoming more deliberate in terms of who is 
considered terrorist. President Obama was viewed as a leader who would prefer conflict 
negotiation over the use of military force. For the most part, that was indicative of his 
style. However, like his predecessor, he knew that in order for America and its allies to 
feel safe, terror networks like Al-Qaeda, and ISIL must be destroyed or incapacitated and 
Osama bin Laden had to be eliminated.   
When President Obama took office, his administration inherited a multiplicity of 
challenges not seen since Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter in 1981. President 
Bush was leaving the White House with a 34% job approval rating (Gallup, 2009). On 
the global stage, his ratings were equally abysmal. According to the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project (2008), 19 of the 24 nations polled, including several strong U.S. allies, expressed 
little confidence in Bush as he neared the end of his presidency (Pew, 2008). The war in 
Afghanistan, the Invasion of Iraq, the misleading of America and its allies on the 
stockpile Weapons of Mass destruction, the recession, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib 
prison, and the infamous waterboarding scandal made President Bush, Vice-President 
Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld extremely unpopular. So 
much so, that in 2012, the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission found President Bush, 
Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld guilty of war crimes in absentia for the illegal 
invasion of Iraq (Foreign Policy, 2012). Not only would President Obama be charged 
with restoring America’s credibility abroad, but after a polarizing campaign, Obama had 
to reassure Americans that he would focus more on domestic issues, specifically, jobs, 
the economy, and the war on terror. 
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President Obama, like his predecessor George W. Bush, was in agreement that 
terrorism must be eradicated. However, he was opposed to the Bush strategy which he 
deemed as a hindrance in fighting global terrorism because of its maverick styled 
unilateral approach.  Although Obama and G. W. Bush had sometimes diametrically 
opposed strategic military strategies, President Obama could not ignore that the situation 
in Iraq was stabilizing while Afghanistan was declining (Jenkins & Godges, 2011). For 
this reason, over the objections of his senior advisers, and to the dismay of many of his 
supporters, President Obama chose to replicate President Bush’s second-term strategy for 
Iraq, sending an additional 45,000 American troops to Afghanistan, further increasing 
economic assistance (Jenkins & Godges, 2011). Obama, in many ways, was Reaganesque 
in his approach towards counter-terrorism in that it was much more focused with 
expected outcomes. Like Bush however, he was in full agreement that America should 
avoid international entanglements unless they proved to be absolutely vital America’s 
national interests. Moreover, Obama believed that America should not be the lone voice 
in the world denouncing terrorism embraced the tenet that the international community 
should also have an integral role in fighting terrorism. President Obama had made it clear 
that the days of unilateral intervention was ending and transformational diplomacy was 
part of the new strategy.  
The election of Barack Obama should have been a symbol of progress and pride 
for the United States of America. President George W. Bush could be heard telling an 
attendee at the 2009 Obama inauguration, “This is a great day for our nation.” However, 
a segment of American society saw the elevation of an African-American to highest 
elected office in America, as a threat to their existence and the beginning of the end of the 
105 
 
White majority. In 2016, D’Vera Cohn at the Pew Research Center released a report that, 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau, for the first time in history, minorities babies 
(50.2%) under the age of 1-year old were slightly more than half of the babies born in 
2011 (Cohn, 2016). Also in 2016, Time Magazine journalist Josh Sanburn reported on a 
study conducted by the University of New Hampshire that found natural decreases in the 
White population across 17 states in 2014, including Florida, New Mexico, Pennsylvania 
and West Virginia, which together comprise 38% of the U.S. population (Sanburn, 2016). 
Between 2015 and 2016, there were several demographers reporting that by the year 
2060, Whites would no longer be the majority population in America. Although the 
resentment of President Obama was in large part rooted in racism, the Obama 
administration, like their predecessors, were short-sighted in that they assumed the 
avalanche of White hatred directed towards President Obama could be explained away as 
simply deep-seeded racism. The lack of inquiry to determine substantive or alternative 
reasons for this animus alienates this segment of the population, which in turn 
metastasizes into radical and violent extremist behavior.  The theory put forth by Robin 
DiAngelo (2011) gives a plausible explanation beyond racial hatred that caused Whites to 
react negatively towards the election of Barack Obama. In her theory, DiAngelo 
postulated:  
White people in North America live in a social environment that protects and 
insulates them from race-based stress. This insulated environment of racial 
protection builds White expectations for racial comfort while at the same time 
lowering the ability to tolerate racial stress, leading to what I refer to as White 
Fragility. White Fragility is a state in which even a minimum amount of racial 
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stress becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves. These moves 
include the outward display of emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt, and 
behaviors such as argumentation, silence, and leaving the stress-inducing 
situation. These behaviors, in turn, function to reinstate White racial equilibrium. 
(p. 54) 
The return to this White racial equilibrium after the election of President Obama was 
often carried out in pseudo-quasi-judicial tribunals that lacked any real authority and only 
served as a means to unite like-minded dogmatic anti-government radical extremist. In 
2009, a group in Georgia that called themselves The American Grand Jury, issued their 
own indictment of President Obama by concluding that he committed fraud and treason 
by falsely claiming he was a citizen of the United States when in fact, he was born in 
Kenya (Potok, 2009). In 2011, billionaire real estate developer Donald Trump 
spearheaded what was known as the Birther Movement which questioned the veracity of 
President Obama’s national origin and demanded that the president release his birth 
certificate to the public. Republicans in leadership positions began to openly normalize 
racially divisive and demeaning rhetoric. Tennessee RNC chairman Chip Saltsman sent 
out a CD of “Barack the Magic Negro” as a Christmas present (Sinderbrand, 2008). 
Rather than rebuking her colleague, Young Republican vice-chairman Audra Shay found 
amusement in a post on her Facebook page sent to her by a colleague that read “Obama 
bin Lauden is the new terrorist....Muslim is on their side...need to take this country back 
from all of these mad coons........ and illegals.”  Shay responded, 8 minutes later, “You 
tell em Eric! lol” (Avlon, 2009). This type dehumanizing and racially demeaning rhetoric 
advanced a new concept of “othering” the first African-American president of the United 
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States by intentionally undermining the prevailing legitimacy of the Oval Office. Ultra-
conservatives rejected the notion that criticism of President Obama was disrespectful and 
they were content with their modes of critique intentionally being a ubiquitous 
commodification of White supremacy. After decades of promoting the values of hard-
work, ethics, morality, and merit-based equality, the radical fringe of the Republican 
Party rejected the homogeneous and monolithic and replaced it with racism, nativism, 
and White male patriotism. This obscene level of hate in conjunction with its corollary of 
intensified partisanship, glamorized right-wing extremism during the Obama 
administration in pursuit of political, materialistic or individualistic gains. Although 
President Obama was a strong advocate of American exceptionalism, human rights, 
education, clean energy, winding down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and re-
establishing American standing and leadership in the world, domestic extremism, he was 
deeply distrusted by ultra-conservatives.    
Since September 11, 2001, the threat of violence inspired by radical right-wing 
ideologies has been largely overshadowed by the “war on terror” and the extraordinary 
effort expended by both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations to thwart 
attacks by jihadists inspired by al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and 
other militant Islamist groups (Mueller & Stewart, 2011). In October 2015, at an event 
hosted by the Program on Extremism, Assistant Attorney General for National Security 
John Carlin announced the creation of the post of Domestic Terrorism Counsel to 
coordinate cases arising from right-wing extremism, an acknowledgment that extremists 
weaned on radical homegrown, right-wing ideologies have killed more people in the U.S. 
since 9/11 than jihadis (Bruer, 2015). In fact, U.S. domestic terrorism groups outnumber 
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international groups seven-to-one and are a far larger threat to America than radical 
Islamist (McGarrell et al., 2007). A study conducted under the Obama administration 
described far-right extremists are predominately White males, late 20s and early 30s, who 
believe they have a patriotic duty to advocate for the elimination of all immigration 
policies and the systemic marginalization of minorities currently in America. Because of 
their views toward minorities, they are more likely than other domestic terrorists to attack 
in groups (55.5%), to target complete strangers (48.4%), and to use weapons (52.4%) 
(Gruenewald, 2011).  Right-wing extremist pursue the agendas of their groups in various 
ways. Some limit themselves to lobbying and political activism, while others resort to 
acts of violence such as murder and domestic terrorism (Garland & Simi, 2011).    
The Obama administration translated its democratic liberal worldview into a 
counterterrorism policy that limits the prerogatives and work methods of American 
security and intelligence agencies (Ganor, 2014). The stark difference between the 
Obama and G.W. Bush administrations was that “the war on terror” was an abstract 
enemy under Bush. President Obama however, was focused in his approach and put faces 
and names together and compiled a list of who exactly the enemy was and why they were 
a threat to the security of the United States (Ganor, 2014). President Obama and his 
national Security team surmised that when the definition of the threat is too broad, it may 
undermine the efficacy of the counterterrorism strategy and make it more difficult to 
identify to devise an effective strategy (Ganor, 2014).  
In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization 
strategy which was devised to address the forces or conditions that influence people 
living in the United States to become so radicalized and extreme in their views they 
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ultimately feel compelled to engage in acts of domestic terrorism. This is the first such 
strategy for the federal government, which is called combating violent extremism (CVE) 
and is just another tool in assisting law enforcement in identifying root causes of 
terrorism (Bjelopera, 2014)  
Conclusion 
Non-jihadist incidents of domestic terrorism have never been a top federal 
counter-terrorism priority for any incoming president. In the media, the Obama 
administration considered the importance of focusing on non-jihadist domestic terrorism 
until December 14, 2012, when a lone gunman Adam Lanza entered Sandy Hook 
Elementary and murdered 20 children and six teachers. However, the FBI’s focus never 
waned on domestic terrorism because of the reorganization efforts that occurred under the 
Bush administration. Nevertheless, incidents such as Sandy Hook feature prominently 
among the concerns of law enforcement officers because of the dramatic increase in 
domestic incidents of terror, active shooters, and lone wolf radical extremist that ambush 
and murder police officers (Bjelopera, 2013). In 2011, former Los Angeles Deputy Police 
Chief Michael P. Downing included “Black separatists, White supremacist, sovereign 
citizen extremists, and animal rights terrorists” among his chief counterterrorism 
concerns (Gertz, 2011). 
A frequent point made in the current literature on the U.S.-led war on domestic 
and international terror is that the war and its public discourse is a continuation from the 
George W. Bush administration. Researchers explored the political discourse of terrorism 
and counterterrorism during the Clinton, G. W. Bush, and Obama administrations. 
However, what is lacking are the challenges of maintaining an ongoing narrative and 
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including diverse perspectives. By examining presidential discourse on terrorism, 
contemporary research articles continue to demonstrate continuities in counterterrorism 
approaches from Reagan to Obama. This study suggests that, based on Reagan's initial 
“war on terrorism”, Clinton articulated thoughts of “catastrophic terrorism” and a “new 
terrorism” both at home and abroad, which became a cornerstone for thinking about the 
issue over the past two decades. Clinton’s counterterrorism discourse provided an 
important rhetorical foundation for Bush and Obama on how to respond to domestic 
terrorist attacks such as the Oklahoma City bombing. Far from being a radical break, 
Bush’s war on terror at home and overseas represents a continuation of established 
counter-terrorist understandings and practices (Tsui, 2015). 
Rhetoric involving catastrophic terrorism involved giving the nation details of 
particular incidents to shock them and allow for quick passage of policies that were 
designed to respond to these threats. Some of the broader outcomes, and political 
consequences of Clinton’s terrorism discourse (such as anti-terrorism initiatives and a 
law enforcement and military approach) was designed to address public fears and 
promote funding for significant responses (Bourdieu, 1987). 
Fairclough’s (2001) critical discourse analysis (CDA) used a three-dimensional 
model as the central framework by which to examine U.S. terrorism statements and 
counter-terrorism initiatives implemented from Clinton to Obama. Fairclough’s approach 
was distinguished by a concept of discourse that considers language commonly used in 
social practices. This discourse is understood as language used when speaking of 
terrorism in such a way that speaking generates ideas and concepts from a perspective 
that garners public support (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Through the process of 
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discursive practice, as exercised by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, a type 
of communication was created, consumed, and reproduced in response to society’s fears 
about domestic terrorism. These Presidents sought to control the message and level of 
fear (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
In the Fairclough CDA study, material from more than 200 official texts including 
all of Clinton’s domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism-related speeches, interviews, 
and radio addresses published in the Federal Register and the Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States were analyzed. Furthermore, in order to explore the 
continuities of U.S. counterterrorism policy, Reagan’s “war on terrorism” material, as 
well as Bush’s ‘war on terror’ discourse –which transitioned into the “war on domestic 
terrorism” –were evaluated (Clinton, 1995b). 
This study of U.S. domestic terrorism discourse not only contributed to our 
understanding of the way speaking and writing about terrorism was constructed in the 
past, but also to our current understanding of how U.S. domestic counter-terrorism is 
framed. The dominant theme in the literature was that the discourse for the current U.S.-
led war on domestic terror largely originated from the George W. Bush administration. 
Before 9/11, there had been a long history of labeling U.S. domestic terrorist threats and 
enemies as “terrorism” and “terrorists.” However, the meaning of these words changed 
several times, depending on the social and political contexts of various Presidents. The 
discursive change in U.S. counter-terrorism is due, in part, to shifts in the political and 
social order, and also the way in which the world was understood (Clinton, 1996c). 
During the Clinton era, the United States and its allies suffered a number of 
significant domestic terrorist attacks, including the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, 
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and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995. These incidents were the primary focus of the 
Clinton administration's domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism discourse, and led to 
solidifying the rhetoric for administrations that followed. In contrast to Reagan’s 
terrorism discourse and its focus on state-sponsored terrorism, the Clinton administration 
developed and constructed its terrorism discourse by identifying and emphasizing the 
characteristics of catastrophic terrorism, or new terrorism. Its characteristics were based 
on the terrorists’ targets, the methods they adopted, and the weapons used.  
Reviewing the syntax and key discourse phrases utilized by the Clinton 
administration, the word “boundlessness” stood out as the most significant feature of 
“new terrorism,” in which terrorists emerged “within or beyond our borders” (Clinton, 
1995c). As terrorists changed, and they were perceived as “becoming an equal 
opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders” (Clinton, 1996a), emphasis was on the 
lack of clear boundaries between external and internal terrorism, where terrorists could 
strike a foreign ally or on U.S. soil (Chin-Kuei Tsui, 2012). 
John Deutch (1997), former director of the Central Intelligence Agency under 
Clinton, echoed the President’s use of boundlessness when he suggested that terrorism 
was like the plague of the Middle Ages, frightening both leaders and citizens. It is a 
social disease that is spreading and its cure is unknown. Portraying terrorism as a 
“disease” was a repetition of a word used by previous Presidents, and not a new rhetorical 
expression. In order to intensify the significance of the domestic terrorist threat, Reagan 
and his administration adopted a similar theme, depicting terrorism as a cancer, with 
politicians actively seeking a cure. Reagan, and later Clinton would say that the plague of 
terrorism would spread like a cancer, challenging civilized societies, and sowing fear and 
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chaos (Leeman, 1991). These outcomes would occur if society, through its leaders, 
permitted terrorism to succeed anywhere. Thus, by employing a medical metaphor, 
terrorism was interpreted as a disease that could strike anywhere in society (Leeman, 
1991). 
Post 9/11, the concept of a new style of terrorism became a prominent concept 
and theme in the G. W. Bush administration’s war on terror discourse. President Bush 
and his top officials adopted the same rhetorical strategy established by the Clinton 
administration to construct their narrative on terrorism discourse which became a primary 
weapon in responding to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. General Colin 
Powell, Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Bush, routinely referred to “the scourge 
of terrorism” (Jackson, 2005) while justifying U.S.-led global and domestic responses to 
terrorism. This type of rhetoric graphically described the characteristics of terrorism and 
promoted the theme that the terrorist threat required aggressive counter-actions and 
measures. Fairclough (2001) pointed out the significance of the fact that “different 
metaphors imply different ways of dealing with things” (p. 100).  When responding to 
terrorism, the rhetoric interpreted these acts as a dangerous disease and an extreme social 
threat to all human beings. Those who did them had to be eliminated and cut out of 
society, like the cancer to which their acts had been likened (Jackson, 2005).  
Oklahoma City was a “wake up call” for terrorism experts in 1995, as well as law 
enforcement officers. It was unnerving that weapons of mass destruction were now 
available to ordinary citizens who had grievances against United States could easily 
engage in acts of domestic terrorism. It was suggested that domestic terrorists would 
likely try to obtain chemical and biological weapons to attack civilian targets since they 
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were easy to acquire and had a significant lethality (Deutch, 1997; Laqueur, 1996). The 
Oklahoma incident was also thought to mark a turning point in the history of domestic 
terrorism: for the first time, a non-state terrorist individual had used chemical weapon to 
attack civilian non-combatants (RAND, 1999).  
Before this tragedy, terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction had only 
been part of theoretical scenarios. However, the bombing came to symbolize the threat of 
such weapons domestically. They were no longer a theoretical possibility, but a reality 
(RAND, 1999).  
The 1995 bombing and other domestic terrorist attacks in the 1990s were 
examples of White extremist terrorism. What was even more alarming for the Clinton 
administration was that the two main suspects were both American nationals. Their 
motivations for carrying out the act was that they disagreed with policies on gun control, 
and they were strong supporters of the militia movement (Linenthal, 2001). After 
reviewing the Oklahoma City bombing, the administration decided to amend its anti-
terrorism legislation, which had initially concentrated on fighting international terrorism. 
Now the administration addressed the immediate threat of “home-grown” terrorism 
(Linenthal, 2001). 
Oklahoma City appeared to display characteristics of modern terrorism: its 
unbounded nature and the means adopted by the terrorists identified them as a clear and 
present danger to national security. In Clinton’s public rhetoric, the President emphasized 
a new approach for responding to the transformation of ‘homegrown’ domestic terrorism. 
By developing the discursive construction of a borderless threat, this ideology would later 
provide a foundation for Bush’s “war on terror” and pave the way for the various security 
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acts following 9/11. With the concept of “new terrorism,” Clinton asserted that the 
United States had become vulnerable to terrorism both from without and within our 
borders.  
Other concerns materialized during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies 
concerning domestic “cyber-terrorism,” a new tactic. The threat was first articulated in 
Clinton’s terrorism discourse, and later used by the Bush administration after 9/11 
Clinton’s cyber-terrorism narrative closely echoed the concepts that supported the idea of 
the new terrorism being boundless. The convenience of technology, and the opportunities 
provided by emerging technologies supported terrorists’ breaching the traditional barriers 
of private and government facilities to achieve large scale social disruptions. 
Reviews by data experts showed a dramatic worldwide increase in the number of 
people possessing the skills to carry out cyber-attacks, escalating from a few thousand in 
the early 1980s to over 17 million in 1996. Another projection that came to fruition was 
that the number would reach 19 million by 2001 (Critical Foundations, 1997).  The 
Clinton administration faced the reality that cyber-terrorism was not just a possibility; it 
was now a fact of life that the government was required to counter.  
A close study of Clinton and Bush’s terrorism discourse reveals that their counter-
terrorism policy was a core issue for the government. Each administration faced domestic 
attacks, and the terrorism issue was frequently mentioned by each President. It emerged 
as an ongoing topic stressed by many senior officials. The Clinton administration also 
declared on several occasions that terrorism was one of the most significant and 
dangerous threats to the United States in the post-Cold War period. In Clinton’s 1995 
remarks at the Air Force Academy, he said that “fighting terrorism is a big part of our 
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national security today, and it will be well into the 21st century” (Clinton, 1995d). Each 
President (Clinton, Bush, and Obama) had heightened American’s fears by promoting the 
fact that terrorism destroys innocent lives.  
Each of these Presidents developed specific interpretations of terrorism that gave 
their perceptions and features of new terrorism, and various scenarios of potential 
terrorist attacks. It is noteworthy that they are generally based on similar ideologies and 
concepts. The response of each President was to build on Reagan’s foundation of the 
“war on terrorism.” Clinton expanded this discourse, and later added the threats posed by 
“homegrown” terrorists. Obama has also stressed the dangers of catastrophic terrorism 
that involve rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber-terrorism. He has used 
legislation such as the PATRIOT Act and bureaucracies such as the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). Clinton’s discourse provided rhetorical context for the 
George W. Bush administration to be able to respond to the tragedy of September 11th. 
Obama promoted the idea of freedom, resulting in continuity of U.S. counter-terrorism 
policies that removed domestic terrorism as a worst case, unlikely scenario and made 
these acts plausible (Christopher, 1996). 
Evolution of U.S. Anti-terrorism Policy 
Soon after Louis Freeh was appointed FBI director, he wasted no time in 
developing a strategy to combat domestic terror threats. In 1998,  Director Freeh 
submitted a comprehensive strategic plan  (FY 1998-2003) designed to address both 
domestic and internationally terrorism absent the previous hierarchal structure that one 
threat was more significant than the other. FBI Deputy Director, Robert Bryant had been 
working on this plan for more than a year and the top strategic priority of this plan was 
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National and Economic Security (Freeh, 1999). The first two goals under this priority 
were the identification, prevention, and defeat of intelligence operations and the 
prevention, disruption, and defeat of terrorist operations before they occur (Freeh, 1999).  
In arriving at the priorities and goals of this plan, Director Freeh and Deputy Director 
Bryant realized the U.S. faced an increasingly dangerous threat and were making efforts 
to reshape the FBI to confront domestic terrorism (Freeh, 1999).  
In March of 2000, Assistant Director Dale Watson initiated an internal counter 
terrorism planning process entitled MAXCAP 05 (Center for Strategic Management, 
2002). This 5-year plan was based on the premise that although the FBI would never be 
able to stop all acts of domestic and international terrorism directed towards the United 
States and its interests abroad, it could however, create a formidable infrastructure so if 
attacked, the FBI would positioned to adequately respond (Center for Strategic 
Management, 2002). Consequently, MAXCAP 05 was designed to measure the readiness 
of each Special Agent’s assigned field office and their capacity to adequately respond to 
viable terrorist threats (Center for Strategic Management, 2002).  
In the spring of 2001, data complied from MAXCAP 05 program revealed that 
field offices were not adequately staffed with key personnel needed to gather intelligence 
such as surveillance teams, translators,  Intel analysts, and access to investigative 
databases. In short, almost every Special Agent field office reported they were 
undermanned and unable to address the terrorism threats or actions of terror (Center for 
Strategic Management, 2002). Watson and his team used this information for drafting the 
FBI budget and requesting additional funds from Congress to support their 
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counterterrorism programs. In September 2001, prior to 9/11, the FBI’s request for 
funding was denied (Johnston & Risen, 2002).  
The continued rise of confirmed and suspected terrorist incidents have once again 
drawn attention to U.S. policies and their implementation. The threats posed by terrorism 
are multi-dimensional, covering a wide range of possibilities: the domestic-international 
dimension; individuals, small groups, large groups, and governments as the perpetrators 
and/or initiators of terrorist activities; poorly organized and well-organized with 
widespread natures and purposes; and single-event-focused and campaign-focused in 
scope. The responses to these threats required multiple, multi-dimensional perspectives, 
and approaches. As dangers continue to emerge, an ongoing need is to gather strong, and 
reliable intelligence (Livingstone & Arnold, 1986). 
U.S. policies varied widely over time based on how the impact of attacks  were 
viewed. Repercussions include the nature of the incident, the scope of incident, its aims, 
geographical concerns, and political concerns. The FBI’s debacle in investigating the 
bombing at Atlanta’s Olympic Village in 1996 highlighted the need for  revised domestic 
terrorism policies. Two key questions were asked following that incident, which showed 
the failures of existing policies. First, given the need for intelligence, why do we not have 
sufficient ‘good’ intelligence to prevent or prepare for such incidents? Second, if the 
United States lacks sufficient information that can lead to policies that increase 
deterrence capabilities, why has no significant action been taken (Fukuyama & McFaul, 
2007). 
These key questions go to the heart of the domestic terrorist issue. The need to 
support preventative measures, and develop a foundation for understanding issues related 
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to gathering and using good intelligence in the fight against domestic terrorist policy are 
crucial. While the focus remains on ‘difficulties’ and ‘issues,’ the research emphasizes 
instances in which good intelligence has paid off. Arnold and Livingstone (1984) noted 
that gathering of good intelligence is the best first line of defense. 
As U.S. domestic terrorism policies benefitted from information utilizing selected, 
identifiable dimensions and contexts, what has emerged are organizations within the 
government, particularly inside the intelligence community, which supported strong 
responses. As information is distilled into intelligence through data collection, analysis, 
and dissemination, what has emerged is a counter-terrorism capability (Crenshaw, 2010). 
While research has not previously focused on ‘anti-terrorist policing,’ Crenshaw’s 
observations provide insight into how the U.S. has streamlined its bureaucracy to respond 
to imminent domestic terror threats. Key factors in creating a domestic terrorist response 
included availability, currency, credibility, and various other factors which can be viewed 
as creating and affecting a ‘rate of exchange’ for information shared among various 
potential end-users.  
Carter, Clinton, Bush, and Obama faced hard decisions concerning pre-emptive 
strikes or formulating a response to an already delivered action, what is noted throughout 
the research is whether or not they had good intelligence. This process of getting and 
exchanging material is commonly referred to as the ‘politics of information’ which 
routinely affect decision making, and selecting options, based on whether or not available 
information is used (Progressive Policy Institute, 2003). 
The escalation of attacks typically receives intense media attention and focus, 
particularly when these events occur on U.S. soil by radicalized citizens. As society seeks 
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to understand these inhumane acts that defy logic, the challenge for the government has 
been to create current and relevant policies. To date, the focus has been on highlighting 
specific sociopolitical and religious situations that may be of significance and 
consequence, thereby promoting a religious overlay (Lacquer, 1987). 
As U.S. counterintelligence operatives probe religious sects and various other 
disenfranchised extremist groups, great effort has been made to gather good intelligence, 
by embedding informants in groups that may use terror as a means to an end. In 
coordinating these covert activities, what has been noted is coordination. Participation by 
multiple organizations, including the Department of State, Department of Defense, DHS, 
and the FBI, make logistical coordination problematic. As these agencies work against 
the clock, seeking to penetrate terrorist cells, what has evolved from the Carter 
administration forward is their ability to organize effectively and share intelligence.  
The success of these organizations is based on their ability to assimilate 
information, analyze content, and evaluate human activities in the realm of collecting 
information for analysis, disseminating such information, and, in some instances, taking 
action. The formation of the DHS, which now coordinates all government responses to 
terrorism threats, has ended the lack of sharing of information between agencies. The 
sharing of information, particularly when agents penetrated organizations under cover has 
become an essential technique and highlights the difficulty, time, and cost associated with 
placing an agent in a group such as the Klu Klux Klan or the AOG (Arnold & 
Livingstone, 1984). By working together, all agencies receive not only good intelligence, 
but credit for their roles in thwarting a planned domestic attack.  
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With the evolution of policies mandating the exchange of information, and 
requiring agencies to develop the ability to identify the relevance of collected material, 
not only internally, but also from other members of the law enforcement community, an 
increase in cooperation is readily apparent. Further, sharing information between nations 
related to domestic terror threats has become standard (Thompson, 2003). This highlights 
a form of cooperation with other governments in which national interests are transcended 
and policies and protocols are established between them (Thompson, 2003). 
While policies on domestic terrorism required adoption by lead federal agencies  
such the FBI, the DOJ, and DHS, jurisdiction remains a challenge. DHS has attempted to 
resolved many of these issues and internal disputes over control of particular 
investigations, promoting the exchange of communication between local, state, and  
federal levels of government. Large security corporations or groups that are also involved 
with terrorist threats, such as Blackwater Worldwide, need to be brought into this flow of 
information as well. The major challenge for the U.S. government is how much 
intelligence to share with private organizations where such sharing may not be in the best 
interest of the American people. As the balancing act continues between who is in charge 
of various activities, who to share information with, and how much information to share, 
increasing the authority of the DHS offers the ability to provide intensive oversight and 
ensure full cooperation at every level by all parties (Turner & Lovell, 1998).  
Prior to 9/11, there were substantive failures in the realm of domestic security that 
plagued the most prominent federal intelligence and investigative agencies in the world. 
Even with the oversight of congressional subcommittees, some critics and the general 
public have wondered if was there ever anything intelligent about U.S. intelligence 
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gathering and domestic terrorism responses. Post 9/11, there was a mandate from 
President Bush that called for multiple investigative probes to uncover “strategic” 
shortcomings, but more importantly, enact policies that would correct all major 
deficiencies. Agency boundaries tied to jurisdiction routinely creates secondary problems 
when dealing with situations that are amorphous or fluid. With overlap between agencies 
needed, the older concept of a ‘lead agency’ may be implemented by some agency 
leaders, and create confusion among operatives and reduce their effectiveness. The 
dissolution of inter- and intra-agency jurisdictional wars involving investigative and 
intelligence organizations has been, and will likely remain a reality, into the future. These 
rivalries, which are slowly being diminished by the DHS, come to the fore when 
Congress annually increases funding related to counter-terrorism (Turner & Lovell, 
1998). 
An additional policy issue surrounding domestic terrorism in U.S. investigative 
and intelligence organizations is that while these agencies continue to become 
streamlined, the statutes by which they operate are bureaucratic. Policy developments 
traditionally followed bureaucratic politics and what has been sought by Presidents and 
Congress. Over the years, what emerged as necessary in policy formation are ways of 
approaching domestic terrorism via investigative and intelligence organizations that build 
collaboration and cooperation. This is a switch to a combined method in dealing with 
terrorist incidents and potential acts of domestic terrorism (Goldsmith, 2008). 
As domestic terrorism continues to change, there will be a need for policies that 
integrate emerging technologies and take into account multi-dimensional approaches and 
investigations of potential threats. With an increasing number of terrorist events, 
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expenditures on new technology will always be justified if there are also increases in 
statistical information. Technology will help streamline jurisdictional issues, increase the 
flow of information, promote policy revisions, and highlight immediate threats 
(Bodansky, 1993).  
Domestic policy has failed at times to appreciate the dynamics of other cultures 
and their willingness to respond to global terrorist events, which ultimately affected the 
U.S. (Bozeman, 1985). With a relatively rapid turnover of Presidents, the overarching 
purposes achieved through a steady developing of particular national terrorism policies 
over the course of one or two terms. However, researchers emphasize the fact that mid-
level and senior levels bureaucrats generally outlast Presidents and the directors and 
supervisors they appoint. These bureaucrats do not always interpret the directives of 
Presidents or Directors the same way as their authors and presents the problem of policies 
and mandates being shelved in hopes the next President or Director will change direction 
following an election (Neustadt, 1960). 
When assessing the competence of those who generate U.S. policy, Sloan (1986) 
noted there are no guarantees that those involved (e.g., politicians, directors, or even 
federal agents) have knowledge of domestic terrorism. Failures in policy and lack of 
security enforcement have almost been predictable, with agents lacking prerequisite 
training and/or education. Superior performance can conflict with administrative 
oversight and progress can be impeded despite strong rhetorical commitments from 
leaders to be proactive about terrorist attacks on the U.S. Concerns remain regarding 
those who develop counter-measures where, in some cases, individuals acted with 
impunity and disregard for lives (Sloan, 1986).  
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In complex and difficult scenarios for which policy has not been previously 
established, protocols are being developed to meet immediate needs and challenge 
organizational interests. With these organizations frequently operating in closed 
environments, concerns and challenges regarding who is socially and psychologically 
appropriate to write coherent and responsible polices that combat domestic terrorism 
(Baritz, 1985; Schlesinger, 1996). 
Economic Determinants of Domestic Terrorism 
This section considers the relationship between economic development and 
domestic terrorism. When a traditional economy is replaced by a more contemporary one, 
the change may lead to protests and various forms of social unrest, making the society 
more prone to terrorist behaviors. However, the lasting effects of such modernization 
should be correlated with reducing domestic terrorism. In order to test this hypothesis and 
find better support for the theory, the latest Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets 
were utilized. The data show that states at intermediate levels of economic development 
are more prone to domestic terrorist activity and attacks, as compared to poorer or 
wealthier nations. Terrorist attacks would seem to be more likely in states that are not 
reducing poverty or providing a proper economic safety net that can cushion the effects 
of rapid economic development on a given region. Further, results indicate that countries 
which are more democratic and older are less likely to have incidents of domestic 
terrorism when compared to less democratic states (Boehmer & Daube, 2013). 
The next question is: What is the statistical relationship between a nation’s 
economic development and its rates of terrorist activity? Past studies were contradictory s 
concerning the development of terrorism. This is not surprising, given the multiple 
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explanations and differences between the kinds of domestic terrorism. Furthermore, most 
of the studies on this matter model the effects of terrorism development as a linear 
relationship. Instead, the relationship between terrorism and development could be 
curvilinear, with different states at various stages of progress. Data shows that modeling 
development as a curvilinear relationship can help explain how seemingly contradictory 
findings from theoretical models created expectations that resulted in different 
explanations for the frequency of terror attacks across different levels of development.  
Testing the new theory using the GTD dataset found support for the theory. 
However, the literature on terrorism provided contradictory evidence that shows a direct 
link between low income, poverty, or lack of state assistance, and increased rates of 
terrorism. Studies that analyze this subject at the level of individuals only infrequently 
found a correlation between poverty and terrorism, or that poverty is one of the key 
demographic criteria in becoming a terrorist today (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; 
Sageman, 2004). Berrebi (2007) showed that it is more likely that individuals with higher 
incomes had higher rates of joining terrorist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  
Kavanagh (2011) demonstrated an interaction between education and poverty, and later 
participation in terrorist groups.  
Mousseau (2011) surveyed individuals in 14 different Islamic states and 
concluded that rates of urban poverty predicted support for terrorist organizations in those 
regions. Recent studies on the issue found that states with more wealth have a much 
higher likelihood of becoming targets of terrorism (Bloomberg & Hess, 2008; Bloomberg 
& Rosendorf, 2009), perhaps due to the fact these states are more attractive targets to 
terrorist groups (Ross, 1993; Sandler, 1995).  
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Piazza (2011) found economic discrimination (real or imagined) against minority 
groups to be an important cause of domestic terrorism cases, especially when economic 
help is not readily available for those who need it. Piazza noted that states that had either 
income disparity or a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, can be positively 
linked to terrorist activity in those nations. Some studies found no strong link between a 
state’s level of development, rates of poverty, and terrorist activity. Yet other studies 
determined that poor states did not fare as well as middle or high-income states regarding  
increased levels of terrorist activity and attacks (Abadie, 2006; Dreher & Gassebner, 
2008; Krueger & Laitin, 2007; Piazza, 2006).  
In contrast, Derin-Güre (2009) found that as a state develops, it become less 
inclined to produce terrorist groups or organizations, and experiences decreased levels of 
domestic terrorist activity as it is decreasingly targeted by global terrorist groups. 
Differences in income have, in varying degrees, been linked to terrorism (Lai, 2007; 
Piazza, 2011); increasing income does appear to lower terrorism rates when nations fund 
social welfare programs. Alternatively, increasing economic development led to greater 
economic opportunity due to globalization (Bravo & Dias, 2006; Burgoon, 2006; Krieger 
& Meierrieks, 2010; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004). Given that research on economic 
development and terrorist activity has produced mixed results, researchers investigated 
the possibility of a curvilinear impact on terrorism. Both Daube (2011) and Enders and 
Hoover (2012) showed that middle-income states are more susceptible to  domestic 
terrorist incidents compared to states with higher or lower income levels. 
In contrast to earlier studies on this issue, the present study sought to determine 
whether high levels of national economic development had an effect on reducing levels 
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of domestic terror attacks and, if so, whether the relationship is non-linear or one in 
which the highest and lowest income states have reduced rates of domestic terrorism 
incidents as compared to states with mid-level economic and social development. 
Furthermore, given that the degree of democracy (or democratic process) coincides with 
economic development, it is important to delineate the effects of democracy on economic 
development. Once the curvilinear effects of democracy and development are modeled in 
this study, the concept was considered that highly democratic states are less likely to have 
incidents of domestic terrorist attacks when compared to those that are less democratic. 
Therefore, the study also examined the relationship between a state’s economic 
development, and the amount of domestic terror attacks using the GTD (LaFree & 
Dugan, 2007; START, 2012). 
Political Determinants of Domestic Terrorism 
Ross (1993) found that economic development does create numerous economic 
and social changes (Kuznets, 1955; Olson, 1963; Rostow, 1960), which disturb 
traditional patterns and can create conditions that give rise to domestic terrorism 
(Crenshaw, 1981). Factors such as economic discrimination against a background of 
economic instability may also affect the conditions needed for the growth of terrorism. 
The literature shows the many links exist between economic discrimination, deprivation, 
and insecurity that further motivate religious, ethnic, minority, and class grievances. 
These situations further increase the threat of terrorist incidents.  
The present study borrowed from Mousseau’s (2002) theory which, as noted 
above, suggested that acts of terrorism are related to a shift away from a traditional client-
based economy to a more market-based one. This mix alters societies and could generate 
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political grievances. Some states do possess attributes of both systems. Mousseau found 
that this situation could compound a population’s grievances against its government, and 
lead to terrorism. This change in an economy does appear to be related to the Kuznets 
curve, which shows the difference between development and income inequality. In this 
study, however, the assumption is that income inequality is not necessarily the single 
cause of terrorist activity, especially when deteriorating economic conditions may worsen 
any existing political conflicts, as was often shown in Piazza’s studies.  
The argument is not that working-class individuals are more inclined to become 
terrorists, but rather that the economic conditions that may give rise to terrorism are 
increased when a state attains a mid-level of development. As socioeconomic differences 
and other issues (e.g., rising unemployment rates begin to surface), economies based on 
social hierarchies that include gift-giving and reciprocity often accumulate a surplus of 
influence by obtaining obligations from others that are often related to patronage systems. 
These economies are inward-looking, and the societies in which they operate have rigid 
social and political norms. In contrast, market economies that rely primarily on contracts 
and enforce equality among economic actors challenge these traditions, especially when 
accompanied by urbanization. Insider groups from these social hierarchies may then 
finally act in the political realm (Piazza, 2006).  
Political and religious extremists who use violence against their government and 
individuals in their society frequently disrupt client-based economies when faced with the 
possibility of privation or other economic insecurity. However, higher levels of state 
wealth do provide for economic safety nets that potentially minimize the threat of 
terrorist activities. Thus, economic unrest is reduced as the public good is promoted and 
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thereby co-opting those who might otherwise have resorted to violence (Burgoon, 2006; 
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010).  
Some of these same economic issues exist for high and mid-level income states. 
However, the former can afford to act by social spending when such problems arise. 
Higher levels of wealth frequently provide richer states with more efficient means to 
prevent civil unrest and successfully counter terrorist activity, even as development 
increases the number of potential targets. Nevertheless, more developed states will still 
experience some level of terrorist activity, perhaps due to post-industrial issues such as 
environmentalism, abortion, animal rights, or other issues that can be used to incite 
violence. In this study, the expectation is that the number of terrorist-related incidents 
caused by post-industrial issues will be less than those of states that are in the midst of 
transition. Post-industrial states should have fewer economic issues that promote 
grievances, and those that do occur will be a less serious threat to the population. Given 
the amount of terrorism in states that have mid-level development, modeling this 
relationship should give a more linear result as increasing development could promote 
domestic terrorism until the pace of transition slows (Meierrieks, 2010). 
Meierrieks (2010) gathered data between 1970 and 2000 from144 nations were 
examined using a cross-sectional time series dataset. The unit of analysis in the study was 
the state-year. The GTD was used to create a count variable of domestic terror attacks 
occurring each year. To effectively record the curvilinear effects of development and 
democracy, the study included non-linear and squared terms, respectively. The 
development terms in these models show a statistically significant difference (i.e., 
expected levels of terror incidents in a state have a non-linear effect on development).  
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The lowest income states in the study showed relatively low levels of terrorist 
incidents. The number, though, could increase if these nations attain more wealth. Again, 
above mid-levels of wealth, the risk of terrorist attacks and related incidents is reduced, 
probably due to higher spending on entitlements and reduced cultural tensions 
characteristic of development. It is also possible that these states are more effective in 
gathering intelligence on terrorism, and successfully stopping terrorists’ efforts (Li, 
2005). 
The effect of democracy on terror incidents is important because it was expected 
that the relative transparency of democratic states made them appealing targets for 
terrorist attacks. However, this was not likely the case for those proven to be durable (Li, 
2005). Democracy was a unique and vital control variable in this equation because many 
of its effects on domestic terrorism were in wealthy states that were also very democratic.  
Meirrieks’ (2010) statistical model included democracy as a term by squaring the 
primary variable, in hopes of gaining a better estimation of a potentially parabolic 
relationship, particularly because the squared term is revealed to be negative and 
statistically significant. This is very significant because it demonstrates—in contrast to 
previous  literature—that it is not the effects of democracy per se, but rather the stability 
and success of a government that defines stability. Overall, then, the literature suggested 
that higher levels of democracy do seem to add increased safety that reduced the rates of 
domestic terrorist attacks. These newer findings are in line with Abadie (2006), who 
concluded that the effect of political freedom on terrorism can be modeled as an inverted 
parabola. These separate conclusions empirically demonstrated that economic 
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development does indeed have a curvilinear relationship with domestic terroristic 
activities in countries in the midst of socioeconomic change.   
Currently, individuals living in states with different levels of development will 
have dissimilar types of grievances against their nations. These can appear to be related 
to changes in socioeconomic relationships, and where citizens live and work within their 
countries. Transitioning to a more mixed economy can result in a (temporarily) more 
dangerous environment that can likely be changed by further development and an 
increase in national wealth, which would permit social welfare spending.  
Meirriek (2010) also showed the various effects that democracy and regime 
durability have, and how they functioned together. By modeling the development process 
of states, and their relationship to democracy generally, it is evident that highly 
democratic nations are less likely to have incidents of domestic terrorism compared to 
others. Very democratic states are generally more stable due to the safety valves of the 
electoral process and civil liberties. At the same time, increased amounts of financial 
benefits from such governments reduce unrest. Democracies with higher economic 
standing internationally have the ability to properly function and disseminate such 
benefits. As such, there were lower incidents of resentment by the poor against the rich.  
However, these results should not be directly interpreted deterministically or 
teleologically, because states that attain higher levels of wealth can fall back into poverty. 
The post-2008 financial shocks to global economic markets led to new economic 
contractions and debt crises even in the most affluent states. If these states reduce their  
safety nets, there would likely be a noticeable increase in income gaps, despite the fact 
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that development is ongoing. Another implication of this study is that there should also 
be an increase in the rate of domestic terrorism in wealthy states. 
Religious Determinants of Domestic Terrorism 
When analyzing terroristic behavior, a vital question that remains unanswered 
concerns  what determines the life or death of the terrorist groups that engage in domestic 
attacks? To expand this question: how do these terrorist organizations’ ideology, base 
location, peak size, or tactics influence their longevity? Are economic, political, religious, 
and geographic considerations in the terrorists’ home country essential to their survival? 
Why do some terrorist groups last for decades, while others wither away within the first 
year of operation? Addressing these questions is crucial to combating terrorism. Possible 
answers can be found by applying survival analysis to the 367 different terrorist 
organizations that conducted operations, at some point, from 1970 to 2007. To date, most 
studies on the subject of terrorist groups’ survival rates used case comparisons that are 
clearly identified by some factors (e.g., achieved political goals, military defeat, theology, 
and reduced popular support) associated with a few groups’ demise (Cronin, 2006; 2009). 
Case studies continue to offer additional evidence that, by their nature, cannot be directly 
applied to terrorist groups in general.  Case comparisons do not seem to capture the main 
trends of statistical survival analyses that are able to be applied to an increasingly larger 
number of terrorist organizations, though they have unique and diverse ideologies.  
Nonetheless, these analyses can be used to identify core determinants and other 
information regarding terrorist group survival rates (Cronin, 2006). 
The GTD has provided large amounts of data on terrorist group tactics and 
ideology, for almost 40 years. This data is used in combination with RAND’s data (Jones 
133 
 
& Libicki, 2008), which focuses on groups’ characteristics (e.g., base of operations, peak 
size, religious order, and mandates) from the vantage of how these aspects influence 
groups’ duration. A proper knowledge of these determinants can better inform policy 
makers on how and when to allocate government resources for counterterrorism, so that 
survival rates are greatly reduced. Having a greater understanding of the tactics which 
help sustain terrorist groups assists counterterrorism  efforts to allocate resources against 
various kinds of terrorist attacks (Jones & Libicki, 2008). 
Prominent among these factors in longevity is religion. Yet, in an otherwise data-
rich study conducted by Jones and Libicki (2008), beliefs were mentioned only in 
passing. In a later study on the same subject, Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer (2010) used 
only global terrorist attacks as their distinctive when considering survival rates, despite 
the fact that the majority of terrorist groups engage in both global and domestic terrorism. 
In fact, most groups rely heavily on domestic attacks to provide income to fund other 
activities. Blomberg et al. included political, socioeconomic, and other factors from 
specific countries. The analysis in the present study incorporated these different aspects 
from the groups’ home countries, consistent with results from Basuchoudhary and 
Shughart (2010). That is, these groups’ survival relies on various conditions such as when 
and where they seek refuge when training. 
Cronin (2009) examined the dynamics of 457 different terrorist groups identified 
in the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) event database. 
Cronin’s study centered on displaying the groups’ overall life span, and their achieved 
goals, instead of conducting a more traditional survival rate analysis. In the study, 
correlated data on the groups’ ages and engagement in negotiations were evaluated; 
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however, the study’s results did not show negotiations with their home governments as 
having an influence on survival rates. Evaluating data on only the oldest organizations, 
introduced bias in the selection process. Furthermore, Cronin did not evaluate potential 
relationships between a group’s size, ideology, location, or base-country characteristics 
and longevity (Cronin, 2009). 
Racial Determinants of Domestic Terrorism 
In the days following the September 11th attacks, the United States Congress  
passed the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, which was an omnibus bill containing multiple changes 
to  federal criminal procedure, laws applying to foreign intelligence surveillance, 
wiretaps and other methods of intercepting electronic communications, laws related to the 
gathering of documentary evidence, DNA collection, and immigration laws. More 
importantly, the PATRIOT Act allows federal investigative agencies less restrictions 
when obtaining permission for wiretaps on multiple electronic devices and secure 
electronic and documentary evidence from multiple sources, such as Internet service 
providers, telephones and cell phones, and cable companies. It also removes restraints 
that had been in place regarding sharing information among federal agencies. The 
increased latitude given to law enforcement activities under the Act, combined with the 
relaxed standards and requirements for information sharing, created a concern for 
preserving civil liberties, and our nation’s approach to immigration and the path to 
citizenship (Rapoport, 2004). 
Section 412 of the Act gives the Attorney General (AG) of the United States the 
power to hold illegal aliens certified to be a threat to national security for up to 7 days 
without bringing charges against them. This standard for detention of individuals is based 
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on the reasonable suspicion standard from the Supreme Court, better known as a “Terry 
Stop.” The certification by the AG must set forth why there are ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe’ that the person being detained would be likely to commit acts of sabotage, 
espionage, and terror, try to overthrow the government, or engage in acts that could result 
in endangering national security.  
After the 7 days end, the individual may be released, although detention could 
continue in the event that the illegal alien is formally charged with a crime or other 
violation of visa conditions under federal criminal law. If circumstances prohibit 
repatriation due to a problem during the immigration process, detention may continue as 
long as deemed necessary by the AG, with re-certification every 6 months. Under the 
PATRIOT Act, the prospect exists that an individual held in violation of proper conditions 
of entry into the United States, but unable to be deported to their home country, could be 
possibly held indefinitely without formal charges being filed (Enders, Sandler, & 
Gaibulloev, 2011). 
In his 1989 dissent in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ (489 U.S. 602), 
Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that “history teaches that grave threats to liberty often 
come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.”  In 
2002, Chief Deputy Attorney General for the State of California Peter Siggins reported 
that surveys conducted by civil liberties organizations found that 66% of Whites and 71% 
of African Americans favored profiling ethnic minorities, particularly those considered to 
be Muslims  (Siggins, 2002).  
Post 9/11 saw a dramatic increase in hate crimes against Muslim Americans. 
According to the FBI’s Hate Crime Statistics Report (2015), aggravated or simple 
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assaults against Muslims in 2000 was only 12 incidents. In 2001, post 9/11, anti-Muslim 
aggravated or simple assaults increased to 93 incidents. FY 2002-2004, there is a 
significant decline in the number of anti-Muslim assaults with a peak in 2006 and with 
considerable decrease in 2007-2008. Beginning in 2009, anti-Muslim aggravated assault 
incidents began to increase and it was unclear as to whether or not there was a direct 
correlation between anti-Muslim sentiments and current events. There were several 
theories that lacked scholarly inquiry into the root causes as to why anti-Muslim assaults 
increased. One of the most populist theories was the election of President Barack Obama. 
The theorem purported that the plethora of unsubstantiated reports by right-wing 
extremists alleging that President Obama was a “secret Muslim” heightened fears and 
agitated anti-Muslim sentiments. Moreover, the Birther conspiracy claiming that 
President Obama was not born in America, but actually born in Kenya, only served to 
increase tensions and validate the montage conspiracy theories that Sharia law would 
soon usurp the U.S. Constitution. This anti-Islamic polemic from the right-wing 
continued from 2009-2015 and did not differentiate between so-called moderate Muslims 
and radical Islamic fundamentalists. Islam was being framed as a “violent” religion and 
anyone of the Muslim faith were de facto supporters of Muslim terrorist. Furthermore, 
anti-Muslim sentiment was seemingly justified by right-wing extremists due to several 
well publicized and high-profile incidents committed by Muslim extremists on American 
soil. In 2009, U.S. Major Nidal Hasan murdered 13 people and wounded 30 others in a 
shooting rampage inspired by his radical Islamic views (McFadden, 2009). In 2013, the 
Boston Marathon bombers, who killed three people and injured more than 100, admitted 
to the FBI they were motivated by their extremist Islamic beliefs. In 2015, there were 
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several high-profile attacks that seemed to re-galvanize anti-Muslim animosity back to 
pre-9/11 levels. In Garland, Texas, at the Curtis Culwell Center, Muslim radical 
extremists Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi Nathan Hunsinger exacted violence on 
attendees and organizers for what they deemed as mocking and disrespecting the Prophet 
Muhammad at a Muhammad Art Exhibition and Contest (Siron, 2015). The second was 
the shooting in San Bernardino, California where, Syed Rizwan Farook killed 14 people 
and injured 22 others at a Christmas party. Americans also feared that with the closing of 
Guantanamo Bay, former “terrorists” could possibly be relocated to the United States and 
wreak havoc in their city or state. Although these fears may have been exaggerated, there 
is substantial evidence of an inverse relationship between anti-Islamic hates crimes and 
how Muslims are portrayed by right-wing media outlets. 
Figure 4 demonstrates the attacks on Muslim Americans from 2001 and ending in 
2015.  In observing the frequency distribution, the attacks on Muslim Americans was at 
its peak soon after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Saudi 
Islamic extremists. But attacks on Muslim Americans from 2002 – 2015 has been 
consistent, but sporadic. From 2002 – 2005, attacks on Muslim Americans dropped 
significantly from the number of attacks reported in 2001. In 2006, attacks on Muslim 
Americans increased considerably only to recede back to the low levels reported from 
2002 – 2005. In 2009, the attacks on Muslim Americans increased, and would remain 
consistently high from 2009 – 2015. This could very well be attributed the election of 
President Barack Obama, whom many right-wing conservatives and extremists accused 
him of being a “secret Muslim.” Although this hypothesis seems plausible, there is other 
evidence that suggest that high-profile attacks against other Americans in the name of 
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ISIL or Al-Qaeda directly contributes to anti-Muslim sentiment which traverses from 
hateful rhetoric and devolves into violence.  
 
Figure 4. Anti-Muslim Assaults. Note. FBI Hate Crime Statistics, 2015 
Muslim Americans were not the only group to see an increase in hate crimes 
perpetuated against them because of their identity. Hate-motivated crimes against Sikhs 
also increased. Because their customary dress code is similar to that of Muslim-
Americans, Sikhs are often attacked due to mistaken identity. In 2012, Wade Michael 
Page, a self-proclaimed Neo-Nazi, entered a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin and 
opened fire, killing six people and seriously wounding three others. Page, after shooting a 
police Lieutenant Lt. Brian Murphy in the throat, committed suicide after he was shot in 
the stomach by a responding police officer. Law enforcement later discovered that Page 
was a member of the White supremacist group called the Northern Hammerskins (Elias, 
2012). After the shooting, FBI and local law enforcement officials concluded that there 
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was strong evidence to suggest that Page mistakenly assumed that his targets were 
Muslims and he was entering a temple and not a Mosque. 
According to the Sikh Coalition (2014), The terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to an 
exponential increase in hate crimes, employment discrimination, law enforcement 
profiling, and school bullying against Sikhs in the United States. Since the FBI does not 
record hate crimes against Sikhs, Hindus, or others that Americans often mistake for 
Muslims, the hate crimes recorded will under-represent the actual number of hate crimes 
directed at Sikhs or other groups that identify with the Islamic faith.   
According to research conducted by Florida State University professors Patrick 
Mason and Andrew Matella (2014), racial profiling of Muslim Americans or suspected 
Muslim Americans went into overdrive post 9/11. In their research, they reported that: 
On November 9, 2001, the DOJ mailed interview requests to 5,000 Arab and 
Muslim males, 18 - 33 years of age, who arrived in America after January 2000 
on student, work, or tourist visas. These were nominally voluntary interviews… 
The same month the US Department of State slowed the visa process for males 
ages 16 - 45 from Arab and Muslim countries. Further, the INS engaged in mass 
arrests of students who had violated the terms of their visas; all of these students 
were from Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen 
(pp.4-5). 
During Spring 2004, the FBI, under intense political pressure from elected 
officials in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, again decided to 
round up Arabs and Muslims for “voluntary” interviews (Mason & Matella, 2014). On 
May 28, 2004, it was revealed that the Justice Department had targeted 5,000 Muslims 
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and Arabs for questioning, questioning based on religion and ethnicity, and not on 
individualized criminal suspicion (Arab America, 2014). The American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) vehemently opposed these measures promised that litigation would be 
forthcoming. The actions taken by the FBI were considered to so blatantly discriminatory 
that some local police chiefs worked hard to refute this racial profiling, going as far as 
resisting cooperation with federal law enforcement efforts on the grounds that the entire 
investigation appeared to violate departmental policies at state and local levels (Rapoport, 
2004). 
In California, Governor Davis and Attorney General Lockyer were concerned 
about possible terrorists congregating in the state. They authorized programs in 
September 2001 that supported racial profiling, using reports from and investigative 
powers of the Highway Patrol and the Office of Emergency Services, an organization that 
was later central in developing the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center. The 
Center, one of the first in the nation, was created to process thousands of anonymous tips 
and leads on suspicious activity following 9/11. The challenge for this organization has 
been separating fictitious reports from potential threats. Threats that are deemed credible 
or present a clear and present danger are forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement 
agency for follow-up. In January and February of 2016, 1,615 incidents identifying 
potential suspects were reported to the Center. Out of the 228 credible reports, 33 
individuals remained as subjects of ongoing investigations. The Center, which contacts 
an average of almost 60 law enforcement agencies per week, and monitors dozens of  
anti-terrorist investigations, remains a tool that has yet to be validated through empirical 
testing and review (Shughart, 2006). 
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While the Office of Emergency Services Center continues to receive significant 
information every day from reports on and tracking of those with an apparent Middle-
Eastern background, concerns emerged as to what is considered suspicious or dangerous 
activities. It is imperative that law enforcement agencies and officials extract relevant and 
reliable information from reports received by the Center, knowing that the outstanding 
challenge is to flag only behaviors and other indicators that indicate patterns related to 
domestic terrorism (STATA, 2009). 
To accept that profiling Middle-Easterners is enough to warrant disparate 
treatment, Americans would need to accept that most Middle-Easterners have a proclivity 
for terrorism—a thought contrary to the Constitution. The horrific nature of the crimes 
committed on 9/11 by this group of foreign nationals from Saudi Arabia motivated 
officials to specifically investigate all foreign nationals from Middle Eastern countries, 
often disregarding other criteria normally a part of such investigations, and has resulted in 
social media backlash, civil rights protests, and confusion as to the scope and mandate of 
some federal and state investigations.  
Systemic Determinants of Domestic Terrorism 
The total numbers of domestic terrorist attacks fluctuate annually. While the 
numbers of events may vary, their deadliness, destructiveness, and potential for 
catastrophic outcomes increased dramatically in recent years. Even states that are 
relatively free of terrorism can no longer afford to be complacent. With evidence of 
domestic terrorism spilling over from one state to another (Enders et al., 2011), the 
potential for disastrous consequences from even a single event must be kept in mind 
(Wilkinson, 2001).  
142 
 
As domestic terrorism is conducted in the pursuit of alternate outcomes, what has 
emerged is that many revolutionary terrorists are most interested in simply raising 
society’s consciousness or demonstrating the fragility of the current state of society. At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, the goal for some domestic terrorists is bringing about a 
utopia that they believe will from destroying all government and its authority. Between 
these extremes are terrorists who seek optimal economic systems that can follow the 
destruction of current institutions. Other groups seek societies that are better served by 
altering the current relationships with nature and promoting the reinvigoration of the 
planet. At the less ambitious end of the scale of domestic terror, there are those that desire 
autonomy or a section of the nation for themselves. Criminologists and other researchers 
found that terrorists and their causes are diverse and require a broad scope of 
investigation to find commonalities and unifying elements (Laqueur, 2003; Sambanis, 
2008). 
As terrorism is difficult to define and research, Silke (2004a) observed that 
academic researchers almost always choose to discuss differing definitions of terrorism 
because there has not been one that has been broadly accepted. For those who choose to 
study terrorism, what routinely occurs is dividing it into two categories (domestic and 
international), based primarily on the national origin(s) of the perpetrators, the choice of 
victims, and the selection of  targets. For domestic terrorism, perpetrator and victim 
nationalities routinely match, with the violence seeking to resolve issues within a nation, 
directed by a group or an individual from that state (Young & Dugan, 2010). 
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Social Determinants of Domestic Terrorism 
Most debate on domestic terrorism had focused on policies related to prevention. 
There was a widespread view that poverty was a feature that creates terrorism and that 
view dominated much of the discourse (Kahn & Weiner, 2002) and ran concurrently with 
theoretical and empirical studies that addressed the economics associated with conflict. In 
particular, the results of a study conducted by Alberto Alesina, Ozler Sule, Roubini, 
Nouriel and Phillip Swagel (1996) suggested that poor economic conditions are likely to 
increase the probability of domestic terror, and drive citizens to challenge the government 
and use violence as a means to be heard. The fact that domestic terrorism is perceived as 
a manifestation of political conflict suggests that poverty and adverse economic 
conditions play important roles in explaining and understanding acts of domestic 
terrorism (De la Calle & Ignacio, 2011). 
Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) suggested that aggressive national 
anti-terrorism policies were attributable to increases in domestic terror. This highlights 
the role that access to information and reporting play in fashioning policy. For example, 
the DOJ, DHS, FBI, and the U.S. State Department data are reluctant to publish material 
that runs counter to their initiatives or agendas. Instead, they seek to galvanize the public 
behind defeating these groups and ignore their messages. There is a single direction to the 
messages reaching the public. In 2003, for instance, the MIPT Knowledge Base (2004) 
reported 1,536 events of domestic terrorism but only 240 events of international 
terrorism, maintaining the focus on domestic terrorists. What is interesting in these trends 
is their impact on present and future actions and policies on domestic terrorism (MIPT, 
2004; Piazza, 2004). 
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Extremist Social Movements and the Internet 
The need to study extremist social movements and their presence on Social Media 
has become vital. Since social media and other emerging digital technology has become a 
necessity, society routinely considers change as inevitable. As world-systems analysts 
predict the decline of the U.S. as the world’s leading nation in the coming decades, 
extremist social movements have the potential to reshape the world (Walter, Hoover, & 
Sandler, 2014). 
Research conducted by Wallerstein (1999) suggested that while researchers 
cannot predict what will happen in the future with any certainty, what is currently being 
promoted are egalitarian and utopian world societies. In trying to create a better world, 
societies must be willing to invest moral energy to achieve this while also challenging 
ones that would stand against brotherhood, equality, and religious freedoms (Piazza, 
2006).  
Following a similar course of research, Chase-Dunn and Boswell (2002) predicted 
a rise in extremist movements spurred by a global economy that would enable societies to 
move beyond borders and seek equitable solutions for all humanity. As this team 
promoted the emergence of a global democracy that would likely begin in the United 
States and move outward. This equality would also extend to assigning economic, 
political and cultural rights, and disregard the influence of the majority in favor of the 
individual. This search of a pure and true form of global democracy will ultimately unite 
factions opposed to the effort. While legislation is already uniting this form of global 
utilitarianism, which continues to gain popularity among the disgruntled, increased 
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domestic terrorist attacks on the United States, in an effort to disseminate the goals and 
message of social extremist movements can be expected (Frey, 2004). 
In a two-pronged attack, leaders of extremist social organizations have been very 
successful in using the Internet and social media to publicize their complaints and goals. 
They seek to win the hearts and minds of those who may not be willing to engage in civil 
disobedience but want to understand and take part in the struggle These digital outlets 
provide information about these “e-movements” and new forms of “e-protests” and “e-
activisms” (Earl & Schussman, 2003) and highlight the Web as a tool for extremist 
groups.  
Domestic and international networks are key resources in overcoming difficulties 
in leadership and decision making  (Castells, 2000). The downside for social extremist 
groups that utilize the Internet as their primary means of communication between leaders 
and members is that government agencies also have a window into their modus operandi. 
Law enforcement therefore has the opportunity to identify immediate and future threats 
presented by these groups (Lichbach, 2003). 
Conclusion 
The dynamic research conducted on the characteristics of domestic terrorists 
provides insights that will assist in establishing the comprehensive models used in this 
study and assessing the variables involved, which will be qualified by creating themes. 
Using poverty, ethnicity, religious ideologies, along with secondary variables, unifying 
connections were explored in Chapter 4, and used a qualitative document evaluation 
approach that followed scientific methodology and protocols. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
As this researcher sought to develop models that could be used by law 
enforcement to predict domestic terrorists’ future activity, case studies with quantitative 
analysis was the optimal methodology. By assessing past domestic terrorist events 
conducted by various militia groups, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionists, 
and left- and right-wing terrorist groups, the researcher anticipated successfully predict 
behavior. The researcher tested the hypotheses, based on variables from the study, with 
bivariate and regression analysis (Yin, 2009). The evolution of domestic terror and their 
supporting organizations were defined within the research. 
A comprehensive quantitative study, rooted in a traditional scientific approach 
afforded the ability to correlate domestic terror incidents and changes in the economy, 
political climate, and beliefs. The search for causation was tied to their message and 
ultimately led to action, suggesting the approach used, which uncovered commonalities, 
and provided justification for producing the predictive models. Given the scope of 
domestic terrorist operations in the United States, this researcher sought reliability and 
validity by integrating quantitative and case study approaches (Creswell, 2011). 
Formulating political hypotheses related to domestic terrorism is based on 
principles offered by Fearon (1991), who put forth a set of defined propositions to 
explain a group of facts or phenomena, or a fundamental component or aspect of a 
research study. This In this study, the researcher addressed multiple hypotheses in an 
effort to provide a full explanation of the social phenomenon under study.  
To develop the various hypotheses for this study, it was essential to avoid 
preconceived assumptions and account for researcher bias, ensuring the validity of the 
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examination. In addressing this concern, the hypotheses were not developed until after 
completing a thorough review of the research, avoiding scenarios where relevant research 
was discounted for a pre-conceived conclusion (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).  
Hypotheses 1 
H1: The frequency of attacks by domestic terrorists from 1980-2016, has a 
direct correlation to the policies and positions of the President of the United States.  
The researcher used the political hypotheses, which were validated by empirical 
data collected in the literature presented in Chapter 3, to develop the models. They call 
attention to the significance of presidential administrations and their domestic policies 
from 1977 onward. One political hypothesis suggests that certain Presidents and their 
domestic policies resulted in increased domestic terrorist activities. Marschall (2002) 
provided a directional political hypotheses and stated that the nature of relationships can 
include positive or negative (inverse) and high or low levels of influence. An increase or 
decrease in domestic terrorism can be attributed to presidential influence.  
Hypothesis 2 
H2: Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism will increase as political and religious 
rhetoric becomes increasingly partisan.  
The systemic hypothesis challenges the nature of society. Our social system and 
its relation to domestic terrorism supports a correlation between perceived injustice and 
radical extremism. Seeking internal consistency for this hypothesis was a significant 
challenge. Reviewing the delivery of social services, education, employment 
opportunities, democratic principles, court challenges, and increased crime rates, the data 
lend credence to certain elements within society that capitalize and exploit on a segment 
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of the population’s belief that the only way the “White race” will survive in the United 
States is the systematic expulsion of all non-Whites, forced repatriation, and a return to 
White nativism. On the evening of June 17, 2015, self-proclaimed White extremist 
Dylann Roof walked in to the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in 
downtown Charleston, South Carolina, and murdered nine African-American 
parishioners during their weekly Bible study. In his manifesto, Roof cited his contempt 
for the American flag and the perceived apathy regarding the felonious deaths of White 
people: "I hate the sight of the American flag. Modern American patriotism is an absolute 
joke," "People pretending like they have something to be proud of while White people 
are being murdered daily in the streets" (New York Times, 2016). 
Some terrorism experts and law enforcement officials would classify Dylann Roof 
as an anomaly or an outlier. However, terrorism experts have uncovered data to the 
contrary. Whether it be a foiled white supremacist act of domestic terrorism or an actual 
attack on ethnic minorities, the consensus among the experts is that Roof is emblematic 
of under-educated, ultra-right-wing, white male, who presumes that their economic and 
social situation would be different if minorities were either exterminated or expelled from 
the United States. When elected leaders irresponsibly make public statements 
sympathetic to the devastating actions of right-wing domestic terrorists, it only does three 
things: empowers their cause, motivate copycats, and it martyrs the perpetrator.    
Domestic terrorist organizations capitalized on citizens who are disaffected by a 
government they feel has excluded them from life, liberty justice, freedom of speech, and 
the right to bear arms. The demonization of the government is the ideal platform to allow 
individuals from the same ideological perspective to unite in their opposition to the 
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government by openly defying the rule of law. Terrorist groups are skillful at promoting 
their message to those disenfranchised persons who see themselves as victims of societal 
amalgamation. As membership increases, so does funding. The research has shown a 
direct correlation between the financial resources of a terrorist organization and the 
likelihood of attacks increasing. For example, a group of bank robbers calling themselves 
the Aryan Republican Army pulled off 22 heists in 1994 and 1995 and had ambitions to 
use the money to start a revolution (Gumbel, 2015). 
Review of historical data supporting the systemic hypothesis highlights key 
periods in U.S. history over the past 40 years when the system faltered and domestic 
terrorist recruitment increased. These indicators are now being used to develop similar 
studies and produce predictive models that allow for proactive measures by law 
enforcement (Palazzolo & Roberts, 2010). 
With this hypothesis, the researcher sought valid relationships between variables, 
expressed as explicitly as possible, and supported by the literature. What emerged as 
significant was that the system cannot meet the requirements and expectations of every 
U.S. citizen. Trying to minimize the number of those who are dissatisfied with the system 
and considering taking violent action, what is suggested is to promote interventions using 
law enforcement and/or social services to deal with frustrations early on. The results 
should be fewer people signing up for and participating in domestic terrorist 
organizations (King et al., 1994). 
Hypothesis 3 
H3: Identify politics, race, and Nativism will become increasingly radicalized 
and divisive.   
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The social hypothesis and its testing for this study followed a process in which 
individuals made judgments about what other people do, think, or say. The literature 
review showed an important deficiency: the percentage of extroverts in focus groups 
were not effectively analyzed. As a result, none of the personality variables were useful 
for the type of hypothesis testing strategy researchers believe is essential to understanding 
domestic terrorists (Newman, 2008). 
To rectify deficiencies in forming a social hypothesis, the researcher used 
Lalonde’s (2002) social identity-intergroup differentiation theory. Lalonde stated that 
individuals have stronger in-group identifications and will perceive greater differences 
between their in-group and a relevant out-group. As domestic terrorist leaders and key 
subordinates are likely to be extroverts, their writings were analyzed from that 
perspective and a deeper understanding of terrorist relationships emerged. The social 
hypothesis in this study suggested that the greater the strength of in-group relationships, 
the stronger the terrorist organization is or will become (Lalonde, 2002). The evaluation   
considered the strength of in-group and out-group identifications, and the relevance of 
dimensions associated with social comparisons. 
Case Study Selection 
The study design addressed the research questions by focusing on the problems 
law enforcement faces when assessing changes in domestic terrorism from 1977 through 
2015. Case studies typically focus on small groups or individuals within a group and 
document the groups’ or individuals’ experience in a specific setting in order to 
understand the social phenomenon under study.  In order to consider domestic terrorism, 
the researcher assessed key variables, perceptions, and goals of domestic terror groups by 
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studying documents related to them. Assigning numeric values to social indicators when 
increased domestic terrorism occurred gave a temporal dimension and included instances 
of escalation. These steps informed the researcher’s construction of a detailed narrative. 
From this narrative, models were developed that validated the hypotheses by drawing on 
the key variables that addressed the research questions (Yin, 2012).  
The purpose of case studies is to give researchers the ability to effectively 
evaluate and filter information. A challenge in this study was developing a design that 
correctly assigned relevance and value to data. The purpose of this quantitative case study 
was to find relevant connections after examining historical documents and assessing key 
incidents in presidential administrations from Carter to Obama. With this approach, the 
researcher constructed a narrative and the models. These models were a comprehensive 
system for monitoring and forecasting changes in the dispersion and character of 
homegrown terrorism. The researcher used this empirical inquiry to examine the 
phenomenon with a reliable and valid data collection process. This case study focused 
exclusively on reviewing existing historical data and sought to identify patterns that 
converged with the research hypotheses and operant variables (Ellet, 2007). 
The rationale for using a case study approach was that it is effective for 
identifying changes within domestic terror groups in the United States. The quantitative 
design assisted with identifying asocial variables and areas of development and growth. 
The premise is consistent with Yin’s (2009) criteria that the case be of general public 
interest and that the social and educational issues have importance for the community. 
As researchers continue to understand domestic terrorism and promote its 
academic study, a quantitative study using an exploratory research design was 
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appropriate for this study. The premise behind each case study was to develop a strategic 
inquiry that examined common links. The six-domestic terrorist categories examined 
through the lens of historical documents resulted in a comprehensive and contemporary 
view of these organizations and their goals. The use of a case study design was consistent 
with previous researchers who studied small groups (Horvat, 2013). The strength of the 
case study research process lies in its series of steps designed to provide careful analysis 
of individual cases (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). A design that includes multiple 
perspectives from different references, and the opportunity to promote new strategies 
such as the proactive models, will serve as effective tools for law enforcement (Creswell, 
2011).  
Dependent Variables 
Domestic terrorism continues to remain a challenge for American society. Thus, 
examining the dependent variables in relation to organizations was essential for this 
study. As research on social phenomenon evolved, Goodwin (2003) highlighted current 
studies relying on connectivity metrics which support empirical modeling. The use of 
structural measures highlighted connectivity measures. This was particularly relevant 
given that connectivity was treated as an independent variable. By reviewing dependent 
variables that supported connections between the six types of terror groups studied, 
interconnections and connectivity were found when identifying the causes that underlie 
domestic terror (Goodwin, 2003).  
The traditional mathematical and statistical modeling the researcher used in the 
study highlighted the variables and informed the model at the conclusion of this study. 
The dependent variables represented the output or outcome whose variation were studied 
153 
 
and the models and tests explained the interactions between them. In this study, increases 
and decreases in domestic terrorism were analyzed to understand how the independent 
variables increased a terrorist organization’s success, and was related to the number and 
outcomes of their attacks (Nyström, Wikström, Blomqvist, Kautsky, & Isaeus, 2013).  
This research relied on dynamic data mining tools that drew on multivariate 
statistics. The dependent variable was the target variable; the independent variable was 
assigned as a regular variable. When identifying variables through a review of historical 
documents, the dependent variables were the events studied (i.e., the terrorist acts) and 
allocating expected changes when the independent variable was altered. The application 
of known values for the target variable was identified by data analysis, allowing for 
identification of target variables to be used in these learning algorithms (Wiersema & 
Bowen, 2009). The algorithms derived their validity from a review of the ebb and flow of 
domestic terrorism. Basing these changes on the effects of the independent variables 
supported the models and the validity of their content and predictions (Wiersema & 
Bowen, 2009). 
Independent Variables 
A review of the historical documents permitted assessing empirical data. Changes 
within society provided a foundational base for the study. The temporal guidelines were 
driven by changes in residents. Independent variables included economics, politics, 
religion, race, social variables, demographics, and the predominance of social media in 
contemporary society (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). These variables were assessed in 
relation to the formation, actions, and success of individual terrorist groups defined by 
pre-qualified categories, with an emphasis on the number of incidents. The number of 
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incidents was a measure for the domestic terrorist organization’s success and was 
correlated with these key social variables (Brett, 2004). 
In traditional scientific, quantitative case study analysis, the value of the 
dependent variable is manipulated by the effects and changes produced by the 
independent variables. While the independent variable is the operant variable that a 
researcher controls, manipulation was limited by societal changes across various time 
periods. To this extent, evaluation centered on convergences of the independent variables 
with the dependent variable of time and domestic terrorist action. Fluctuations in 
economics, social structure, race relations, and emerging technology such as the Internet, 
discovered relationships that could not have existed in the past. By accounting for the 
importance of time in this study, and the changes occurring among the independent 
variables within the research, the conclusions supporting the predictive behavior models 
drew on validated methodological approaches (Hastings, 1998). 
As law enforcement seeks to better understand domestic terrorism, this study 
provides for a means to effectively evaluate the independent variables. What was 
emphasized in the conclusions is the challenge of the convergences of independent and 
dependent variables in qualifying and validating the influence of each on the final results. 
Though there were multiple independent variables, and the researcher could not directly 
manipulate the evaluated exchanges. However, the study’s validity and the outcomes 
assigned to the statistical models were supported (Kusurkar, Ten Cate, van Asperen, & 
Croiset, 2011). 
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Control Variable 
The control variable, which is designated as the constant within a scientific study 
and the element that remains unchanged during the investigation, was the continued 
threat of domestic terrorism facing the United States. The control variable plays an 
important role in influencing experimental results and is tested relative to the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables (Cheng & Thaga, 2006).  
Following the example set by Aradillas-Lopez, Honoré, and Powell (2007), 
investigating difference estimation with non-parametric control variables—essential in 
developing the study—requires acknowledging that any system existing in a natural state 
may have many variables that are interdependent, with each affecting the other. By using 
an experiment, the relationship between independent and dependent variables is tested. 
Also, what is essential is identifying whether any additional independent variable can 
serve as a control variable. With a statistical analysis of the interplay between the 
independent and dependent variables (and the effects on the control variable), what is 
presented in the conclusions is the ability for law enforcement to utilize these exchanges 
and proactivity respond to domestic terrorism. 
Conclusion 
Dependent and independent variables allowed the various hypotheses to be tested, 
provided direction for this study, and offered a methodology that ensures confident and 
reliable results. Using a quantitative case study approach supported a comprehensive 
evaluation of retrieved historical documents, in which social, system, and political 
variables operated as dependent variables and gave a detailed picture of the historical 
development of domestic terrorism that ran concurrent with changes in society.  
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In Chapter 5, the independent variables were examined using terrorist typologies: 
militia, lone wolf, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionists, and left- and right-
wing extremists. Convergence among these variables validated the hypotheses. 
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Chapter 5: Case Study Analysis 
Using a quantitative case study design that explored typologies of domestic 
terrorism allowed the researcher to conduct a comprehensive evaluation that addressed 
the study’s research questions and problem. As this researcher drew upon empirical data 
from historical documents, an accurate depiction of the motivations, social influences, 
and organization of different types of domestic terror groups was possible (Creswell, 
2011).  
The case study method draws out relevant connections from primary, peer 
reviewed journal articles, governmental databases, and data collected by law 
enforcement. Incorporating this material supported the narrative. This form of empirical 
inquiry examined past and present phenomena by the data collected (Ellet, 2007). 
Militia and Paramilitary Groups Case Study  
The public activities that dominate the militia agenda include public and private 
meetings, rallies, and paramilitary training. Of those, rallies and paramilitary training 
emerged as potential concerns for law enforcement authorities. However, due to the small 
number of rallies and marches, they fail to generate the kind of opposition that would 
identify them as a danger. Conducting paramilitary training activities in some instances 
may violate state law, depending on the state in which the activity takes place. However, 
nationwide legislation prohibiting paramilitary training has not occurred, although there 
were attempts to create and enforce laws prohibiting militia training (Crawford, Gardiner, 
& Mozzochi, 1994). 
Concerning the group dynamics of militias, researchers identified two behaviors 
that caused concerns. The first is the propensity of militias to engage in confrontations 
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with local or federal authorities using their paramilitary training. The second type of 
dangerous behavior is their collecting and/or manufacturing illegal weapons and 
explosives, with the intent to use them against specific domestic targets. These activities 
stem from the movement’s core ideology of using firearms to resist the government. 
Driven by their desire to protect citizens, and feeling themselves to be victims of the 
government, they justify their illegal and criminal actions (Abanes, 1996). 
The media sensationalized militia confrontations with the government. Events 
included mobilizations, in which individuals claiming to be victimized by the government 
contact militia groups, as in the incident at Ruby Ridge. Typically, such confrontations 
result from individuals refusing to vacate property that has been foreclosed or seized, or 
from instances involving people who have warrants against them but refuse to give 
themselves up. When a militia organization identifies a victim, members mobilize 
support through communication channels such as ham radio or the Internet. A successful 
mobilization results when members assemble at a designated location, often armed and 
prepared for confrontation between the perceived victim and law enforcement agents, 
hoping to force authorities to back down and submit to the will of the militias (Pitcavage, 
2001). 
Contemporary militia movements are the latest in a series of paramilitary 
movements evolving from right-wing ideologies that emerged during the 20th century 
(Bennett, 1995). The original Ku Klux Klan militia and their derivatives began in the 
1920s. In the 1930s, the world experienced a sudden rise in fascism. Groups such as the 
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Silver Shirt Legion and the Christian Front Units appeared and were organized into 
paramilitary units. The threat they posed was considered real (Warren, 1996). 
The start of the Cold War ushered in new waves of paramilitary groups, causing 
the government and law enforcement to fear that some combination of Communist agents 
and fifth-column subversives would take place. Counter-militia groups such as the 
Minutemen and California Rangers saw it as their duty to arm themselves and defeat 
domestic communist threats facing the United States. These types of militias routinely 
formed sporadically during this period, driven by issues that addressed concerns ranging 
from White Supremacy to surviving the next world war. The Cold War also spawned 
militia groups, including the Christian Patriot Defense League, the Texas Emergency 
Reserve, the Covenant, and the Sword. The importance of religion is significant in the 
history of militias (Cobb, 1996). 
As domestic militias seek to validate their purposes and causes, what is central to 
the majority of the organizations is challenging the federal government as legitimate. One 
of the more successful militias in the Northwest, the Posse, emerged in 1970 to advocate 
that a truer form of government would be led by county sheriffs whose primary goal was 
to mitigate intrusions by the feds. By challenging the authority of the federal government 
and asserting that it was not a legitimate government, their ideology quickly gained 
support from the far right and created the image of militias as true freedom fighters.  
Militias interpreted each failure of the federal government as a crime against the 
people, and treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement as limiting 
individual opportunity and freedom. Also, the assaults on Ruby Ridge (ID), Waco (TX) 
against the Branch Davidians, and gun control legislation such the Brady Handgun 
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Protection Act (1993), provided the groups with pretexts for their criminal actions. Social 
media and the Internet fueled their rise in the 1990s and gave individuals who would 
otherwise have no access to militia groups a means to communicate with recruiters and 
leaders. The militias used the federal assaults noted above to increase organizational 
strength and succeeded in funneling the anger of some citizens into action (Eaton, 1995). 
As authorities face the challenge of responding to militias who covet illegal 
weapons and explosives, and engage in conspiracies to obtain and use them, the need to 
understand domestic militias is required. Militias now seek support internationally, 
conduct fundraising for weapons and explosives, and seek information about potential 
targets. A legitimate threat is that a U.S.-based group could receive directives from 
overseas.  
The continued goal is to challenge the authority of the American government 
(Intelligence Report Summaries, 1999). Despite the potential for danger in every militia 
confrontation, many authorities are more concerned with the desire of many militia 
members for illegal weapons, and their engaging in conspiracies to obtain or use them. 
Such occasions bring the militia movement closest to fitting more traditional definitions 
of terrorism (Larizza, 1996). 
With many contemporary research studies on terrorism using 9/11 as a baseline 
for tracking increases and decreases in activities, Forensten (2015) highlighted the fact 
that Americans, and not foreigners, committed 80% of terrorist attacks in the United 
States since 9/11. In the 15 years since the attacks, not one domestic terrorist attack was 
committed by a foreign terrorist organization, including the most recent mass shooting in 
Orlando Florida by Omar Mateen, who was an American citizen. In addition, militia 
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groups who cultivated homegrown terrorists perpetrated 26 deadly domestic terrorist 
attacks in the post-9/11 era (Forensten, 2015).  
One of the key points argued in several research articles is that mainstream media 
has been effective in depicting militia groups as a consortium of racists, anarchists, and 
lunatics, all waiting for an opportunity to overthrow the U.S. government. New groups, 
such as the Arkansas Defense Force, emerged and promote a compelling and reasonable 
platform, and operate from the Bill of Rights, the writings of Thomas Jefferson, and 
Greek and Romans legislators. They believe that every citizen should be a soldier. What 
is often referenced is the famous Thomas Jefferson quote from a letter he wrote to 
William S. Smith, a diplomatic official in London, on November 13, 1787, commenting 
on Shays’ Rebellion,  “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time, with the 
blood of patriots and tyrants… [and] the Constitution asserts that all power is inherent in 
the people; requiring them to take action” (Jefferson, 1787). 
To support these beliefs, militias are united in the belief that they should be armed 
at all times, entitled to freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of property, and 
freedom of press. Any government challenges to these freedoms demands an immediate 
response, and violent (and illegal) actions are accepted as a means to an end (Pitcavage, 
1997b; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016). 
Lone Wolf Case Study 
Researchers who monitor lone wolf terrorists in contemporary society see a 
continuous revision of their modus operandi. Uniformed police are now primary targets, 
they note. Lone wolves enjoyed the easing of gun control laws from the 1990s, which 
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likely increased the number of mass shootings that have used their preferred method of 
firearms, high-velocity weapons (Reid Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). 
Forensic psychologists sought to develop a standard profile of the lone wolf. 
However, a profile has not yet been developed, but it is widely believed that most 
domestic terrorists are unemployed, single, White males with criminal records. Also, 
social and psychological characteristics indicate that they are similar to members of other 
terrorist groups in that they are older, lack education, and are more susceptible to mental 
illness. As lone wolves go through personal radicalization, leading up to their 
involvement in terrorist activities, what is significant at the outset is their combination of 
personal and political grievances.  
Though the individual seeks solitude, what is unique is their desire to elicit 
sympathy for their cause, subsequently validating their terrorist action. The Internet has 
enabled this process. Given that an enabler now supports the lone wolf, intent is 
developed. The final commonality is a triggering event that overcomes the final hurdle 
for action. Once radicalization is complete, what occurs—and is likely unnoticed by the 
lone wolves themselves—is the creation of their own terrorist signature.  
Investigators are now becoming aware of the radicalization process of lone 
wolves and what to search for regarding their enablers and the significant triggering 
events that would likely lead to action.  With this enhanced understanding of lone wolf 
profiles, there is a need to understand their intentions. Despite being isolated from 
society, they seek recognition through manifestos, e-mails messages, and videotaped 
proclamations. In the case of lone wolf Ted Kaczynski (the ‘Unabomber’), his capture 
was the result of his desire to be acknowledged when the media published his manifesto, 
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which ultimately led to his capture. This desire to be acknowledged is a key weakness of 
the lone wolf, but ultimately it is a benefit to law enforcement in understanding the frame 
of mind of the lone wolf terrorist (Reid Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). 
Lone wolf profiles support the concept of what the FBI termed violent true 
believers (Meloy, Jr., 2011) and suggested that these individuals have, in most cases, 
experienced developmental growth issues in their late adolescent stages. As young adults, 
they present an immaturity due to a psychological issue originating from the pre-frontal 
cortex. As a result of this pathology, there impulsivity, psychological grandiosity, self-
identification vulnerability, and biologically-based drives peak during this key growth 
period and support self-imposed isolation, leading to a downward trajectory. This 
trajectory has been established and follows a path of seeking to be enabled, finding a 
triggering event, and committing the act itself.  
Erikson (1950) argued that this process could be interpreted as a complex internal 
negotiation related to whether the self is a terrorist or a soldier. As reality and fiction 
compete within the mind of the lone wolf, those who are incapable of integrating into 
society experience a deepening frustration that builds upon itself and the future terrorist 
eventually takes action in defense of their own cause. This delusional interplay makes the 
lone wolf particularly dangerous, as they are not beholden to group mandates, and 
possess a freedom to engage in any activity that presents itself as an opportunity. Every 
citizen is a potential target. The Internet has only enhanced the fantasy and made finding 
enablers easier. Also, there is always the opportunity to view triggering events online that 
may lead to lone wolf terrorist action (Alderdice, 2005; Alderdice, 2007; Bargh & 
McKenna, 2009). 
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When evaluating the mental status, professional success, and social status of lone 
wolves, it is understood that some of these individuals have histories of unfulfilled 
personal goals, leading to cases of extreme narcissism. In what has been identified as in-
betweeners, they are caught between the confusion of late adolescence and the necessity 
to move through identity integration and enter adulthood. They also embody an absence 
of anticipated pride and joy, and lack the ability to meet their objectives and personal 
destiny. Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013) noted that this type of terrorist is 
particularly vulnerable to adult role models who convey a belief in and requirement to 
submit to authority. This point is relevant for law enforcement officers pursuing lone 
wolves as they mature and draw upon previous experiences in which they may have felt 
minimized and treated as less than others (Fonagy & Target, 1996). 
A review of cases involving lone wolf terrorist activity between 1940 and 2000 
highlighted 171 attacks resulting in 98 fatalities and 305 injuries. Statistics indicated that 
60% of lone wolves committed a single attack and 40% committed multiple attacks. 
Examples of serial terrorism include racist serial killer Joseph Paul Franklin, believed to 
be responsible for an estimated 23 attacks over 4 years; Muharem Kurbegovic, the 
“Alphabet Bomber,” who committed 10 attacks in 2 years; and Kaczynski, who 
committed 16 bombings during 17 years.  
A Department of Justice Report (2015), noted that between 2001 and 2013, 45 
lone wolves committed 45 attacks, resulting in the deaths of 55 people and injuring 126. 
These domestic attacks involved using bombs, airplanes, biological weapons, 
construction equipment, and knives. The report highlights their heightened ability to 
attack their targets, despite their lack of education and isolation. Using multiple attackers 
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was noticeable before 9/11; afterward, the reality of the lone wolf rose to prominence. 
This fear was supported by media sensationalism surrounding lone wolf mass murderers, 
including Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 and injured 30 in the Fort Hood shooting (2009); 
Jared Laughner, who killed six and wounded 13 in the Tucson shooting (2011); and 
Wade Page, who killed six and wounded four in the shooting at the Sikh temple in Oak 
Creek, Wisconsin (2012). By highlighting these examples, the data indicates a continued 
rise in lone wolf terrorism, enabled by technology and particularly social media (Hamm 
& Spaag, 2015). 
As lone wolf terrorists focused their attention on uniformed police and military 
officers, the results have been 12 law enforcement officers dead or wounded in the 60 
years preceding 9/11. This figure doubled in the first 13 years after 9/11: the number of 
government officials killed or wounded by lone wolves rose to 24. It was clear that this 
form of domestic terrorism presented an immediate danger to the United States. Because 
these attacks happened between 2009 and 2013 and coincide with Obama’s presidency, it 
was clear that political dissent was a likely the main motivation behind the attacks.  
Prior to the Obama administration, Black Power movements, the Israeli-
Palestinian controversy, and abortion pro-life radicals, were key reasons why lone wolf 
terrorists directed their anger towards law enforcement. In the post-9/11 era, researchers 
confirmed that attacks on local, state, and federal law enforcement officers were 
motivated by three factors: anti-government sentiment, White supremacy, and anger over 
the election of the first African American President. As a result, lone wolf terrorist 
emerged from their ranks and displayed their dissatisfaction by engaging in acts of 
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domestic terror and the result has been a steady rise in these types of attacks (Sageman, 
2008). 
The lens through which society views the violent true believer, such as the lone 
wolf, is often rooted in psychoanalytic theory, which emphasizes attachments, object 
relations, mental structure (especially superego identifications), and internal defenses. 
Empirical case studies also focused on social dynamics, including the significance of 
social, religious, and political forces at work in terrorism. The lone wolf used his 
isolation from mainstream society to validate his actions. They have come to the point 
where violence toward organizations and others is considered the only way to receive 
validation and praise.  
While the motivation for extreme violent action varies, clinical and forensic 
psychologists and psychiatrists believe that lone wolves likely have both conscious and 
unconscious characteristics that support their action. The mental instability that this 
produces in lone wolves who create their own reality, championing imaginary causes like 
a contemporary Don Quixote, ultimately justifies the violence in their mind. Their lack of 
connection to reality and mental instability make them inherently dangerous (Simi & 
Futrell, 2010; Smith, 1994).  
Political Extremist Case Study 
Political extremists are overtly defined by their strong disapproval of an ideology, 
and they are generally contrasted with moderates or centrists on the political spectrum. In 
their research on the conditions supporting political extremism, Bartoli and Coleman 
(2009) highlighted the importance of power differences within the context of extremism. 
When conflict arises, low-power groups are routinely viewed as more extreme than other 
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groups engaged in similar activities, but still fundamentally believe in and support our 
system of government. In the political arena, marginalized groups and people who 
believe that normal modes of conflict resolution are either biased or blocked and give 
unfair outcomes, routinely utilize extremist acts. However, some argued that dominant 
political groups also employ extreme measures. For example, many argued that Janet 
Reno, who sanctioned the attack on the Branch Davidians, is a prime example of a 
political extremist who caused the death of innocent civilians. This type of extremism 
routinely uses violent means to ensure submission of marginalized groups. However, 
political extremists can promote change through non-violent means. Therefore, the 
spectrum of political extremism consists of many groups having a variety of 
characteristics (Coleman & Bartoli, 2005). 
Political platform and positions are routinely aligned when considering the 
utilization of violent actions, where the level of violence, targets, differentiating between 
military personnel, civilians, and children, defines the level of extremism. The evidence 
of political power structures, and the use of extreme violence, is more consistent with 
lower power groups routinely resorting to episodic attacks and forms of violence such as 
suicide bombings. In contrast, dominant political extremist power groups rely on 
structural, institutionalized violence such as covert uses of torture, or allowing the police 
force to engage in brutality as a sanctioned code of conduct (Wilcox, 1987). 
Political extremist groups and individuals are routinely demonized by society 
through the media because their extremist ideologies are almost always associated with 
violent behavior or violent rhetoric, which are precursors to violence. What is often 
overlooked by the media and law enforcement is the rationale for the extremist behavior. 
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As a result, all members that subscribe to an extremist political ideology are framed or 
depicted as radicals who only advocate violence to further their political agenda when in 
fact there are internal power struggles between individual members with regards to what 
course of action will best advance their cause and not all of them include acts of violence. 
The development of opposing internal factions in political extremist groups is not 
anomalous. Ideological demagoguery is a quintessential trait that often emerges in 
political extremist’s groups often with the purpose of unifying those members who 
advocate a violence only mentality and expelling or converting those who are open to the 
idea of employing non-violent strategies. The key for political extremist groups is to 
present a united front because conflict or ambivalence can undermine the very foundation 
of the group. The unity of political extremists and their willingness to use violence is its 
greatest threat, and arguably its greatest asset in an effort to be heard and respected for 
the purposes of government policy modification or actions. When assessing the core 
problems facing extremist political factions in contemporary society as they seek 
consensus, it is evident that the very consensus they seek undermines their ability to 
evolve and grow out of a fixed, closed mindset. The inability for the political extremist to 
move beyond extremist attitudes and approaches suggests an inability and 
imperviousness to change, with the challenge being that by mainstreaming and moving 
towards the middle, the political extremist loses their most valuable asset. In what is 
clearly a catch-22, where political extremism requires participants of the group to take 
action on certain political issues, what is a determining and defining factor is the level 
and severity of the action (Wintrobe, 2006).  
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Studies of political extremes in convergence with politics indicate that the former 
draws heavily on political philosophy, with establishment of what constitutes the middle 
or political center, and addressing how these variables shift together over time, and create 
cultural contexts. The development of extremist politics, leading to terrorism, highlights 
the ongoing need to study and analyze individual and group behaviors, attributes, 
strategies, preoccupations, and internal/external supporters. In considering the different 
Presidents, approaches, and the creation of political sub-groups, which morphed into 
extremism, what is compelling is how liberal democracies such as the United States 
responded to these extremist politics and actions. This does not preclude the government, 
or the need to examine the role of the media and electorate in comprehending and 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of democracies and extremists. As past 
research uncovered, the study of extremism reveals and supports assumptions concerning 
mainstream politics and ethics, highlighting their potential vulnerability to causes related 
to extreme dissent (Eatwell, 2006; Fleming, 2014).  
Social media promoted the idea of political extremists being on the lunatic fringe, 
where simply being labeled a political extremist suggests that the actions of any opponent 
offered either directly or implicitly will be rejected out of hand, and is routinely promoted 
through the use of censorship, segregation, and persecution. With past research failing to 
conduct evaluations through assessments into violent political extremism, it was believed 
that an integrated theoretical framework that offers an explanation for an individual’s 
involvement in politically motivated violence, was lacking, resulting in research that 
offered a poor understanding of causal mechanisms. Examples of political extremist 
groups include the following: Black September; Aryan Nation; Mexican Mafia; Bloods 
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and Crips Gang; WACO/Branch Davidian Compound; Black Guerilla Family; Original 
Knights of the KKK; Weather Underground (Weathermen); American Nazi Party; and 
the Aryan Brotherhood. The challenge for society has been understanding and 
acknowledging these extremist group’s political positions, as doing so in some instances 
requires openly embracing racism and committing political suicide. As religion, ethnicity, 
and political ideology, these groups have been attributed with sustained, political 
domestic terrorist activities and attacks. The course of action, offered by Eatwell (2006), 
is to continue examining the relationships between perceived injustice and poor social 
integration, and political/religious violence, which is further mediated by perceived 
alienation. By drawing groups together, extremes can be avoided, perceived political 
procedural injustices can be resolved, ethnic discord can be minimized, and religious 
authoritarianism that supports continuous political discourse, in an effort to avoid 
marginalization and the escalation towards violence, can be resolved (Schils & Pauwels, 
2016). 
A unique argument for the existence of political extremists and their use of terror 
is that it continues to challenge the power of the government and avoid what conspiracy 
theorists argue is a continued evolution towards a New World Order. With governments 
routinely succumbing to tyranny, corruption, strife, and supporting the status quo, some 
argue that extremism offers a check to that possibility, with organizations seeking to 
generalize the entire population under one form of government. For example, the United 
Nations is seen as such an organization as it has already marginalized and has control 
over many third world countries. While many nations succumbed, the United States 
remains out of the grasp of the United Nations, with conspiracy theorist and political 
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extremist George Eaton’s Patriot Report continuing to chronicle the descent of the last 
great Western power. Despite being anti-Semitic, and calling for an internal revolution by 
White patriots, his writings and literature express more fear toward the dissolution of a 
free government and press, challenging independent Christian patriots to fight. This 
example highlights the fact that the United States will likely continue to face some form 
of political extremism that relies on domestic terrorism, where the members, driven by 
fear and the right leader, will succumb and commit violent acts in support of their 
political group’s greater good (Eaton, 1993). 
Eco-Terrorism Case Study 
The behavioral characteristics of eco-terrorists are seen in those willing to engage 
in acts of violence to support of environmental or ecological causes that could result in 
destroying or damaging property and harming others. Other aspects within the eco-
terrorist profile highlight the fact that radical environmentalism is also characterized by 
the belief that human society is ultimately responsible for degrading and depleting the 
environment. With society failing to act and leaving the destruction unchecked, the result 
could be the catastrophic end of the United States and the world’s ecosystems (Leader & 
Probst, 2003). 
In the FBI’s National Crime Information Center Report (2014), eco-terrorism was 
defined as “the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against people or 
property, by an environmentally oriented sub-national group, for environmental-political 
reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature” (NCIC, 
2014, p. 1). Between 2003 and 2008, domestic eco-terrorists were credited with over 
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$200 million in property damage, prompting many states to strengthen their laws and set 
stronger deterrents on place against these types of crimes (NCIC, 2014). 
Disaffected environmentalists, in 1980, formed a radical group called Earth First 
and engaged in a series of protests and civil disobedience events (Jarboe, 2002). In 1992, 
the ELF was founded in Brighton, England, by radical Earth First members who began to 
view protests and acts of civil disobedience a waste of time and ultimately ineffective 
(Jarboe, 2002).  
Despite the interconnections between philosophies that support eco-terrorism, this 
research identified that these organizations support a diverse set of goals and 
philosophies. Examples of radical ecology/eco-terrorist organizations include: 
Greenpeace, Animal Liberation Front (ALF), People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA), the Earth Liberation Front ELF), the Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society, People for the Earth First, the Hardesty Avengers, and the Coalition to Save the 
Preserves. Each has been labeled an eco-terrorist group and been formally charged with 
acts of domestic terrorism by the FBI. The diversity of these groups is evident; some 
focus on the protection of animals, others the environment, and others seek to find a 
compromise between people and the environment and use of extremist or terrorist tactics 
to advance their message. Their consciousness and belief in the righteousness of their 
cause and organizational mandate makes these organizations a real domestic terrorist 
threat. In many instances, the end justifies the means, even if human casualties are 
collateral damage (Lepper, 2005). 
Radical environmentalists can be recognized by their diagnoses and prescriptions 
regarding the impending environmental crisis (Taylor, n.d.). Their diagnoses generally 
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involve a critique of the dominant streams of occidental religion and philosophy, which 
are said to desacralize nature and promote oppressive attitudes toward it and people 
(Taylor, n.d.). Prescriptions generally include overturning anthropocentric and 
hierarchical attitudes (Taylor, n.d.). 
After reviewing the research, what is essential for the continued success of eco-
terrorism and continuing to add new recruits to their cause, is its ability to validate 
participant actions. Many eco-terrorist organizations subscribe to the idea of biocentrism, 
which is the belief that all human beings are ordinary members of the biological 
community and by extension, all living things should be assigned basic rights and 
afforded protection under humanitarian laws. Some of the more radical agendas of eco-
terrorists include concepts from deep ecology, such as the goal to return the United States 
environment to its original, pristine state by ending the effects of industrialization (Eagan, 
1996).  
Since 1977, when disaffected members of the ecological preservation group 
Greenpeace formed the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and attacked commercial 
fishing operations by cutting drift nets, acts of eco-terrorism occurred around the globe 
(Jarboe, 2002). In recent years, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) became one of the 
most active extremist elements in the United States (Jarboe, 2002). The ALF was 
classified by the FBI as a terrorist group, whose purpose is to bring about social and 
political change through the use intimidation, extremist tactics, and terrorist activities. 
ALF eco-terrorists engaged in a steadily growing campaign of illegal activity against fur 
companies, mink farms, restaurants, and animal research laboratories (Jarboe, 2002). 
According to Fur Commission and the National Association for Biomedical Research 
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(NABR), from 1992-2002, ALF was responsible for approximately $45 million dollars in 
damages (Jarboe, 2002).  
On March 18, 2002, Pennsylvania State Police discovered heavy equipment used 
to clear trees at a construction site in Erie, Pennsylvania, spray painted with the 
statements “ELF, in the protection of mother earth,” and “Stop Deforestation” (FBI 
Terrorism Report, 2002-2005). On March 24, 2002, police responded to the same 
construction site, where a large hydraulic crane had been set on fire, causing 
approximately $500,000 in damage (FBI, 2002-2005). It was later reported that ELF sent 
a facsimile to authorities’ claiming responsibility for the arson and vandalism (FBI, 2002-
2005). ELF also claimed responsibility for an August 11, 2002 arson on the U.S. Forestry 
Scientific Laboratory in Warren, Pennsylvania (FBI, 2002-2005). 
In late 2005 and early 2006, the FBI dismantled a network that, according to DOJ, 
committed violent acts in the name of both the ALF and the ELF (Bjelopera, 2013). They 
called themselves “The Family” and it was reported that they were directly responsible 
for at least 25 criminal incidents totaling approximately $48 million in damages 
beginning in the late 1990s through early 2000s (Bjelopera, 2013). In 1998, The Family 
was responsible for an arson attack at the Colorado Vail Ski Resort that destroyed radio 
towers, ski lift towers, restaurants, and the ski patrol office, which resulted in excess of 
$24 million in losses (FBI, 2008). 
The threat of ecological terrorism has become a major concern of environmental 
discourse during the past three decades and ominously shifted focus in the process (Buell, 
2009). This neologism has been brandished as a negative epithet from the conservative 
right, who are collectively pro-industrialist and have strategically used as lighting” 
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rhetoric to stigmatize all environmentalists and animal rights activists as eco-terrorist. 
(Buell, 2009). Those on the left often seek and imbalanced compromise which often 
creates a callous unilateral negotiation framework designed to allow business leadership 
to set the terms of their environmental friendliness and compliance instead of being 
relegated to a democratic scrutiny that holds them accountable for animal abuse, dumping 
illegal waste, deforestation, oil spills, safety violations, and carbon emissions.  
When eco-activist challenge this type of corporate self-aggrandizement, their dissent is 
then classified by those on the left as being unreasonable and protest is regarded as 
intimidation. Liberal democrats Martin Lewis (1992) and Luc Ferry (1995), posited this 
analysis regarding eco-terrorists: 
…these movements are atavistic, primitivist, and Luddite; offer no realistic way 
to live in the modern world; and are anti-democratic, refusing to abide by 
decisions arrived at through democratic processes. Others argue that these 
movements are counterproductive to building sustainable societies because they 
do not value and support science, which is a critical foundation for environment 
related public policies, but is already assailed by religious conservatives and 
hardly needs its credibility further eroded in the public mind by radical greens. 
When offensive and demeaning statements like this are made, the eco-terrorism 
discourse evolves as a predominantly rhetorical weapon not only against radicals but 
sometimes even mainstream reformist initiatives (Buell, 2009). In response, radical 
extremists, in their resentment of being classified as atavistic ideological bullies or 
radical terrorists, begin ratcheting up the level violence and extremism deemed 
appropriate to advance their cause. (Amster, 2006; Burns, 2001; McGregor, 2010). 
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Anti-Abortion Case Study 
Pro-life and Pro-choice ideologues continue to vigorously debate the issue, 
whether or not life begins at conception. The Roe v. Wade decision allowed women the 
choice of having an abortion. Since this decision, pro-life advocates have insisted that 
elected officials balance a woman’s right to choose against the state’s legitimate interests 
in regulating abortions, to include protecting a women’s health as well as the unborn 
baby. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, using the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, set the stage for battles between the U.S. government and anti-abortion 
groups. Now that abortions were sanctioned, anti-abortion violence and terrorist activities 
began to be part of the social landscape. Violent and non-violent crimes used in the years 
since the decision included kidnapping, assault, stalking, attempted murder, murder, 
arson, the threat of bombs, and actual use of bombs on abortion facilities. Jacobson and 
Royer (2011) and Nice (1988) explored the aftermath of Roe v. Wade by examining the 
impact of violence on clinics and its effects on abortion services. They noted that there 
are more documented incidents of anti-abortion terror in the U.S. than Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand combined. Their research highlighted anti-abortion violence, a single-
issue form of terrorism, and found that anti-abortion violence in was considered to be a 
form of sub-revolutionary terrorism.  
The DOJ (1988) identified anti-abortion extremists as a current domestic terror 
threat. This decision was precipitated by the murder of Dr. Barnett Slepian, who had 
created the National Task Force on Violence against Health Care Providers, which 
resulted in prosecuting a number of anti-abortion attacks. The killing of a high-profile 
figure brought attention to the issue; the media attention the anti-abortion forces were 
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after was achieved. This attention also assisted in apprehending James Kopp, a major 
anti-abortion extremist who was ultimately convicted of Slepian’s death.  
The FBI, now aware of the emerging threat of anti-abortion terrorism, began to 
develop inter-agency task forces to aggressively pursue relevant groups, with the goal of 
ending the violence against abortion providers. The challenge for the judicial system and 
law enforcement remains significant: the media, in some instances, portrayed Kopp as a 
crusader who led people who agreed that this was a just cause and felt the need to 
become involved join anti-abortion groups. As a result, many of the attacks against 
abortion providers in the United States are conducted by individuals who accept the 
correctness of the cause. In some cases, new participants were not affiliated with a 
particular organization. However, over time and through indoctrination, the idea—
indeed, the necessity of—engaging in overt criminal acts became a reality. Extremists felt 
justified planting a bomb in an abortion clinic or killing an abortion provider (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2003; Wilson & Lynxwiler, 1988). 
Synthesizing research conducted between 1973 and 2003, U.S. abortion providers 
were the targets of over 300 acts of extreme violence. Statistical analyses of attacks on 
abortions providers were subjected to meta-analysis in an effort to understand anti-
abortion violence and its effect on providers’ decisions to offer abortions. Considerations 
included women’s decisions end their pregnancy and their location (Jones & Kooistra, 
2011; Nice, 1988). The effects of anti-abortion extremism and their activities were 
highlighted in 1993, a year that saw heightened anti-abortion activities. At that time, 50% 
of U.S. clinics reported being targets of violence and harassment (Feminist Majority, 
2006).  
178 
 
The threat of violence extended from providers and support staffs to patients. To 
stem the escalating tide of anti-abortion domestic terrorism, Clinton signed the Freedom 
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) in 1994. The Act created federal statutes 
covering cases where individuals were prevented access to abortion facilities. Women 
entering health care facilities had to negotiate picket lines, protestors, threats, and insults. 
The legislation gave women the right to receive an abortion with free and unencumbered 
access to the facilities. The picketers, often considered domestic terrorists, now had to  
operate within the law and allow patients the necessary space to enter facilities. The 
judiciary could now prosecute offenders who violated FACE (Cozzarelli & Major, 1994; 
Doan, 2007). 
While anti-abortion extremists were ultimately unsuccessful in obstructing the 
market for abortion services, it is clear that this type of activity does impose a cost. 
Because anti-abortion forces effectively reduced demand for abortion services and 
instilled fear in some women, it could be argued that the movement has experienced 
some level of success. Recent studies indicated that despite the prevalence of anti-
abortion extremism, what remains notable are the effects on the decisions of pregnant 
women and abortion providers. Henshaw and Finer (2003) concluded that one of the 
primary reasons for recent declines in abortion providers is clinic violence, particularly 
the murder of abortionists. However, this claim however lacks validity. While FACE 
reduced anti-abortion violence for a decade, this lull in extreme violence does not mean 
the threat to providers has disappeared. Studies done after 2000 show that increased anti-
abortion acts perpetuated the cloud of violence surrounding this issue (Bitler & Zavodny, 
2001; Jones & Kooistra, 2011). 
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The predominant anti-abortion terrorist groups in the United States include 
Americans United for Life, Anglican Priests for Life/Order of Holy Innocents, Anglicans 
for Life, Anti-Choice Project, and the largest and most significant organization, the AOG 
(described in Chapter 2). These organizations and their leadership work, often 
underground, on planning activities while maintaining a more peaceful public image that 
seeks new members and funding, as well as continues to challenge the legality of 
abortion, the DOJ, and the DHS. The AOG, charged with numerous acts of violence 
including kidnapping and murder, is unique in that they rarely communicate and 
essentially operate as independent cells. The violent factions of the organizations cannot 
be found at rallies and marches; instead, they are buried deep within the organization and 
require sophisticated intelligence-gathering systems to bring them to justice (Blank, 
Christine, & London, 1996).  
The AOG, whose mandate explicitly advocates violence as a means to end 
abortion, is a prime example of extremism. Other anti-abortion groups seek to promote 
their message while avoiding direct confrontation, if possible. The AOG, which first 
came to public attention in 1982, is a prime example of an informal domestic  network of 
anti-abortion extremists. While many anti-abortion groups publish and distribute 
literature, the AOG is unique in that it produces a manual, offering direction on how 
individuals should engage in abortion clinic violence. The content is chilling, providing 
detailed methods for carrying out butyric acid attacks, bomb making, committing arson, 
and other tactics (Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004).  
Anti-abortion extremists, labeled terrorists by the federal government, gained 
traction after Roe v. Wade, has grown from individuals acting alone, to nationwide 
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networks such as the AOG. The frequency of anti-abortion attacks has grown apace; there 
has been a considerable increase in such activity. Violence fluctuated, but peaked in 
1984, 1992, and 1998. Recent data that reflects the success of the Obama administration 
in responding to anti-abortion attacks indicates that this type of domestic violence may be 
increasing, as noted in a NAF report (2009). It suggested that anti-abortion activity was at 
its highest level in the past decade. The need for due diligence and sophisticated 
intelligence gathering is needed to support current laws and mitigate the damage inflicted 
on those legally seeking an abortion, as well as those providing the means and facilities. 
It also points to the need for successful deterrence to end violence by extremist anti-
abortion groups (Eisinger, 2004). 
Left-Wing Extremism Case Study 
As a militant form of Marxist-Leninist ideology came to the United States and 
was blended with ideologies expounded by groups such as the Weather Underground, the 
Black Panthers, and various student groups that emerged on university campuses in the 
1970s such as the Students for a Democratic Society, left-wing extremism developed a 
strong ideological and political base. This base was founded on the use of terrorism, with 
examples such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), discussed in Chapter 2.  
Media coverage of the SLA and their apparent persuading of Patty Hearst to their 
political agenda (she appeared to be actively involved in one of the bank robberies), led 
to increased public awareness of this brand of extremism. The formation of M19CO and 
various smaller organizations such as the United Freedom Front followed (Jamieson, 
1990). 
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Research conducted by Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks (2009) showed that 
left-wing terrorism in the United States was ideologically motivated. The central 
argument that motivates them to action is that the revolutionary goal is non-negotiable. 
As a result, the rigidity of their demands may explain their lack of support and success 
compared to nationalist groups such as paramilitary and right-wing extremist 
organizations (Arena & Arrigo, 2006). 
Left-wing movements are routinely fueled by injustices related to socioeconomic 
conditions, and it is not surprising that communism pervades these organizations political 
agendas, including their use of terror. Many American left-wing terror groups follow the 
examples of successful groups such as ETA (in the Basque region of Spain), the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army, and the Irish National Liberation Army (both in 
Northern Ireland). The use of violence was incorporated into communist and socialist 
ideologies and is reflected in their policies. Many of these policies came from Marxist 
revolutionaries, such as Che Guevara, who supported using violence and terror to achieve 
equity for entire marginalized groups during the 1970s (Jamieson, 1990). 
Despite the early success of left-wing terrorism both abroad and in the United 
States during the 1970s, its success as a political ideology led to its marginalization. 
Criminal acts associated with these organizations dropped considerably in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, with the re-emergence of the New Black Panthers in the early 2000s, 
this form of political protest and unrest in the United States again created incidents of 
domestic terrorism. While many researchers considered the left-wing movement as 
having reached its zenith decades ago, its re-emergence in new forms and new 
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organizations suggested a need for law enforcement to study and track them, hoping to 
avoid a repeat of their earlier successes (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
Conclusion 
By examining the political dimensions of the various domestic terror groups, 
focusing on militias, lone wolves, political extremists, anti-abortionists, and left-wingers, 
commonalities were determined, allowing for behavioral characteristics to emerge, thus 
supporting the creation of typologies and the development of profiles. Drawing from key 
historical documents in plotting the trajectories of the various political factions, the 
detailed nature of this case study allows for critical and statistical analysis, utilizing 
clustering and bivariate methodologies to search out convergences and divergences. In 
Chapter 6, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics will be identified, 
enhancing the outcomes of the case study. The presentation of the findings will assist in 
the development of the predictive behavioral models, aimed at assisting law enforcement 
in preventing future domestic terrorist activities and incidents. 
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Chapter 6: Findings 
The findings based on this case study identified key variables in assessing the 
following six groups: militias, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionist, and 
left-wing terrorists. The correlation between these typologies would support risk 
assessment through by developing models that focused on demographic, social, and 
behavioral characteristics. These characteristics were utilized in bivariate and cluster 
analyses designed to assist law enforcement in both understanding and pursuing these 
groups. The goal was to create a probabilistic terrorism model which drew from historical 
patterns and used intelligence analysis, descriptions of terrorist plans, behavioral patterns, 
attack coordination, funding, and planning, to prevent attacks in the future (Samuels, 
2006). 
Bivariate Correlations 
Bivariate correlation is a measure of the relationship between two variables. This 
measure seeks to evaluate the strength of the relationship between the variables within 
the absolute values ranging from 1 to 0. A stronger relationship validates the correlation. 
Assessing the variables listed in the graphs and assigned pre-determined numbers, a 
positive relationship in the escalation of terrorism beginning with Carter and concluding 
with Obama was confirmed. The process of assigning values was drawn from the 
literature. The case study design highlighted the key variables. As law enforcement 
agents may need to conduct these correlations in the future, it is suggested that a primary 
and secondary review of the assignment of values to the variables being studied be 
conducted in relation to domestic terror, with a goal of maximizing the validity and 
success of the outputs, which will then support the development of predictive behavioral 
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models. Currently, while there are some profiling and predictive behavioral models for 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, there is also a lack of consistency 
regarding their use. Adding bivariate correlation may enhance the success of such models 
(Samuels, 2006). 
Bivariate Correlations Significant Findings 
The bivariate analysis gave outcomes of over .80 regarding the demographic 
variables. Many of the domestic terror groups operate nationally, and cultivate overt and 
covert faces for their organizations. While many of these groups are in rural areas, 
technology has allowed universal access and led to new recruits. The case study allowed 
for subjective assignment of numbers, with oversight. The outcomes of the bivariate 
analysis supported valid and reliable forecast for a continued increase in domestic 
attacks. Social, demographic, and behavioral bivariate analysis of the variables all 
produced scores over .50. This implies that domestic terrorism has become part of the 
fabric of society, and that law enforcement needs to remain vigilant. By examining these 
basic research variables, connections to the case studies will not only assist in promoting 
the creation of behavioral response models but also educate law enforcement officials and 
politicians on key motivating factors identify the most significant factors (Yin, 2009).  
The strength of the bivariate correlations has been evaluated in this study by 
SPSS. By using bivariate correlation tests such as the one from this study, the relationship 
between two variables is reviewed as linear. If one variable increases, the other may also 
increases; if one variable increases, the other variable decreases. The uniformity of 
outputs produced using SPSS analysis confirmed the escalation of domestic terrorist 
incidents, driven by the identified variables (Field, 2006).  
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When two dependent variables in correlation with the independent variables listed 
in Tables 1-3 were examined, the strength of their connections was confirmed by 
highlighting the traits and characteristics that can be used by law enforcement in 
understanding terrorists while developing counter-measures based on their social, 
behavioral, and demographic traits. The most significant connections were behavioral 
traits identified through case analysis. They reflected a strong bivariate correlation (.85) 
to the dependent variable, consistent with the number of attacks. In addition, social 
media, having opened avenues to new ways to communicate and exchange plans and 
ideas, draws a moderate correlation where covert actions need a level of secrecy. As a 
result, a reduction in the correlations to social engagements and interactions among the 
various groups was observed. 
Case Details and Demographic Characteristics 
A review of the demographic characteristics of the populations in this study 
focused on key variables that could be used in the bivariate and clustering process to 
assist law enforcement in developing a demographic profile. The demographic variables 
included income, educational attainment, employment status, and location. The 
distributions of values within a demographic variable correlated to trends over time. This 
study was concerned with the escalation of terrorist activities by reviewing and assessing 
demographic characteristics. The following tables detail the six primary categories 
evaluating the key variables used to develop the domestic terrorist profiling model. The 
variables emerged as significant in the literature, validating their significance for this 
research (Schuman & Scott, 1989).  
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Researchers and scholars used demographic trends to explain various social 
phenomena, including election outcomes, stock market results, and land acquisitions. 
Their usefulness is validated. Methodologists and researchers note that bivariate analysis 
is not final, but instead, a helpful means that routinely explained two-thirds of the 
variance of a social phenomenon. In this study, the researcher added cluster analysis to 
support the bivariate assessments (Foote, 1996; Klauke, 2000).  
Table 1 
The Nature of Extremism 
Extremist Group Social Variables Key Demographics 
Militias Poor Uneducated 
Political Extremists Politics Older (25-40) 
Eco-terrorists Environmental Younger 
Anti-abortionists Nationwide Movement Binding Theology Principles 
Left-wing extremists Politics Uneducated 
Right-wing extremists Politics Educated 
Case Details and Social Characteristics 
The identification of social characteristics for this study, promoted the analysis of 
attitudes, orientations, and/or behaviors which take the interests and intentions of these 
groups into account. The behavioral models were constructed to retain consistency and 
reliability, and relied on concepts that included social constructivism, social psychology, 
social anarchism, and capitalism, where the identified variables created a sense of 
practicality and realism. While the identification of social variables is routinely used in 
politics, where its meaning often depends on the context of the group or organization 
using it (for example, left-wing and right-wing characteristics), emphasis was placed on 
identifying general social attributes and variables. Table 2 includes the key variables used 
for bivariate and clustering analysis (Dolwick, 2009; Latour, 2005). 
  
187 
 
Table 2 
Extremist Organizations 
Extremist Group Political Position Political Principles 
Militias Anti-government Pro-1st Amendment 
Political Extremists Anti-government Violent Change 
Eco-terrorists Group Actions Civil Disobedience 
Anti-abortionists Aggressive Binding Religious Principles 
Left-wing extremists Radical Promote Group Consensus 
Right-wing extremists Radical Continually Challenge the 
Government 
Case Details and Behavioral Characteristics 
One of the primary purposes of Victoroff ‘s (2005) study was to understand and 
profile terrorists by focusing their on actions or reactions in response to external or 
internal stimuli. By identifying key behavioral traits that emerged in this case study 
review of  domestic terrorists, law enforcement could better understand these behaviors 
and underlying motivations, a valuable resource can be developed in the fight against  
extremist groups. During this study, the researcher conducted bivariate and clustering 
assessments of behavioral traits. The focus was activities that could be observed, 
measured, and recorded that would consequently allow for learning essential social 
components, which are shown in Table 3. In preparing for the analysis, which drew on 
two behavioral points of view and considered overt and covert social behaviors. Langbine 
(2010) reiterated Lewin’s formula B = ∫ (P x E), where B = Behavior, ∫ = Function, P = 
Person, E = Environment. This heuristic supported the validity of the variables identified 
in Table 3. The inclusion of this in-depth analysis, despite producing generalized 
variables within the report, supported a case analysis, which included assessing behaviors 
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that are increasingly recognized by researchers as a critical means of describing internal 
driving forces supported by counter-terrorism responses (Langbine, 2010). 
Table 3 
Extremist Group Characteristics  
Extremist Group Extremist Nature Political Position 
Militias Group Dynamic Promote Sovereignty 
Political Extremists Overt Challenge Political Structures 
Eco-terrorists Overt/Covert Prefer Non-Violence 
Anti-abortionists Pro-Life Overt Use of Violence 
Left-wing extremists Aggressive Utopian/Equality 
Right-wing extremists Radical Isolationists 
Results of Cluster Analysis 
The cluster analysis showed there has been an acceleration in the number of 
domestic terrorist acts, with concurrent results highlighting increased severity of the  
attacks. The analysis, beginning with Carter’s term through Obama’s, highlighted that 
with increasing legislation and policies, the outcome nonetheless supported an increase in  
domestic attacks. This technique relies on the use of exploratory data mining that is itself 
a commonly used for statistical data analysis. The correlation with the bivariate analysis 
supported confident and reliable outcomes and assessments.  
This study focused on developing a predictive behavioral model for assisting law 
enforcement authorities; the clustering analysis assisted pattern recognition, image 
analysis, information retrieval, and data compression. As a result, the ability to separate, 
differentiate, and then validate the variables in this study (driven by a temporal 
oversight), became a reality for having a domestic terrorist response model (Creswell, 
2011; Yin, 2009; 2012). 
The researcher used a clustering method called Density-Based Spatial Clustering 
of Applications with Noise. This method is an advancement in this type of analysis 
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technique, and uses well-defined cluster models that are referenced as density-
reachability (Rahmah, 2016). The approach is similar to linkage-based clustering, where 
the clustering is based on connecting points within certain distance thresholds and only 
connecting those that satisfy a density criterion that is identified by the original variant 
(defined as a minimum number of other objects within the radius). Defining presidential 
terms and the number of incidents allowed an accurate assessment. Using this clustering 
methodology confirms the escalation of domestic terrorist attacks. It is anticipated that 
the ongoing development of predictive behavioral models will continue to employ 
clustering techniques to highlight and confirm domestic terror patterns (Willis, 
LaTourrette, Kelly, Hickey, & Neill, 2007). 
Conclusion 
The convergence of outcomes produced by the individual case studies of the 
various organizations, and the identification and emergence of the key variables within 
each of the groups, allowed for bivariate analysis coinciding with the clustering analysis 
and provided some key insights into the historical evolution of the domestic terrorist 
organizations. In confirming the central research question, which supports an escalation 
of domestic terrorism, moving forward from the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the outputs 
also provide a key understanding of primary social, behavioral, and demographic 
characteristics. Chapter 7 includes a review of the study’s findings, with the continued 
discussion focusing on how elected leaders are promoting the problems associated with 
domestic terrorism, and how a lack of policy and enforcement has aided in the expansion 
of this social problem.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Analysis 
This chapter includes analysis of a series of typologies of domestic terrorists, 
explores issues related to the increase of incidents, and considers the impact of a number 
of administrations and their policies (or their absence) impacted attacks. By correlating 
relevant definitions, literature, and statistical analyses, an enhanced understanding of this 
significant social issue emerges. 
A Typology of Domestic Terrorism 
The diversity of domestic terrorist groups operating in the United States has been 
extensively explored in case studies. When examining the goals of militias, lone-wolves, 
sovereigns, anti-abortion groups, eco-terrorists, and left- and right-wing political 
extremists, the factor that makes each of them a significant social phenomenon is that 
they used (and in some cases, continue to use) violence as a means to advance a radical 
agenda. If researchers and criminologists explore domestic terrorism as a monolithic 
entity, important aspects of their evolution and continued growth may be missed. These 
oversights contributed to the escalation of criminal violence displayed by these various 
groups (Boxall et al., 2015). 
The various typologies defining domestic terrorism can be divided into four 
categories: ethnic, ideological, political, and religious. In the case of ethnic extremists 
such as the KKK, their racial purity ideology is a central consideration. The Army of God 
has a religious stance against abortion. Green Peace operates from an ideological 
platform that seeks to save the earth from humanity. The Black Panthers promoted their 
political struggle to achieve equality in the United States. Many right- and left-wing 
groups sought to expand before the end of the Cold War by confronting the American 
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power structure and attempting to change it to their vision for the country. Leftist 
ideologues demanded the government correct social injustices and abuses of power, and  
right-wing groups sought to curb what they saw as intruding into their lives.  
In this study, the researcher highlighted variables that define particular groups. 
What emerged is that they all use radical and extreme approaches to solving their 
concerns. Whatever social, demographic, or ethnic differences distinguish them from one 
another, the overall unifying factor is their acceptance of violence to achieve their goals. 
This makes each typology a danger to the nation (Huntington, 1993). 
Counterterrorism Strategies In The 21st Century 
According to the infamous Chinese general, military strategist, philosopher, and 
writer, you must always have a strategy when confronting or being confronted by an 
enemy. In his legendary military treatise, Art of War (1963), Sun Tzu writes:   
If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior 
strength, evade him. If your opponent is temperamental, seek to irritate him. 
Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him 
no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. If sovereign and subject are in 
accord, put division between them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear 
where you are not expected (p. 80). 
In 2002, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released 
by the Bush Administration, made a statement that was not only timely, but prophetic:   
Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose 
avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-
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called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is 
statelessness. (p. 15). 
Since 9/11, domestic counterterrorism expenditures have increased significantly. 
According to a study conducted by researchers John Mueller and Mark Stewart (2014):  
Domestic counterterrorism expenditures per year were about $25 billion in 
2010 dollars before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These increased 
by about $75 billion in the subsequent decade or so. Spending on homeland 
security by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Department of Energy, and 26 other such federal agencies was $50 billion more in 
2010 dollars than in 2001, adjusting for inflation. …..Overall intelligence 
operations were $80 billion in 2010. A core function is “protecting against the 
threat of international terrorism in the United States,” and we conservatively 
estimate increased intelligence expenditures since 9/11 devoted to domestic 
homeland security to be $15 billion in 2010 (p. 238) 
A key way to fight the threat of homegrown terrorists is to develop an 
understanding of how radicalization works and formulate ways to prevent radicalization 
from morphing into terrorist plotting (Bjelopera, 2014). Counterterrorism investigators 
must strategically develop a lesson plan on how to learn everything there is to know 
about about the targeted person or group. Ultimately, an effective counterterrorism 
investigator must learn to think like a terrorist (Silke, 2003). More specifically, you must 
think like the terrorist in the subgroup you are investigating. Although psycho-
pathological profiles are helpful, they should not be referred to as the primary instrument 
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for drafting a counterterrorism plan. When developing a comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy, the goal is to create a plan  that demands a clear understanding of the 
motivations and causes of terrorism. Terrorists, even those with the same ethnic or 
religious background, should not be considered a homogeneous group considering their 
motivations and beliefs are oftentimes very different.  
Once the investigator develops the ability to think like a terrorist, he or she can 
now begin prepare a plan to assess the degree of the threat and develop proactive security 
measures to manage the threat (Silke, 2003). Counterterrorism operations are extremely 
expensive, particularly those that specific members in a group or an individual terrorist. 
According to Mueller and Stewart (2011), the United States spent roughly $1 trillion 
dollars in the pursuit and capture of Osama bin Laden from 2001 through 2011. 
Government resources are finite. That being the case, counterterrorism operations must 
be well planned and very strategic.   This quantification allows intelligence teams to 
answer some very crucial questions before embarking on a counterterrorism mission. For 
example, Are they an immediate threat? How many key members or leaders have been 
captured or killed? If key members or leaders of this group are captured or killed, what 
members or other groups are likely to retaliate against the U.S. and their allies?  
Campbell (2005) argued that the challenge of overcoming terrorism is the ability 
out-think and out-maneuver the terrorists. His strategies include:  
(1) the ability to formulate complex relational models, (2) an awareness 
and recognition of the critical level variables, (3) an understanding of their 
influence and interrelation, (4) a determination of the controllable and 
non-controllable aspects of each variable, (5) the implicational value of 
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such factors as applied to potential terrorist scenarios, and (6) an 
assessment of the potential consequences of shifts in each variable’s 
valuation to the overall model. (p.2) 
Almost all significant terrorist attacks are motivated by an agenda for political or 
policy change. To affect this change, extremist are willing to engage devastating terrorist 
acts. Furthermore, when developing a counterterrorism strategy, the IQ and the financial 
resources of the perpetrator must be considered. Osama bin Laden vilified and framed in 
public as the epitome of evil, a terrorists, and a homicidal psychopaths. The danger is this 
labeling is that it is assumed that the terrorist is dull-witted and angry. This is a 
misnomer. Terrorists, especially those who are well organized, could never sustain 
success in combating the FBI, CIA, NSA, and military intelligence if they did not possess 
a high degree of rationality and intelligence (Woo, 2004). 
Terrorist Network Deconstruction Model 
The FBI has enjoyed much success post 9/11 I thwarting terrorists plots. Although 
they have proven strategies to combat and prevent terrorist acts, their approach towards 
domestic terrorism will have to be modified in order to adjust to a political climate that has 
become increasingly anti-FBI. Since its inception, the agency has always endured some 
form of criticism. However, in 2016, the public vitriol towards the top law enforcement 
agency by elected officials was unprecedented. Both Republican and Democrat leaders 
sharply criticized the investigative efforts of the FBI and even accused the agency of being 
partisan. More concerning is the willingness of elected officials to openly support extremist  
behavior and ideology, knowing, it is an affront to civility and the behavior is criminal. 
Moving forward, the FBI will have to come up with new clandestine and creative 
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approaches when investigating radicalized persons or groups that politicians openly 
support. Elected officials that openly criticize the FBI and the intelligence community in 
favor of extremist behavior, will embolden these dissident groups to engage in terroristic 
behavior with impunity, while creating a culture of timidity in the ranks of counterterrorism 
authorities. When this happens, we become less safe as a nation.  
When constructing a counterterrorism strategy, the focus of the policy should be 
one of deterrence and mitigation because realistically, the U.S. government does not have 
unlimited resources which is what it take in order eliminate acts of terrorism. Moreover, 
domestic terrorism has existed in America for more than one-hundred years and despite 
the best efforts of every U.S. president within that time, none of them have been 
successful in eradicating terrorism.   
These components and recommendations below are not new concepts, but some 
of them have different approaches which should at least be considered when drafting a 
comprehensive or tailor-made counterterrorism strategy.  
Intelligence Gathering/Analysis 
Over the years, law enforcement officials have discovered that terrorist are 
extremely disciplined. This can be attributable to their military styled training and the fact 
that some members are actually military veterans. Their political cause is the most 
important thing in their lives (Dyson, 2012, p. 61). Terrorists learn from the mistakes of 
other terrorists and realize that the only way to avoid being captured or killed, is to keep a 
low profile and follow the protocols anonymity. A person who has such dedication will 
go out of his way to follow security procedures, even if it limits his ability to function 
(Dyson, 2012, p. 61). He would rather travel ten or even twenty miles away to a remote 
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area to mail a letter rather than risk being followed or captured on surveillance (Dyson, 
2012). When investigators consider how vigilant and disciplined terrorists are in avoiding 
detection, they now understand the importance of intelligence gathering.    
The value of law enforcement officers reading and carefully studying clandestine 
“how to-function” documents is akin to a football coach having the opposing team’s 
playbook (Dyson, 2012, p. 62). For this reason, counterterrorism analysts and officers 
must invest time in reading extremist manuals, manifestos, or writings in general. 
Without question, this is one of the most important task in thwarting terrorist activities. 
Just as we view the act of terrorism as an act of war, collecting good intelligence should 
be considered the task that disrupts terrorist activities. 
The collection of raw intelligence is a very good strategy, however, if it cannot be 
converted into actionable intelligence, it then becomes useless. It is not uncommon for 
counterterrorism analysts to sift through thousands of documents, recorded conversations, 
phone records, surveillance videos and social media pages before determining whether or 
not the information discovered is worth expending valuable resources.  
Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #1: Intelligence Gathering/Analysis. 
Gathering intelligence presents opportunities for counterterrorism agents to disrupt 
domestic terror networks. Investigators should be aware that many groups, particularly 
domestic entities in the United States, have documents that instruct their members with 
respect to operations (Dyson, 2012, p. 58). The FBI, in conjunction with cooperating law 
enforcement agencies, should consider raids as an opportunity to disrupt terror networks 
by taking subtle actions. For example, if a counterterrorism raid uncovers terrorist 
training manuals, maps, security manuals, etc., after the information is analyzed, media 
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outlets should also receive materials created by the FBI’s counterterrorism team that 
discredits the leaders, the organization, and their purpose. As a strategy, the information 
will be compiled by the counterterrorism team and the objective is to make the material 
appear as though is was created by the leadership for select members with the intent to 
deceive the rank-and-file membership and their supporters.  
Terrorists are known for their commitment to using psychological warfare to their 
advantage. If they are to be neutralized to the point of ineffectiveness, counterterrorism 
teams must out-think them at every turn. By doing so, frustration is inevitable and the 
likelihood of dissention and distrust becomes highly probable. Internal power struggles 
and internal strife creates organizational instability which benefits law enforcement in 
that crucial mistake will be made or members become counterterrorism assets.    
Covert Operations 
Covert operations is one the oldest forms of intelligence gathering. Although it 
has been effective, it has also been deadly. Undercover operatives that were exposed 
were either tortured, murdered, or imprisoned for their betrayal. Although covert 
operatives are useful in the fight against terrorism, it is very risky and extremely 
dangerous. Many domestic terrorism networks provide members and followers with 
security manuals that teach them how to detect informants and the tactics used by the 
police to penetrate the network (Dyson, 2012). Moreover, renditions, enhanced 
interrogations techniques and torture are frowned upon by leaders of the United States 
even if they yield results. 
Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #2: Covert Operations. As stipulated 
earlier, comprehensive counterterrorism strategy is crucial in disrupting activities of a 
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terrorist network. Disaggregating a terrorist network into its component parts can 
illuminate how terrorists in different functional roles calculate costs and benefits 
(Kroenig, & Pavel, 2012). For example, a person who sympathizes with an extremist 
movement, but refuses to jeopardize  his or her own life setting off explosives, is more 
likely to offer financial or other types of support to the network (Kroenig & Pavel, 2012).  
The new role of the agent provocateur is to create an environment of distrust since 
it is necessary to disaggregate the terrorist network. In conducting case analysis of radical 
extremist and terrorist organizations, although they posses different styles and ideologies, 
there is one common denominator that unifies them all: they are all distrustful of the 
government and they are extremely paranoid when it comes to informant infiltration. This 
paranoia give the covert operative an advantage to disrupt operations by creating internal 
distrust and infighting. Depending on the mission, the covert operative may never be 
required to join the extremist group or terrorist network to disrupt the entire organization. 
For example, militia groups, like many others extremist groups, although divided by 
ideology, they are extremely skeptical. Once the counterterrorism team has gathered 
enough actionable intelligence and the agent provocateur is competently knowledgeable 
about the targeted terror network, he or she can discreetly begin their campaign of 
“sowing” seeds of discord. The agent provocateur could arrange for billboards to be 
strategically placed throughout the city and create notices that go out to members of the 
community advising them to report “suspicious activity” because it has been “brought to 
the attention” of law enforcement that international terrorism networks are posing as 
militia groups in order fund terrorist operations abroad and in the United States. 
Considering the likelihood that the agent provocateur will draw the most suspicion, the 
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counterterrorism team would stage the arrest of the covert operative, charge him or her 
with the crime, thus  making the propaganda real in the minds of the residents. As a result 
of the highly publicized arrest, it should be enough to “sow the seeds” of distrust. 
Residents and supporters who were normally quiet, may now decide to assist law 
enforcement because infiltration by a foreign enemy would be deemed as completely 
unacceptable.   
Social Media Disruption 
Because so much of the radicalization process occurs within the marketplace of 
ideas, counterterrorism efforts must involve activity in the same realm (Bjelopera, 2014). 
We have often seen, through the media, how active shooters and domestic terrorists use 
social media to espouse their ideas and recruit like-minded individuals. They inspire 
radicals to engage in acts of domestic terrorism. YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter have 
all been used at one point or another to promote and inspire terrorist action. The strategy 
of monitoring radicalized social media pages, in my view, is insufficient. 
Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #3: Social Media Disruption. The 
counterterrorism strategy of monitoring extremist social media sites is very limiting and 
only provides law enforcement with valuable information after the fact. Counterterrorism 
teams must take a new approach: create their own social media platforms. Although 
monitoring other social media sites can be an effective investigative tool, the intelligence 
community should create their social media outlets equivalent to Stormfront, Ayan 
Nations.org, Council of Conservative Citizens, or Gab. This allows the cyber counter-
intelligence team to monitor extremists for hate speech that encourages violence, death 
threats, inflammatory rhetoric that advocates targeting federal buildings and elected 
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officials. More importantly, they can collect the IP addresses of those users who are 
considered potential threats in order to pinpoint an address or location. The challenge 
here would be to establish sufficient internal controls that prevent abuse. In addition, 
Considering the potential legal implications and political backlash, plausible deniability 
must be factored into this strategy. 
The Capone Approach 
To counter violent domestic terror plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two 
tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” (Bjelopera, 2014). 
The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on 
lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations, unrelated 
misdemeanor or felony bench warrants. The purpose of this strategy is to apprehend the 
suspect while law enforcement either gathers more evidence to file more serious charges 
or disrupt a potential acts of violence.  As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically 
these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, 
white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants Bjelopera, 2014, p. 19). The Al 
Capone approach works well when you do not have time to secure a warrant and 
apprehending the subject has become an issue of national security and public safety. 
While these techniques may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots, 
their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities as well as civil rights 
organizations who are concerned that this approach is a license to target racial and ethnic 
minorities for racial profiling (Bjelopera, 2014). 
Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #4: The Capone Approach. Law 
enforcement officers, particularly FBI agents, should make every effort to avoid direct 
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confrontation with terror suspects until its time to make an arrest(s). When we look back 
on the 1995 Bombing in Oklahoma City or 1992, Ruby Ridge, we recognized that these 
two incidents were the catalyst for the militia movement and other anti-government 
movements to grow their membership by using these incidents as recruiting tools. Today, 
any confrontation with the FBI, or any federal law enforcement agency has the potential 
of giving the perpetrator status among both followers and sympathizers.  
The Al Capone approach should never be used (or give the appearance) to 
intimidate or harass a suspect for the purposes of disruption. It should however, continue 
being used to prevent a suspect from fleeing the country or thwarting terrorist plot.  
When utilizing the Al Capone approach, counterterrorism experts should maintain 
a list of each of these suspects along with a systematic approach of following up with 
these individuals to keep track of their movement once they have been released. If they 
have been deported,  its equally important to know their whereabouts. It is critical to 
making sure they have not “slipped through the cracks” and returned to engaging in acts 
of domestic terrorism.   
Limitations of the Study 
Limitations in this study included the fact that the study was circumscribed by 
previously published documents and research. That is, there are likely items relevant to 
the study that the researcher did not find. The quantitative analysis was limited by prior 
findings and the data derived from this study. While the researcher explored primary and 
secondary sources, interviewing professionals from various fields could have offered 
insight and increased the overall depth of the research (Ellet, 2007). However, reflecting 
on the subjective nature of domestic terrorism, and seeking a foundation on which to 
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understand it, what was possibly lost by not having assessments beyond the available 
resources was compensated for by extensive data mining (Creswell, 2011; Yin, 2009). 
Increase in Homegrown Terrorism 
As the literature review was collated with case studies and led to examining a 
number of post-9/11 incidents, the researcher discovered that of 74 cases chosen for 
analysis, approximately 85% of these terrorist plots were either carried out or attempted 
by U.S. citizens or permanent residents. These homegrown terrorists, once law-abiding 
citizens, permanent residents, or visa card holders, were usually radicalized within the 
Unites States (Congressional Research Service, 2009). The overall numbers presented in 
the data clustering, shown in Appendices A-F, reflect an almost 152% increase from 
1977-2016, where there was significant and phenomenal spikes in homegrown terrorism 
activity. Earlier data, beginning with President Jimmy Carter, shows gradual increases, 
with occasional inactivity followed by some periodic spikes. However, data collected 
after 9/11 clearly indicated that the threat of homegrown terrorism increased drastically 
and would continue to rise based on deeply entrenched radical and religious beliefs 
(Rohlinger & Earl, 2012).   
Elected Leaders Contribute to the Problem 
With the correlation of the case studies and the statistical analysis during the 
terms of the six Presidents within the time frame, the researcher highlighted policies and 
practices that escalated the problems associated with domestic terrorism. These policies 
and practices began with Carter and his evangelical approach to issues, particularly his 
proclivity to engage in multi-lateral peace agreements, to Reagan’s original war on terror 
(which almost exclusively focused on global terrorism), and back again to the different 
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evangelically-inspired policies promoted first by President George H. W. Bush and later 
by his son, George W. Bush. When President Clinton took office, he had the daunting 
task of addressing David Koresh and his Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas at a time 
when anti-government sentiment was still at its a peak. The incident at Ruby Ridge under 
the George W. Bush administration was an effective recruiting tool and was responsible 
for the influx of new recruits to the sovereign citizen and militia movements (Simmons, 
1999).  
When President George W. Bush presented a challenge to Roe v. Wade, by telling 
Americans to “reflect on the sanctity of life,” a second wave (the first being in his 
father’s term) of pro-choice radicalism began to emerge but nothing equivalent to the 
pro-life extremism witnessed in the 1990s. The threat level was extremely low to almost 
non-existent, but post 9/11, after his perpetual War on Terror began, radical Islamic 
terrorist incidents sharply increased. According to New American’s International Security 
experts (2016), there were 107 incidents of domestic terrorism post 9/11 from December 
2001 through December 2008. If the War on Drugs was considered a referendum on the 
civil liberties of urban minorities; the War on Terror was equally considered an assault 
on this Islamic faith.  As a result, anti-Islamic sentiments as well as radical Islamic 
extremism devolved into a chasm of intolerance. 
When President  Barack Obama assumed control of the Oval Office, radical right-
wing groups re-emerged in conjunction with political extremists and hate groups that 
considered the election of an African-American president as clear indication that Whites 
had somehow lost control of America and they needed to collectively “Take Back Their 
Country.” On its praxis, the conceptualization of “taking back” is a grim reminder that 
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recapturing outdated American ideals and customs that marginalized women and 
minorities begins at the existential level but evolves into sinister strategy to marginalize 
and dehumanize selective groups of people based on race and gender in an attempt to 
undergird the premise superiority, specifically, White male domination. The domestic 
extremist, despite the odds, is determined to influence society from the lens of 
anachronistic ideals and norms. Radical Republicans sided with right-wing extremists in 
berating President Obama with impunity and attempting to humiliate him on the world 
stage by forcing him to show his birth certificate as justification of his authenticity to 
serve as President of the United States.  The entire process was demeaning and was 
considered equivalent to slaves in the 1860s proving their freedom by providing slave 
owners or traders their free papers. More destructive to American democracy was that 
mainstream conservatives gave subtle (sometimes overt) signals that under the Obama 
administration, radical, extremist behavior would now be welcomed as long as the vitriol 
was directed towards President Obama. Instead of the congratulating the historic victory, 
radical conservatives were committed to making President Obama’s ascension to the 
highest political office in America feel as though his decision was an act of self-imposed 
marginality. 
President Obama and his incoming administration recognized immediately that he 
was in precarious position. On one end of the political spectrum, President Obama was 
faced with an insouciant democratic party still vexed that Hillary Rodham Clinton was 
not the party nominee. On the other end of the political spectrum was an insolent 
Republican Party that vowed to make him a “one term president” and refused to work 
with the newly elected Commander-and-Chief even if it would be beneficial to the 
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American people (Hulse & Nagourney, 2010). This public display of resistance from 
conservative elected officials in the highest levels of government created a climate for 
political and religious extremism to flourish. The animus projected towards President 
Obama created such rigid lines of demarcation and distance between Democratic and 
Republican ideals that radical conservatives viewed any acts of utilitarianism as liberal 
appeasement. This Republican strategy was myopic in scope in that conservatives either 
did not consider or concern themselves with the residual effects of their extremism. 
During the Obama administration, from 2009-2016 (including foiled plots), there were 
291 incidents of terrorism (New American, 2016). Moreover, when President Obama was 
succeeded in office by Real Estate Developer and reality television personality, Donald J. 
Trump in 2017, Democrats in Congress have seized the opportunity to exact revenge on 
the Republican controlled Congress by mimicking their blueprint of obstruction 
superimposed on President Obama’s legislative agenda for the last eight years. Although 
this one-upmanship revolves on the axis of power and respect, the chronic polarization 
between the two major parties will only further divide America along the lines of political 
and moral ideology. As a result, partisan propaganda will only intensify and be directly 
responsible for an increase in domestic terrorism as substantive issues such as 
employment, national debt, the economy, education and healthcare erode into obscurity.      
When President Obama settled into his new role as commander-and-chief, there 
was a miscalculation of his counterterrorism strategy that fueled anger in America and 
abroad.  During the campaign, candidate Obama pledged to end the War on Terror and 
commit fewer military resources to Afghanistan and abroad. Liberal ideologues 
considered this approach refreshing while conservatives criticized the move as being 
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weak at a time when America needs to show its strength. Both critics and supporters were 
taken aback when President Obama implemented his aggressive counterterrorism strategy 
(Becker & Shanemay, 2012). President Obama and his security team crafted a “Kill List” 
a process where the team decided on which terrorists should be killed or captured based 
on their threat level towards the United States or their allies. Moreover, the Obama 
administration waged a relentless drone strike campaign in Pakistan and Yemen because 
counter-intelligence revealed that these countries were safe havens for suspected 
terrorists (Savage, 2012).  
Based on the data analyzed for this study, there is a clear connection between  
politicians and their policies, and increased incidents of  domestic terrorism. The level of 
terrorism appears to coincide with the ability of the various typologies to develop 
connections and create enough fear take action. This is noted in a DOJ (2009) report that 
outlined potential threats for violence in reaction to Obama’s election. However, 
discounting the variables supported by this study will put U.S. citizens in greater danger 
(Samuels, 2006). 
Lack of Policy and Enforcement directed at Homegrown Terrorism  
As the threat of homegrown terrorism expanded from 1977 to 2001 (pre-9/11), an 
aspect that has remained a concern for the law enforcement officials are policies that fail 
to send a clear message of zero tolerance and are backed by retributive deterrence. 
Several trials, such as McVeigh’s and Kaczynski’s, received sensationalized media 
coverage. For the most part, society and its politicians avoided tackling the issue of 
domestic terrorism pre-9/11.  As a result, federal, state, and local domestic terror laws 
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were primarily inadequate which allowed the terrorists organizations to become more 
unified, more organized, more defiant and unfortunately, more deadly. 
The events on 9/11 serves as a constant reminder of the dangers of complacency. 
Former FBI Director Louis Freeh, in his testimony to the Joint Inquiry Committee, 
highlighted that the government was not efficiently organized to confront terrorism and 
terrorism was not the clear priority because the threat it posed was under-appreciated 
(Freeh, 2002).  Post 9/11, the FBI has revamped its entire organization and domestic 
terror threats are now given equal priority to international terrorist threats. However, 
considering international terrorism has a “head start” in the areas of strategy and policy 
development, there must be a continual effort to formulate comprehensive and detailed 
policies for responding to domestic threats of terrorism. Although DHS took on some of 
the responsibility of responding to internal threats, there continues to be ongoing 
concerns about their ability to actively reduce incidents of domestic terrorism without 
continued collaboration with the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies. (Oliver & 
Steinberg, 2006). 
Conclusion 
Analyzing the policies and ideological positions of former U.S. Presidents from 
the perspective of domestic terrorism, there is clear evidence that responses to domestic 
terror threats were usually reactive instead of proactive from 1977-2001 (pre-9/11). It can 
be argued that this approach led to somewhat of a quiet evolution and expansion of 
domestic terror groups that resulted in them being substantial threats to public spaces. 
When elected, every U.S. President has an agenda for the nation, and the world, during 
their time in office. What can be correlated to the study’s outcomes are specific periods 
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of increase in domestic terror threats. As future Presidents responding to domestic terror 
threats, what is necessary is a balanced and thorough approach that provides retribution 
while avoiding escalation. Weak policy positions regarding domestic terrorism are as 
equally irresponsible as aggressive and intrusive ones that the average American would 
consider infringing on the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Lastly, using 
predictive behavior models and continuing to use a case study approach to study the 
problem can provide a foundation for solid and thoughtful policy decisions in the future.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
In this final chapter, the researcher considers the contribution of this research and 
revisits using a scientific approach to the issue. The researcher also presents findings that 
could develop ‘learning algorithms’ to be used in a model by which law enforcement 
could anticipate incidents. Such a model could be supported by the clustering data in 
Appendices A-F and by reviewing all domestic terrorist incidents through the seven 
presidential terms (the primary independent variable in this study). Final conclusions 
offer insight into the policy implications of developing a domestic terrorist behavioral 
model while acknowledging the study’s potential use. 
Contribution of Research 
The researcher designed this quantitative case study to bridge the gap between 
current knowledge and the three hypotheses of this study on the frequency of domestic 
terror.  In a detailed historical analysis spanning seven Presidents and 40 years of politics 
and policies, the findings from this study can assist future researchers in correctly 
identifying domestic terror typologies, their key characteristics, and societal variables, 
which sometimes led to increased attacks. Following established protocols, law 
enforcement officials can use the conclusions from this study to inform responses to 
domestic terror events by utilizing the predictive model schemas that are validated 
through empirical data (Yin, 2012). 
This researcher identified reliable outcomes that promote the continued 
examination of domestic terrorism. With the constant changes in society and its norms, 
what is offered by this research is insight into the effects of policies and their successful 
(or unsuccessful) implementation. Yin (2009) highlighted the need for studies to build on 
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each other and produce similar outcomes. This researcher expects that future social 
scientists could benefit from this wide-ranging assessment. 
Policy Implications 
The essential policy implication for future U.S. Presidents from this study is the 
need for diligence in developing coherent policies and strategies that respond to domestic 
terrorists. By identifying key variables within certain organizations and their goals, it may 
be possible to reduce threats and, as a result, save lives. As leaders of the United States 
consider their options when reviewing predictive behavioral models, past trends, and 
develop policies that promote inclusion rather than isolation and social fragmentation, 
these may serve to reduce incidents. While hoping for positive results from the policies 
developed, the President, Congress, and state and local officials also need to develop 
significant, retaliatory deterrents.  
To date, the United States has had domestic terrorist policies that have not been 
effectively shared with the terrorists or the public. To create a coherent message to 
domestic terror groups, the government must be willing to engage parties in a broader 
dialogue while also prosecuting offenders to the fullest extent. It is possible that dynamic 
changes may then occur within even the most radicalized groups and typologies who 
simply want their message to be heard and acknowledged by the government (Rohlinger 
& Earl, 2012). 
Ethics and Reflexivity 
While conducting this research study, ethical mandates of the American 
Psychological Association and Nova Southeastern University were followed to limit 
researcher bias. The goal was to produce a study that would have validity as well as 
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sound reflection, and a circular logical relationship which produces reliable and confident 
causes that is correctly related to outcomes. Having peer review when assigning 
quantitative values to the data used to develop a model supported by generated variable 
tables, helped produce confident and reliable outcomes (Yin, 2012). 
Future Research Concepts 
It is expected that with the increased threat of domestic terrorism, future studies 
will expand their scope and include additional social, ethnic, demographic, and political 
variables in their assessment. With numerous federal agencies awarding grants for long-
term research projects, future research designed to explore the long-term effects of 
policies on a variety of extremist groups would be essential in furthering this area of 
study. These studies could also heighten the awareness of those in elected office, and 
even those who previously believed that the only way to promote their agenda is to 
engage in the attention-grabbing acts of violence.  
As these studies continue, one factor that would remain constant is the 
opportunity and ability to protect the public from those who would use them as a means 
to an end. Advances in behavioral studies could produce superior behavioral models than 
those used presently to address domestic terrorist behavior. By including social 
perspectives, the researcher hopes that the realization emerges that by using violence, the 
intended message is lost; as a consequence, violent behavior undermines the entire cause 
(NIH, 2009). 
Contribution of Research 
This research study and its contribution to the academic community is aimed at 
assessing and examining a social phenomenon by developing a behavioral model. The 
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focus of the research was to offer researchers and society a unique and comprehensive 
look at the social phenomenon of domestic terrorism. While the variables presented in 
this study are subject to change and were given numerical values subject to interpretation, 
the aspect that is offered this study is the ability to look at the past and avoid making the 
same mistakes again. The opportunity for policy makers and law enforcement to learn 
and grow, and possibly save lives, makes this study a potentially valuable contribution. 
Findings 
The findings from the tool developed for law enforcement authorities to use in 
responding to acts of domestic terrorism are highlighted in Tables 4-6, with the variables 
being aligned with quantitative assignments in Tables 7-9. The historical data, obtained 
through DOJ databases, allowed alignment of the social, ethnic, and demographic 
variables with the appropriate Presidents: Table 4 for Jimmy Carter, Table 5 for Bill 
Clinton, and Table 6 for George Bush. A potential challenge during the research phase 
was for law enforcement and the policy makers to understand the social dynamics of 
these organizations while accounting for norms which, in this instance, were developed 
under various Presidents. The aspect that is significant in the bivariate analysis is the 
continuous increase in domestic terrorist violence, according to the designated variables. 
As policymakers and other officials use these predictive models, the key is oversight. 
However, by including professional criminologists in the design and quantitative 
assessments, bias would be limited, and reliability would increase. The expected result is 
a more accurate understanding of domestic terrorists, which would then support 
appropriate levels of funding, training, and articulating the appropriate message to 
terrorists operating openly in communities across the United States (Hoffman, 1988).  
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Table 4 
Two-Tailed Pearson Correlations 1 
Correlations 
  VAR00002 VAR00003 
VAR00002 r 1 -.739 
 p  .094 
 N 6 6 
VAR00003 r -.739 1 
 p .094  
 N 6 6 
Table 5 
Two-Tailed Pearson Correlations 2 
Correlations 
  VAR00002 VAR00003 
VAR00002 r 1 .059 
 p  .912 
 N 6 6 
VAR00003 r .059 1 
 p .912  
 N 6 6 
Table 6 
Two-Tailed Pearson Correlation 3 
Correlations 
  VAR00002 VAR00003 
VAR00002 r 1 .000 
 p  1.000 
 N 6 6 
VAR00003 r .000 1 
 p 1.000  
 N 6 6 
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Table 7 
Quantitative Review 1 
Quantitative Assignments 
Extremist Group Attempted Attacks Actualized Attacks 
Militia 7 8 
Political Extremists  6 8 
Eco-terrorists 9 7 
Anti-abortion 8 7 
Left-Wing 7 7 
Right-Wing 7 8 
Table 8 
Quantitative Review 2 
Quantitative Assignments 
Extremist Group Attempted Attacks Actualized Attacks 
Militia 8 8 
Political Extremists  7 8 
Eco-terrorists 8 8 
Anti-abortion 9 9 
Left-Wing 9 7 
Right-Wing 7 8 
Table 9 
Quantitative Review 3  
Quantitative Assignments 
Extremist Group Attempted Attacks Actualized Attacks 
Militia 7 9 
Political Extremists  8 8 
Eco-terrorists 9 9 
Anti-abortion 8 7 
Left-Wing 8 7 
Right-Wing 7 8 
Conclusion 
The following totals represent the clustering of numbers: Carter—14 domestic 
terrorist incidents; Reagan—55 incidents; George H. W. Bush—29 incidents; Bill 
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Clinton—34 incidents; George W. Bush—60 incidents; and Obama, completing his final 
term as of 2016—48 incidents. It is evident from the data, literature review, case studies, 
and statistical analyses that domestic terrorism is not only a clear danger to American 
safety and security, but also a threat to the stability of its democracy. 
In the future, tools and resources to support law enforcement agencies that 
consider social variables will become necessary. Future studies are recommended in an 
effort to fill the gap observed during the research phase of this study. 
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Appendix A: Incidents during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) 
Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
03/22/77 Denver, Colorado 1 0 TER bombing attributed to Chicano activist 
04/23/77 Washington, 1 0 TER bomb explodes in locker at airport 
08/03/77 New York City, 
New York 
1 7 TER-
natl 
FALN bombs two office buildings;  
05/28/78 Evanston, Illinois 0 1 TER-
pol 
mail bomb slightly injures campus police 
officer at Northwestern University 
01/01/79 Wilmington, 
North Carolina 
0 0 THW extortion attempt threatening release of 
uranium dioxide 
05/03/79 Chicago, Illinois 0 5 TER-
natl 
FALN bombing at Shubert Theatre 
05/09/79 Evanston, Illinois 0 1 TER-
pol 
bomb slightly injures student at 
Northwestern University 
11/03/79 Greensboro, 
North Carolina 
5 11 TER-
right 
shooting attack at protest 
11/15/79 Chicago, Illinois 0 12 TER-
pol 
bomb ignites on American Airlines flight 
which lands safely; 12 passengers suffer 
from smoke inhalation 
12/01/79 Sabana Seca, 
Puerto Rico 
2 10 TER-
natl 
Macheteros members ambush Navy bus 
in Puerto Rico, killing 2 sailors and 
injuring 10 
05/29/80 Fort Wayne, 
Indiana 
0 1 TER-
right 
Vernon Jordan Jr., civil rights leader, shot 
and injured 
06/19/80 Chicago, Illinois 0 1 TER-
pol 
mail bomb injures president of United 
Airlines 
04/22/80 Bethesda, 
Maryland 
1 0 TER-
pol 
Ali Akbar Tabataba’i, former senior 
officer in Iranian Shah’s SAVAK, shot at 
home by Daoud Salahuddin, a radical 
Black Muslim under instructions from 
Iran 
01/12/81 Muniz ANGB, 
Puerto Rico 
0 0 TER-
natl 
Macheteros terrorists bomb 9 Air 
National Guard jets, causing $40 million 
in damage 
Total Incidents: 14. Total dead: 11; Total injured: 49 
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Appendix B: Incidents during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) 
Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
03/17/81 Mobile, Alabama 1 0 
TER-
right 
United Klans of America murders Black 
teenager  
03/30/81 Washington, DC 0 4 TER 
President Ronald Reagan and 3 others 
injured in attempted assassination by 
Hinkley 
04/16/81 
New York City, 
New York 
1 0 
TER-
natl 
bomb explodes in JFK airport terminal 
04/21/81 Tulsa, Oklahoma 1 0 RCSI 
fatal self-inflicted radiation dose using 
stolen source 
10/20/81 
New York City, 
New York 
3 0 
TER-
left 
Weather Underground member Kathy 
Boudin captured after killing 3 
12/21/81 
Warren County, 
New Jersey 
1 0 
TER-
left 
UFF members murder New Jersey State 
Police officer 
01/21/82 
Los Angeles, 
California 
1 0 
TER-
natl 
Kemal Arikan, Turkish Consul-General, 
assassinated by Armenian terrorists 
05/04/82 
Somerville, 
Massachusetts 
1 0 
TER-
natl 
Orhan Gunduz, honorary Turkish Consul 
in Boston, assassinated by Armenian 
terrorists 
05/05/82 
Nashville, 
Tennessee 
0 1 
TER-
pol 
mail bomb injures secretary at Vanderbilt 
University 
05/16/82 
San Juan, Puerto 
Rico 
1 3 
TER-
natl 
shooting attack on navy sailors 
04/02/82 
Berkeley, 
California 
0 1 
TER-
pol 
mail bomb injures professor at University 
of California 
09/25/82 
Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania 
13 0 RCSI shooting attack 
12/31/82 
New York City, 
New York 
0 3 
TER-
natl 
two bombings in Manhattan and 
Brooklyn by FALN 
04/15/83 
Los Angeles, 
California 
1 0 
TER-
natl 
bomb in car kills Armenian Victor 
Galustian 
08/17/83 Detroit, Michigan 3 0 
TER-
pol 
Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam secretary 
killed by members of Fuqra, a Black 
Islamic sect; 2 members killed setting fire 
in AMI temple 
11/07/83 Washington, DC 0 0 TER 
bombing at U.S. Capitol building; later 
linked to Revolutionary Armed Task 
Force 
12/01/83 
Seattle, 
Washington 
0 0 THW 
authorities prevent attempt by pro-
Khomeini students to set fire to theater 
where 500 anti-Khomeini Iranians were 
attending a singing performance 
12/31/83 
New York City, 
New York 
0 1 
TER-
natl 
FALN bombings at federal and city 
buildings; 1 policeman injured 
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Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
04/01/84 New York 0 0 THW 
two Canadians arrested in NY attempting 
to purchase large amounts of pathogenic 
bacteria (tetanus and botulinal toxin) from 
a Rockville, MD, firm 
04/18/84 
San Ysidro, 
California 
22 19 RCSI shooting attack at McDonalds restaurant 
04/18/84 Denver, Colorado 1 0 
TER-
right 
Alan Berg killed by White supremacists 
08/29/84 
The Dalles, 
Oregon 
0 2 
TER-
rel 
followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh use 
water to infect two officials with 
salmonella; both sickened, one 
hospitalized 
09/09/84 
The Dalles, 
Oregon 
0 751 
TER-
rel 
salmonella poisoning in restaurants by 
followers of Bhadwan Shree Rajneesh 
12/07/84 
Whidbey Island, 
Washington 
1 0 
TER-
right 
Robert Matthews, leader of The Order, a 
right-wing group, killed in raid by federal 
agents 
12/25/84 Pensacola, Florida 0 0 
TER-
right 
three abortion clinics bombed 
03/01/85 
New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW 
letter writer threatens to contaminate New 
York City’s water reservoirs with 
plutonium unless charges against 
Bernhard Goetz are dropped; testing was 
announced to have detected femtocurie 
levels of plutonium in the water on 26 
July 
03/13/85 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
11 0 RCSI 
police assault on headquarters of radical 
Black group Move starts fire 
03/15/85 
Berkeley, 
California 
0 1 
TER-
pol 
mail bomb injures student at University of 
California 
08/15/85 
Paterson, New 
Jersey 
0 1 TER 
Tscherim Soobzokov, alleged Nazi war 
criminal, injured by bombing possibly 
linked to JDL; died 6 Sep 
11/10/85 
Santa Ana, 
California 
1 0 TER 
Alex Odah, officer of American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, killed by 
bombing possibly linked to JDL 
11/15/85 
Ann Arbor, 
Michigan 
0 2 
TER-
pol 
bombing injures two 
12/11/85 
Sacramento, 
California 
1 0 
TER-
pol 
Unabomber bomb kills Hugh Scrutton, a 
computer store owner, with bomb in 
paper bag behind store 
04/16/86 
Cokeville, 
Wyoming 
2 79 
TER-
right 
two Aryan Nation members take 150 
students and teachers hostage at an 
elementary school; bomb accidentally 
explodes, killing one terrorist and injuring 
many children; second terrorist commits 
suicide 
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Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
04/05/86 Chicago, Illinois 0 0 THW 
members of Libyan-linked street gang El 
Rukn arrested attempting to obtain SAM 
to attack an aircraft at O’Hare IAP 
04/20/86 
Edmond, 
Oklahoma 
15 6 RCSI 
shooting attack by postal employee at 
post office 
09/05/86 
New York City, 
New York 
0 30 TER 
tear gas bomb set off 5 minutes before 
end of Russian dance troupe performance 
at New York City’s Metropolitan Opera 
House by Jewish extremists 
09/29/86 
Coeur d’Alene, 
Idaho 
0 0 
TER-
right 
four bombs explode in Coeur d’Alene, at 
department store, restaurant, federal 
building, and armed forces recruiting 
station, set by Bruder Scheigen Strike 
Force II 
10/28/86 
Fort Buchanan, 
Puerto Rico 
0 1 
TER-
natl 
Macheteros bombings at military facilities 
12/01/86 Arizona 0 0 THW 
6 members of Arizona Patriots indicted 
for planned bombings of the Phoenix 
ADL regional office, a Phoenix 
synagogue, the Simon Wiesenthal Center 
in Los Angeles, and the Ogden Utah IRS 
facility 
12/14/86 
New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW 
Dennis Malvasi sets bomb in Planned 
Parenthood building in Manhattan, 
leaving rental agent handcuffed nearby; 
bomb fizzles 
12/31/86 
San Juan, Puerto 
Rico 
97 140 RCSI 
three employees set fire in Dupont Plaza 
Hotel; most fatalities were in the hotel 
casino; the employees were in a labor 
dispute with the hotel’s management 
02/20/87 
Salt Lake City, 
Utah 
0 1 
TER-
pol 
bombing injures computer store owner 
03/01/87 
Atlantic City, 
New Jersey 
0 0 THW 
apparent Islamic terrorist plot to bomb 
Atlantic City casinos called off due to 
alerted authorities 
10/23/87 Vermont 0 0 THW 
Lebanese national and two others, all 
members of Syrian Socialist National 
Party, arrested attempting to enter 
Vermont from Canada with bomb 
components 
11/29/87 
Livermore, 
California 
0 0 THW 
bomb exploded in parking lot of Sandia 
National Laboratories 
04/12/88 New Jersey 0 0 THW 
Yu Kikumura, member of Japanese Red 
Army, arrested in New Jersey with bombs 
to be detonated in Manhattan 3 days later 
11/10/88 
Norwalk, 
Connecticut 
0 0 THW 
animal rights activist arrested leaving 
pipe bomb at U.S. Surgical Corporation 
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Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
01/17/89 
Stockton, 
California 
6 30 RCSI 
shooting attack on children in playground 
of elementary school; gunman then fatally 
shot himself 
03/10/89 
San Diego, 
California 
0 0 
TER-
pol 
pipe-bomb exploded in van of Sharon Lee 
Rogers, wife of U.S.S. Vincennes captain, 
planted by pro-Iranian terrorists 
03/13/89 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
0 0 THW 
US FDA inspectors in Philadelphia 
discover two grapes laced with minimal 
amounts of cyanide in shipment from 
Chile following warning telephoned to 
U.S. embassy in Santiago 
03/18/89 
Indianapolis, 
Indiana 
0 1 RCSI 
child maimed by bomb in toothpaste tube 
in K-Mart store; apparent teenage 
perpetrator commits suicide 20 April 
03/19/89 
Atlantic Ocean, 
Puerto Rico 
47 0 RCSI 
explosion in gun turret of battleship 
U.S.S. Iowa off Puerto Rico kills 47; 
Navy cites some evidence of sabotage 
08/21/89 Atlanta, Georgia 0 15 
TER-
right 
gas canister in parcel explodes at NAACP 
regional office 
12/21/89 
Mountain Brook, 
Alabama 
1 1 TER 
Judge Robert Vance killed by mail bomb, 
wife injured 
12/18/89 
Savannah, 
Georgia 
1 0 
TER-
right 
Black civil rights lawyer Robert Robinson 
killed by mail bomb 
Total Incidents: 55. Total dead: 233; Total injured: 1092 
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Appendix C: Incidents during the Presidency of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) 
Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
03/10/89 
San Diego, 
California 
0 0 
TER-
mil 
pipe-bomb exploded in van of Sharon 
Lee Rogers, wife of U.S.S. Vincennes 
captain, planted by pro-Iranian 
terrorists 
03/13/89 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
0 0 THW 
US FDA inspectors in Philadelphia 
discover two grapes laced with 
minimal amounts of cyanide in 
shipment from Chile following 
warning telephoned to U.S. embassy in 
Santiago 
03/18/89 
Indianapolis, 
Indiana 
0 1 RCSI 
child maimed by bomb in toothpaste 
tube in K-Mart store; apparent teenage 
perpetrator commits suicide 20 April 
03/19/89 
Atlantic Ocean, 
Puerto Rico 
47 0 RCSI 
explosion in gun turret of battleship 
U.S.S. Iowa off Puerto Rico kills 47; 
Navy cites some evidence of sabotage 
08/21/89 Atlanta, Georgia 0 15 
TER-
right 
gas canister in parcel explodes at 
NAACP regional office 
12/21/89 
Mountain Brook, 
Alabama 
1 1 TER 
Judge Robert Vance killed by mail 
bomb, wife injured 
12/18/89 Savannah, Georgia 1 0 
TER-
right 
Black civil rights lawyer Robert 
Robinson killed by mail bomb 
01/30/90 Tucson, Arizona 1 0 
TER-
pol 
Rashad Khalifa assassinated 
03/25/90 
New York City, 
New York 
87 0 RCSI arson fire in social club 
04/24/90 Oakland, California 0 2 
TER-
left 
two Earth First members injured in 
explosion while transporting bomb in 
car 
06/18/90 
Jacksonville, 
Florida 
10 4 RCSI shooting attack at GMAC office 
11/05/90 
New York City, 
New York 
1 1 
TER-
pol 
Rabbi Meir Kahane assassinated by 
Al-Sayyid Abdulazziz Nossair 
02/25/91 
Brooklyn, New 
York 
1 0 
TER-
pol 
Mustafa Shalabi killed in Brooklyn by 
Islamic group members 
10/16/91 Killeen, Texas 24 20 RCSI shooting attack at Luby’s restaurant 
03/01/92 Minnesota 0 0 THW 
Minnesota Patriots Council plots to 
assassinate law enforcement officials 
using ricin 
03/26/92 
Franklin Lakes, 
New Jersey 
1 0 
TER-
pol 
Parivash Rafizadeh, wife of former 
senior officer in Iranian Shah’s 
SAVAK, shot near her home 
04/19/92 Ruby Ridge, Idaho 2 0 RCSI 
federal marshals in shootout with 
White supremacist Randy Weaver in 
Idaho kill his wife and son 
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Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
04/27/92 
Los Angeles, 
California 
58 4000 RCSI 
Black riots following not guilty verdict 
in trial of four policemen for beating 
Black offender 
05/01/92 
Olivehurt, 
California 
4 10 RCSI shooting attack at high school 
01/25/93 Langley, Virginia 2 3 
TER-
pol 
Mir Amail Kansi, an Afghan Islamist, 
shot several CIA employees in cars in 
front of CIA headquarters 
02/26/93 
New York City, 
New York 
6 1040 
TER-
pol 
truck bombing in garage of World 
Trade Center 
02/28/93 Waco, Texas 86 25 RCSI 
Branch Davidian cult members kill 4 
ATF agents, injure 16, when agents 
raided their compound in Waco, TX; 
10 cult members killed; compound was 
sieged until 19 Apr when another raid 
was attempted and the compound 
burned down 
03/10/93 Pensacola, Florida 1 0 
TER-
right 
abortionist David Gunn shot and killed 
by abortion opponent 
06/22/93 Tiburon, California 0 1 
TER-
pol 
bomb injures scientist from University 
of California 
06/24/93 
New Haven, 
Connecticut 
0 1 
TER-
pol 
bomb injures professor at Yale 
University 
06/24/93 
New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW 
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and 
others arrested for role in World Trade 
Center bombing, thwarting plans to 
bomb United Nation Headquarters, the 
Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland Tunnel, 
the George Washington Bridge, and 
FBI offices in New York City 
04/01/93 
Los Angeles, 
California 
0 0 THW 
FBI arrests skinheads planning to 
machine gun worshippers at First 
African Methodist Episcopal Church 
in Los Angeles in hopes of starting a 
race war 
08/18/93 Wichita, Kansas 0 1 
TER-
right 
abortionist George Tiller shot and 
injured at an abortion clinic 
12/14/93 
Garden City, New 
York 
6 19 
TER-
left 
Colin Ferguson shot and killed 6, 
injured 17 on Long Island train, 
professing hatred of Whites 
Total number of incidents: 29. Total dead: 339; Total injured: 5134 
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Appendix D: Incidents during the Presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001) 
Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
03/01/94 
New York City, 
New York 
1 3 
TER-
pol 
gunman fires at van of Orthodox 
Jewish students at the Brooklyn Bridge 
04/26/94 
Colorado Springs, 
Colorado 
1 1 RCSI 
mail bomb kills man and injures his 
wife 
06/20/94 
Fairchild AFB, 
Washington 
4 22 RCSI shooting attack at base hospital 
04/29/94 Pensacola, Florida 2 1 
TER-
right 
abortion opponent shot and killed 
abortionist and his bodyguard and 
injured abortionist’s wife 
09/12/94 Washington, DC 1 0 TER 
Frank Corder flew Cessna from MD 
into White House, striking tree near 
President’s bedroom, killing himself 
and causing damage to White House 
10/29/94 Washington, DC 0 0 THW 
lone gunman with semi-automatic 
weapon fires shots at White House 
from sidewalk in front on 
Pennsylvania Avenue 
12/10/94 
North Caldwell, 
New Jersey 
1 0 
TER-
pol 
Unabomber mail bomb kills New York 
advertising executive Thomas Mosser 
12/30/94 
Brookline, 
Massachusetts 
2 5 
TER-
right 
gunman kills 2 abortion clinic workers 
in MA, then drives to Norfolk, VA, 
and fires on clinic before arrest 
04/19/95 
Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma 
169 675 
TER-
right 
Timothy McVeigh and co-conspirator 
Terry Nichols set off a truck bomb 
explosion in front of Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building, causing a partial 
collapse killing 168 people and 
injuring hundreds 
04/24/95 
Sacramento, 
California 
1 0 
TER-
pol 
Unabomber mail bomb kills Gilbert 
Murray, president of California 
Forestry Assn., at office 
05/01/95 Washington, DC 0 2 THW 
Man, with unloaded gun scales White 
House fence; jumper and Secret 
Service agent shot and injured by 
another guard 
09/12/95 Essex, Maryland 5 0 RCSI 
Car bombing at shopping mall, 
apparent murder plot 
10/10/95 Hyder, Arizona 1 100 RCSI 
Amtrak train derailed near Hyder, AZ, 
by sabotage to tracks with nearby note 
claiming responsibility by Sons of 
Gestapo, later attributed to railroad 
employee 
12/23/95 Arkansas 1 0 THW 
Thomas Lewis Lavy arrested in 
Arkansas for possession of ricin, a 
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Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
biotoxin; Lavy commits suicide the 
next day 
02/27/96 Houston, Texas 0 1 RCSI Radioactive source theft 
06/01/96 New York 0 0 THW 
Several individuals arrested in plot to 
kill Republican officials; seized 
weapons included radioactive 
materials 
06/01/96 New York 0 0 THW 
Several individuals arrested in New 
York planning to kill Republican 
officials; seized weapons included 
radioactive materials 
04/27/96 Atlanta, Georgia 2 110 
TER-
right 
Pipe bomb explodes in park at night 
concert at Summer Olympic Games; 1 
killed, 1 died at nearby location of 
attack 
01/02/97 multiple 0 0 TER 
Letter bombs received at Egyptian 
newspaper offices in Washington, DC, 
New York City, and a prison in 
Leavenworth Kansas; similar device 
exploded at Egyptian Newspaper 
office in London, UK, injuring 2 
guards 
02/22/97 Atlanta, Georgia 0 4 
TER-
right 
Bomb explodes in Atlanta, GA, 
nightclub frequented by homosexuals; 
4 injured 
02/24/97 
New York City, 
New York 
2 6 
TER-
pol 
Lone Palestinian gunman fired on 
tourists on observation deck of Empire 
State Building; Danish national was 
killed and other tourists injured before 
gunman killed himself 
03/26/97 
Rancho Sante Fe, 
California 
39 0 RCSI 
Discovery of mass suicide by 39 
members of Heaven’s Gate cult, tied 
by cult members to Comet Hale-Bopp 
04/31/97 
New York City, 
New York 
0 2 THW 
Would-be Palestinian suicide bombers 
are arrested at their apartment while 
planning to bomb New York subways 
01/29/98 
Birmingham, 
Alabama 
1 1 
TER-
right 
Bombing at abortion clinic kills one 
guard and injures a nurse; Eric 
Rudolph suspected in case 
03/24/98 Jonesboro, Arkansas 5 11 RCSI 
Shooting attack at middle school by 
two students; 4 students and 1 teacher 
killed, 9 students and 2 adults injured 
04/21/98 Springfield, Oregon 4 25 RCSI 
Shooting attacks at residence and high 
school 
04/24/98 Washington, DC 2 2 TER 
Gunman enters U.S. Capitol building 
and kills two guards; one tourist and 
gunman are injured 
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10/19/98 Vail, Colorado 0 0 
TER-
left 
Arson attacks by the Earth Liberation 
Front at Vail ski resort cause $12 
million in damages 
10/23/98 Amherst, New York 1 0 
TER-
right 
Abortionist shot and killed at his home 
04/20/99 Littleton, Colorado 15 27 RCSI 
mass shooting at Columbine High 
School by two students; 12 students 
and 1 teacher killed, 23 wounded; both 
gunmen (Eric Harris and Dylan 
Klebold) committed suicide 
08/10/99 
Los Angeles, 
California 
1 5 
TER-
right 
shooting attack at Jewish daycare by 
White supremacist 
09/15/99 Fort Worth, Texas 8 8 RCSI shooting attack at church service 
10/31/99 
Atlantic Ocean, 
Massachusetts 
217 0 
TER-
pol 
intentional crash of Egypt Air flight 
off Nantucket Island by copilot 
12/14/99 
Port Angeles, 
Washington 
0 0 THW 
terrorist arrested crossing from Canada 
with material to bomb Los Angeles 
International Airport 
Total number of incidents: 34. Total dead: 486; Total injured: 1011 
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Appendix E: Incidents during the Presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009) 
Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
02/07/01 Washington, DC 0 1 THW gunman fires on the White House from 
outside the perimeter fence; gunman is 
shot and injured by a guard 
09/11/01 New York City, 
New York 
2759 8700 TER-
pol 
crashing of two hijacked planes into 
World Trade Center towers, causing fires 
and collapse 
09/11/01 Alexandria, 
Virginia 
189 200 TER-
pol 
crashing of hijacked plane into Pentagon 
09/11/01 Somerset County, 
Pennsylvania 
45 0 TER-
pol 
crashing of hijacked plane into rural area of 
Pennsylvania, following attempt by 
passengers to regain control of aircraft 
09/18/01 West Palm Beach, 
Florida 
1 10 TER anthrax-laced letters mailed to West Palm 
Beach, Florida, USA, and New York City, 
New York 
10/09/01 Washington, DC 4 7 TER anthrax-laced letters mailed to Washington, 
DC 
12/22/01 Atlantic Ocean, 
Florida 
0 1 THW British citizen prevented from igniting shoe 
bomb on flight from Paris to Miami 
05/08/02 Chicago, Illinois 0 0 THW US citizen arrested for seeking to use dirty 
bomb in US 
04/22/02 Los Angeles, 
California 
2 4 TER-
pol 
Egyptian gunman kills two Israelis, injures 
four at the El Al ticket counter at the Los 
Angeles International Airport 
05/08/02 Clinton, Maryland 0 1 TER-
mil 
owner of Italian restaurant shot in robbery 
by Beltway snipers 
09/10/02 Lackawanna, New 
York 
0 0 THW 6 U.S. citizens arrested for terrorist 
connections 
09/21/02 Montgomery, 
Alabama 
1 1 TER-
mil 
liquor store employees shot in robbery by 
Beltway snipers 
10/02/02 Glenmont, 
Maryland 
1 0 TER-
mil 
1 killed at grocery store by Beltway 
snipers 
10/03/02 Aspen Hill, 
Maryland 
5 0 TER-
mil 
5 killed in separate shootings by Beltway 
snipers 
10/04/02 Spotsylvania 
County, Virginia 
1 0 TER-
mil 
1 killed at shopping mall by Beltway 
snipers 
10/07/02 Bowie, Maryland 0 1 TER-
mil 
1 child injured at a middle school by 
Beltway snipers 
10/09/02 Manassas, Virginia 1 0 TER-
mil 
1 killed at gas station by Beltway snipers 
10/11/02 Fredericksburg, 
Virginia 
1 0 TER-
mil 
1 killed at gas station by Beltway snipers 
10/14/02 Falls Church, 
Virginia 
1 0 TER-
mil 
1 killed at shopping mall by Beltway 
snipers 
10/19/02 Ashland, Virginia 1 0 TER-
mil 
1 killed at restaurant by Beltway snipers 
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Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
10/22/02 Aspen Hill, 
Maryland 
1 0 TER-
mil 
1 bus driver killed by Beltway snipers 
03/19/03 New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW US citizen arrested for planning to 
sabotage Brooklyn Bridge 
06/01/03 Alexandria, 
Virginia 
0 0 THW 11 arrested for planning attacks on U.S. 
servicemen 
04/08/03 Meridian, 
Mississippi 
7 8 RCSI shooting attack at factory 
11/28/03 Columbus, Ohio 0 0 THW arrest of terrorist plotting to bomb 
shopping mall in Columbus 
08/01/04 Albany, New York 0 0 THW 2 arrested plotting assassination of 
Pakistani diplomat 
08/01/04 New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW 2 arrested planning to bomb Penn Station 
during Republican National Convention 
08/03/04 New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW terror cell leader arrested in London for 
planning attacks on financial centers in the 
US 
03/21/05 Red Lake, 
Minnesota 
10 7 RCSI shooting at Red Lake Indian Reservation 
school 
08/01/05 Los Angeles, 
California 
0 0 THW 4 arrested plotting attacks on Los Angeles 
targets 
11/29/05 Santa Cruz, 
California 
0 4 TER-
left 
4 injured, including several children, by 
incendiary attacks by suspected animal 
rights activists 
12/05/05 Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania 
0 0 THW 1 arrested plotting attacks on refineries in 
Wyoming and New Jersey and on the 
transcontinental pipeline 
12/29/05 Toledo, Ohio 0 0 THW 3 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. military 
abroad and on domestic targets 
03/05/06 Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina 
0 9 TER-
pol 
man drives vehicle into pedestrians at the 
University of North Carolina 
04/07/06 Atlanta, Georgia 0 0 THW 2 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. Capitol 
and World Bank headquarters 
06/22/06 Chicago, Illinois 0 0 THW 7 arrested planning to bomb the Sears 
Tower 
04/01/06 New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW 1 arrested planning to bomb train tunnels 
04/28/06 Seattle, 
Washington 
1 5 TER-
pol 
gunman fires on women at the Jewish 
Federation of Greater Seattle 
09/27/06 Bailey, Colorado 2 5 RCSI hostage taking and shooting attack at high 
school 
10/02/06 Nickel Mines, 
Pennsylvania 
6 5 CRI hostage taking and shooting attack at 
Amish schoolhouse 
12/01/06 Chicago, Illinois 0 0 THW 1 arrested plotting grenade attack on 
Chicago area shopping mall 
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Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
04/16/07 Blacksburg, 
Virginia 
33 17 RCSI shooting attack at Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute 
05/09/07 Cherry Hill, New 
Jersey 
0 0 THW 6 arrested plotting armed attack on Fort 
Dix 
06/03/07 New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW 4 arrested in Trinidad plotting to bomb 
fuel pipelines near JFK airport 
08/01/07 Clinton, Michigan 0 1 RCSI radioactive source theft 
02/24/08 Los Angeles, 
California 
0 1 TER-
left 
animal rights activists attempt home 
invasion of biomedical researcher, injuring 
the researcher’s husband 
06/12/08 Columbus, Ohio 0 0 THW 1 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. and 
European targets 
04/27/08 Knoxville, 
Tennessee 
2 7 TER gunman fires on congregation at a church 
03/10/09 Alabama 11 6 RCSI multiple shootings at residences and 
businesses in Samson and Geneva, AL 
04/03/09 Binghamton, New 
York 
14 4 RCSI shooting attack at immigrant center 
04/20/09 New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW 4 arrested plotting bombing attacks on 
New York Jewish centers and attacks 
against Air National Guard aircraft 
05/31/09 Wichita, Kansas 1 0 TER-
right 
1 doctor killed (George Tiller) in shooting 
attack at Reformation Lutheran Church 
06/01/09 Little Rock, 
Arkansas 
1 1 TER-
pol 
1 Army private killed (William Long), 
second injured in shooting attack at Army 
Navy Career Center 
06/10/09 Washington, DC 1 1 TER-
right 
1 guard killed (Stephen Johns) in shooting 
attack at the Holocaust Museum 
09/11/09 Owosso, Michigan 2 0 TER-
left 
abortion protester shot and killed outside a 
school; the gunman also killed an area 
businessman 
09/23/09 Springfield, 
Illinois 
0 0 THW US citizen arrested plotting to detonate car 
bomb at the federal building in 
Springfield, IL 
09/24/09 Dallas, Texas 0 0 THW terrorist arrested planning to bomb Dallas 
Fountain Place 
10/24/09 Sudbury, 
Massachusetts 
0 0 THW 1 arrested plotting attacks on shopping 
malls and assassinations of two politicians 
11/05/09 Foot Hood, Texas 13 44 TER-
pol 
shooting attack at Soldier Readiness 
Center at Foot Hood 
12/25/09 Michigan 0 3 TER-
pol 
Yemeni terrorist attempts to detonate bomb 
on flight from Amsterdam to Detroit; bomb 
only ignites, and passengers and crew 
subdue the terrorist 
Total number of incidents: 60. Total dead: 3117; Total injured: 9054 
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Appendix F: Incidents during the Presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2016) 
Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
03/18/10 Austin, Texas 2 13 TER suicide crash of small plane into federal 
office building 
04/04/10 Alexandria, 
Virginia 
1 2 TER shooting at gate outside Pentagon; gunman 
killed 
05/01/10 New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW failed car bombing in Times Square by 
Pakistani terrorists 
06/12/10 Anchorage, Alaska 0 0 THW 2 arrested plotting mail bomb 
assassinations 
09/01/10 Silver Spring, 
Maryland 
1 0 TER 3 hostages held by gunman at Discovery 
Communications headquarters; gunman 
killed by police 
09/17/10 Washington, DC 0 1 THW attempted shooting at Capitol Hill; 
gunman shot and injured by guards 
10/10/10 Washington, DC 0 0 THW Pakistani-American arrested plotting 
bombing attack on Washington subway 
11/04/10 Portland, Oregon 0 0 THW 1 arrested plotting bombing at Christmas 
tree lighting ceremony in Portland 
12/07/10 Maryland 0 0 THW 1 arrested plotting bombing of military 
recruiting center 
01/08/11 Tucson, Arizona 6 13 TER Jared L. Loughnershooting attack at 
political event at a supermarket; U.S. 
District Judge John Roll and five others 
were killed; U.S. Representative Gabrielle 
Giffords and 12 others wounded  
03/07/11 Lubbock, Texas 0 0 THW 1 arrested plotting bombings of domestic 
targets 
05/10/11 New York City, 
New York 
0 0 THW 2 arrested plotting attacks on a Manhattan 
synagogue 
06/08/11 Seattle, 
Washington 
0 0 THW 2 arrested plotting attack on Seattle 
military recruiting station 
04/27/11 Killeen, Texas 0 0 THW thwarted attempt to attack restaurant near 
Fort Hood with bombing and shooting 
attack; Naser Abdo arrested 
09/06/11 Carson City, 
Nevada 
5 7 RCSI shooting attack at restaurant, killing 4 (2 
died immediately, 2 died later of injuries) 
and injuring 7 others; casualties included 3 
Nevada National Guard soldiers killed and 
2 injured; gunman also died of self-
inflicted wounds 
04/20/12 Aurora, Colorado 12 58 RCSI shooting attack at movie theater; suspect 
was arrested afterwards; suspect had 
booby-trapped his nearby apartment with 
explosives which were successfully 
disarmed by police 
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08/05/12 Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin 
7 4 TER-
right 
6 killed, 4 injured in shooting attack at a 
Sikh temple shortly before worship service 
on Sunday morning; one of those injured 
was a police officer, another was president 
of the temple; the gunman was shot and 
killed at the scene by police 
08/14/12 LaPlace, Louisiana 2 4 TER 2 police officers killed, 1 injured while 
investigating attack that injured another 
officer; 7 arrested, 2 of whom were injured 
in the shootout; several of those arrested 
had ties to the sovereign citizen movement 
08/15/12 Washington, DC 0 1 TER-
left 
1 guard shot and injured while subduing 
gunman at Family Research Council 
offices 
12/14/12 Newtown, 
Connecticut 
28 3 RCSI shooting attack at elementary school kills 
20 children and 6 adults; shooter killed 
himself and had killed his mother earlier 
that day 
03/15/13 Boston, 
Massachusetts 
3 264 TER-
pol 
two bombings at Boston Marathon kill 3 
(including 1 child) and injure 183 
(including 8 children) 
04/17/13 Washington, DC 0 0 THW two letters testing positive for ricin mailed 
to Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker and 
President Obama are found at mail 
screening facilities; a third letter to an 
official in Mississippi was awaiting 
testing; an individual in Mississippi is 
arrested and charged in the case 
04/19/13 Watertown, 
Massachusetts 
2 2 TER-
pol 
1 police officer killed, one injured during 
manhunt for the Boston Marathon 
bombers; one terrorist killed and one 
injured and captured 
05/12/13 New Orleans, 
Louisiana 
0 19 RCSI two gunmen fired on crowds at Mother’s 
Day parade; 19 injured, including 2 
children 
09/16/13 Washington, DC 13 3 RCSI shooting attack at Washington Navy Yard 
11/01/13 Los Angeles, CA 1 7 TER shooting attack at Los Angeles 
International Airport; 1 TSA officer killed, 
2 TSA officers and several civilians 
injured 
04/01/14 Fort Hood, Texas 4 16 RCSI shooting attack on Fort Hood; 3 killed, 16 
injured; in addition, the gunman killed 
himself 
04/13/14 Overland Park, 
Kansas 
3 0 TER-
right 
shooting attack at a Jewish community 
center and Jewish retirement home; 3 
killed, including one teenager 
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04/27/14 Skyway, 
Washington 
1 0 TER-
pol 
shooting attack killed 1 
06/01/14 Seattle, 
Washington 
2 0 TER-
pol 
shooting attack near night club killed 2 
06/08/14 Las Vegas, 
Nevada 
5 0 TER-
right 
shooting attack at restaurant and store; 3 
killed, including 2 police officers; both 
shooters killed themselves 
06/25/14 East Orange, New 
Jersey 
1 0 TER-
pol 
shooting attack killed 1 teenager 
09/12/14 Blooming Grove, 
Pennsylvania 
1 1 TER-
right 
shooting attack on police officers; shooter 
evaded a manhunt in nearby woods until 
30 Oct 
09/25/14 Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma 
1 2 TER-
pol 
knife attack at food processing plant killed 
1, injured 1; attacker was shot and injured 
10/23/14 New York City, 
New York 
1 3 TER-
pol 
axe attack on police officers injured 2, one 
severely; police shot and killed the attacker 
and injured one bystander 
11/28/14 Austin, Texas 1 0 TER shots fired at Mexican consulate, US 
courthouse, and police station during early 
morning hours; failed attempt at arson at 
consulate; attacker was shot at by police 
12/20/14 New York City, 
New York 
3 0 TER shooting attack killed two police officers, 
gunman shot and killed himself 
05/03/15 Garland, Texas 2 1 TER-
pol 
attempted shooting attack at event 
involving art critical of Islam, one guard 
shot and injured 
06/17/15 Charleston, South 
Carolina 
9 1 TER-
right 
gunman killed 9 in attack at Emanuel 
African Methodist Episcopal Church on a 
Bible study group; South Carolina state 
congressman among those killed; 1 injured 
04/16/15 Chattanooga, 
Tennessee 
6 2 TER-
pol 
gunman killed 4 Marines and injures 1 
Navy sailor (who died 18 Jul of injuries), 1 
police officer, and 1 Marine, at two 
locations; gunman was shot and killed by 
police 
11/04/15 Merced, California 1 4 TER-
pol 
student stabbed two students and two staff 
at the University of California; attacker 
was shot and killed by police 
11/27/15 Colorado Springs, 
Colorado 
3 9 TER-
right 
gunman killed two civilians and one police 
officer outside a Planned Parenthood 
clinic, also injuring 4 civilians and 5 police 
officers 
12/03/15 San Bernardino, 
California 
16 23 TER-
pol 
two attackers killed 14 and injured 21 at a 
county employee meeting and Christmas 
party; 
01/01/16 Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
0 2 TER-
pol 
gunman shot and injured a police officer; 
attacker was shot and injured 
287 
 
Date Location Killed Inj. TER Description 
02/11/16 Columbus, Ohio 1 4 TER-
pol 
attacker injured 4 in machete attack at a 
restaurant 
06/12/16 Orlando, Florida 50 53 TER-
pol 
shooting attack at nightclub 
04/07/16 Bristol, Tennessee 1 3 TER-
left 
shooting attack killed one civilian, injured 
one police officer and three civilians 
04/07/16 Dallas, Texas 5 9 TER-
left 
sniper attack killed 5 police officers, 
injured 8 police officers and two civilians 
at protest rally 
Total number of incidents: 48. Total dead: 200; Total injured: 534 
